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Nature has surrounded Lake Superior with 
immense and valuable forests, and has placed 
near its shores rich lodes of copper and, in the 
famed Mesabi Range, the world's largest and 
most accessible deposits of iron ore. But Na­
ture has also, by some quirk of geology and 
accident of geography, caused Lake Superior 
to have an elevation twenty-one feet higher 
than that of Lake Huron, into which it flows, 
and has connected the two by a river that, 
though sixty-three miles in over-all length, 
completes the drop in elevation in a stretch of 
precipitous rapids three-fourths of a mile long 
and a quarter of a mile wide, down which 
rushes 74,000 cubic feet of water per second as 
Superior races into Huron. The story of the 
construction of a bypass to this formidable 
natural barrier to the free passage of raw mate­
rials from the American Midwest to the great 
commercial centers of the eastern United 
States and beyond is the subject of this reveal­
ing and entertaining book. 
Traders who visited the area that the French 
had dubbed the Sault Ste. Marie had, as early 
as the eighteenth century, discerned the need 
to build a canal to circumvent the falls in the 
St. Mary's River, and one, of a sort, was 
indeed already in operation in the days of 
George Washington. A far more efficient 
waterway than this primitive expedient was 
clearly required, however, if the iron ore so 
abundant in Minnesota and Michigan was to 
join the coal and limestone of Ohio and Penn­
sylvania in the mills and furnaces surrounding 
the lower Great Lakes; and in 1853, after years 
of legislative haggling and political maneuver­
ing, construction of the St. Mary's Falls Canal 
was at last to begin. Two years later, on June 
18, 1855, in the wake of labor disputes, epi­
demics, scandals, lawsuits, jeopardized 
careers, disrupted schedules, and constant 
financial difficulties, the steamship Illinois 
(Continued on back flap) 
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Foreword

As in the affairs of men, there is an element of chance in the natural 
geography of our earth that can be favorable, or fatal, or merely 
adverse to man's use of his environment. Geologic chance 
surrounded Lake Superior with immense and valuable forests and 
placed near its shores rich lodes of copper and the world's largest 
and most accessible iron ore deposit, in the famed Mesabi Range. In 
the modern era a once unlikely resource, billions of tons of granitic 
rock yielding tiny particles of embedded iron, has given rise to the 
multibillion-dollar business of taconite extraction, now basic to the 
steel economy of Canada and the United States. 
A quirk of geology and geography caused Lake Superior to have 
an elevation twenty-one feet higher than the level of Lake Huron, 
into which Superior flows. The two lakes are connected by the St. 
Mary's River. Another accident of nature caused this river not to 
flow by a gradual gradient over its sixty-three mile length (or 
seventy-five miles by the longest measurement of another channel). 
The drop occurs in a precipitous rapids, in a stretch of water only 
three-fourths of a mile long and a quarter of a mile wide, where the 
74,000 cubic feet per second flow of Lake Superior hurtles toward 
Lake Huron in a welter of rock ledges and turbulent water that no 
canoe or ship could traverse. 
These quirks of geology, geography, and hydrology have had 
enormous political, economic, and engineering consequences, 
which in turn led to the writing of this treatise by Dr. John N. 
Dickinson, whose research has added much to the literature of the 
phenomenon of Sault Ste. Marie. 
The early French explorers called the connecting river between 
the lakes St. Mary's River (Ste. Marie in French). What we call the 
falls or rapids of the St. Mary's River the French identified as "Sault 
xii FOREWORD 
Ste. Marie." The literal translation of the French word sault is jump; 
thus did the French fur traders identify the need for their early 
flotillas of canoes or bateaux to make the "jump" up and over (or 
down and over) the stretch of white water that neither they nor the 
Indians could overcome except by portaging around it. 
As the French trade routes became established, reaching from 
Lake Superior and western Canada all the way back to Montreal, 
the early Jesuits devised a timber flume to facilitate the dragging of 
boats and cargo around the white water of the Sault. In 1797 the 
North West Company, trade concessionaire for the region, built the 
first lock on the Canadian side of the rapids. It was thirty-eight feet 
long and nine feet wide, and had a lift of nine feet and a draft of 
thirty inches. It served for seventeen years, until destroyed by 
American troops in 1814 on one of the American incursions of the 
War of 1812. This lock, which disappeared, was not rebuilt; and its 
foundations were not rediscovered until 1889, seventy-five years 
later. 
After 1814 the portage process around the Sault Ste. Marie rapids 
had to be resumed if Lake Superior was to be linked with the other 
four lakes. In 1825 the opening of the Erie Canal brought flood tides 
of settlers and immigrants over the lakes to the rich new territories of 
Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. In addition to wheat, 
timber, and furs, rich lodes of copper and iron had been located in 
the Superior region. With trade and population blossoming, and 
with Lakes Erie, Huron, and Michigan burgeoning economically, 
Lake Superior still lay inaccessible, twenty-one feet higher than 
Huron and with no solution to that three-quarter-mile stretch of 
white water. 
Steam vessels succeeded the canoe and the bateau and began to 
overtake the schooner. In 1827 the first steamer, the Henry Clay, 
reached the St. Mary's River but could go no farther. Aboard it were 
General Lewis Cass, soon to be governor of Michigan, and General 
Winfield Scott, later to achieve fame as "Old Fuss and Feathers" in 
the war with Mexico and as chief of staff of the U. S. Army at the 
beginning of the Civil War. They were en route to inspect the forts 
west of Lake Michigan. Cargo from the Clay, and from other ships 
of the era, was unloaded and portaged around the rapids to the ships 
available for Lake Superior navigation. 
With the phenomenal success of the Erie Canal and the 
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blossoming of the new western territories, there developed a classic 
case in the history of American political confrontations. As in the 
recent example of the St. Lawrence Seaway, the eastern "establish­
ment" of ports and trade centers feared loss of population as well as 
economic competition from the new territories. Plank roads and 
canals were wanted everywhere in this prerailroad era, and federal 
aid was sought as avidly then as now. 
For several decades the "Doctrine of Internal Improvements" was 
the battleground in Congress between East and West. It was finally 
resolved when Congress began to appropriate monies to improve 
the harbors of pioneer cities on the lakes and to grant lands as well as 
money for a variety of public improvements. The craze for local 
canals and plank roads collapsed as rails reached the West in the 
1850s. 
A towering figure on the federal political scene for decades was 
Henry Clay (1777-1852). Lawyer and professor, he became Speaker 
of the House and a several-time candidate for president, but 
achieved his greatest fame as U. S. senator from Kentucky. A 
principal architect of the Missouri Compromise, he is identified as 
"The Great Compromiser." However, he could be singularly 
uncompromising. As a leading "War Hawk," he was instrumental in 
forcing war with Great Britain in 1812, and boasted that the militia 
forces of Kentucky could conquer Canada by themselves. 
In 1837 Governor S. T. Mason of the newly admitted state of 
Michigan urged his new legislature to approve a passage for ships 
around the falls of the St. Mary's River. Since the new frontier state 
had meager resources, it sought federal assistance, and the proposed 
locks and canal became a subject of congressional debate. 
As a westerner, Clay generally supported "internal im­
provements," but he took a strong stand against the Michigan canal 
project. Apparently not impressed that the first steamer to reach the 
St. Mary's River had borne his name, in 1840 he rose to new heights 
of uncompromising opposition when he described the proposed 
lock and canal as "a work beyond the remotest settlement of the 
United States, if not the moon." Another great western American, 
Senator Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri, rebutted Clay by stating 
that the object was "not just a good one, but a great one." Clay's 
memory is tarnished by his lack of vision, and his quote about the 
moon is a landmark in the literature of the lakes. The canal he 
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opposed so vehemently became within a single generation the 
world's busiest ship canal. 
President Millard Fillmore in 1852 signed a federal authorization 
bill calling for a canal at least 100 feet wide and 12 feet deep, with a 
lock or locks at least 250 feet long and 60 feet wide. Given the ship 
sizes of that era, these were reasonably imaginative dimensions. 
Details of the bill are not at hand, but apparently it had been agreed 
that the state would build the canal through its Canal Commission. 
The state's vision was broader, and its action called for lock sizes not 
less than 350 by 70 feet. 
Whatever the politics may have been, the right man appeared at 
the critical moment. A Fairbanks Scales salesman, Charles T. 
Harvey, helped form the St. Mary's Falls Ship Canal Company, 
which received the contract from the Michigan government. Harvey 
had seen with frustration the ships from Lake Superior unloaded, 
their cargoes portaged and laboriously reloaded into schooners and 
steamers, and all commerce frustrated by a short space of white 
water. The "Harvey locks" have been the principal interest of Dr. 
Dickinson, as evidenced by this new book. 
The first iron ore cargo from Lake Superior passed through in the 
trim brigantine Columbia on 14 August 1855, consigned to 
Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Company, which to this day continues to 
remove Superior ore. The steamer S.S. Illinois was the first vessel 
into the locks on 18 June 1855. 
Originally a toll canal (at four cents per ton), the Sault continued 
under state ownership and operation until 1881. By then it was clear 
that the route was of national importance and that the state 
probably could not finance needed expansion. Title was conveyed to 
the United States government, and Congress assigned jurisdiction 
to the Corps of Engineers on a toll-free basis. New and larger locks 
were successively completed in 1881, 1896, 1914, 1919, 1943, and 
1969. The original state locks were removed. In 1895 the Canadian 
lock, 900 feet long, was built on the north side of the rapids. Less 
than 17 feet deep, it has had limited use, and the American locks and 
canal have served the bulk of the commerce. 
In World War II the Sault locks were aptly described as "the 
jugular vein of the Allied War effort." More than 100 million tons of 
iron ore per year poured from the Mesabi Range eastward and 
southward to steel mills and factories producing the ships, trucks, 
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aircraft, and supplies that were to defeat the Axis powers. The war 
efforts of Canada and the United States, and the gigantic lend-lease 
aid to allies, were based upon steel production. At one period, 
unknown to the public, the Sault Ste. Marie area was the most 
heavily defended spot in North America. New fighter airfields were 
built; many batteries of the most modern anti-aircraft artillery were 
stationed; and flotillas of barrage balloons floated over the Sault as 
they did over London. The fear was that Germany might develop a 
long-range bomber to penetrate the region and to blast the locks out 
of service. 
Another giant effort was the building of the MacArthur lock 
under forced draft conditions, at the height of the war, to increase 
and enhance the vital iron ore flow. Completed in 1943, it was 800 
feet long, 80 feet wide, and 31 feet deep, substantially the same as the 
Welland locks and future Seaway locks. 
In 1969 the completion of a new Poe Lock, 1,200 feet long, 110 
feet wide, and 32 feet deep, gave birth to the newest economic and 
transport phenomenon of the lakes—the thousand-foot bulk 
carrier. Landlocked in the upper four lakes and too large to transit 
Welland or Seaway locks, a growing fleet of these fresh-water 
leviathans is reshaping the economics and the hardware of lake 
shipping. Proposals for larger and deeper locks to accommodate 
even larger lake vessels have been advanced and are being studied. 
Primarily serving the basic bulk cargo flows of the lakes region— 
ore, grain, coal, stone, and oil—the Sault waterway is also reflective 
of other trade routes. For example, in 1975, a year of moderate 
volume, it served 63.4 million tons of domestic Great Lakes cargo, 
over 8.6 million tons of cargo to and from Canada, and nearly 3.0 
million tons of Seaway shipping, for a grand total of 75.2 million 
tons. There were 146,000 passengers by water, and 3,774 ships were 
locked through. The ships were fewer and larger— 1,700 of them had 
drafts of twenty-six feet or more. 
A waterways convention held at Sault Ste. Marie in 1887 noted 
that the building of the Suez Canal had cost $92 million; that the 
Sault canals had cost little more than $3 million; and that "Soo [sic] 
was serving a larger commerce than Suez." When the Sault tonnages 
began to pass the 100-million-ton mark per year, it was frequently 
boasted that the Sault handled more tons of commerce in given 
years than the Panama, Suez, and Kiel canals combined. In 1953 a 
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record 128 million tons of ore, coal, grain, and other traffic used the 
Sault locks and canal. For the ten years 1945-54, tonnage averaged 
107,300,000 tons per year, or over a billion tons in a decade. 
The richest agricultural and industrial region of the world and a 
huge concentration of people are found in and around the Great 
Lakes. Ships from the oceans are lifted 602 feet from sea level to 
Lake Superior by the vast engineering works of the St. Lawrence 
Seaway, the Welland Canal, and the Sault locks. Of that 
tremendous lift, only 21 feet are accomplished at Sault Ste. Marie, 
but this is one of the most crucial small measurements in global 
history and in the economics of a continent. To the original builders, 
and to all the later engineers or navigators who enlarged upon their 
phenomenal achievement, the people of Canada and the United 
States, and even of the world, must be profoundly grateful. 
HARRY C. BROCKEL 
Center for Great Lakes Studies 
University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee 
Preface

It would be hard to exaggerate the economic importance of the St. 
Mary's Falls Canal, through which the vast mineral resources of the 
Lake Superior country move to mills and furnaces on the lower 
lakes. Linked to the coal and limestone of Ohio and Pennsylvania, 
these resources energized an industrial development undreamed of 
before the Civil War. From a nation with a multiplicity of small 
enterprises in 1860, an industrial giant would grow. It is strange, 
therefore, that there has not been a complete history of the 
construction of this important canal. 
The only scholarly works published to date and devoted 
exclusively to the canal are an article and a book chapter by the 
Indiana University historian Irene D. Neu. Dr. Neu began her work 
in this field with her Cornell University dissertation, "A Business 
Biography of Erastus Corning," which she subsequently expanded 
into a book, Erastus Corning, Merchant and Financier, 1794-1872 
(Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1960). Her article, "The Building 
of the Sault Canal: 1852-1855," was published in the Journal of 
American History 40 (June 1953), and is far from comprehensive. 
Her book chapter, in The Frontier in American Development: 
Essays in Honor of Paul Wallace Gates (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1969), is primarily concerned with the disposition of the 
Michigan mineral lands owned by the Canal Company. A Michigan 
state senator, Otto Fowle, set out to write the entire history of the 
Sault area but died before he could complete the story of the canal. 
Another history, published in Joint Documents of the State of 
Michigan in 1887, is incomplete and filled with errors. 
A number of questions should be asked. How was the canal a part 
of a vast number of engineering and commercial undertakings 
essential to the development of the American economy? What were 
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the interactions between the forces interested in seeing a canal built 
and the rest of the country? What was the nature of the pressure 
brought upon Congress for the authorization of the canal? What 
were the relations among federal and state governments and private 
corporations during the building process? Who actually had the 
responsibility for the design and construction of the canal? Was the 
work honestly done? Were there any significant innovations in 
design? How was the project financed? What were the rewards to the 
contracting party? 
No place on earth, including Michilimackinac, has had more 
forms and combinations of spellings than has the Sault. The citizens 
of the area dislike "Soo," even though a railroad has adopted that 
name. They dislike even more the sex transformation to "Sault St. 
Marie." "St. Mary" is correct for the river, and it is proper to speak 
of the "rapids of the St. Mary's River." However, it is just as 
incorrect to write of the "rapids of Sault Ste. Marie" as it is to write 
of the "Rio Grande River" or "Bull Run Creek." The characters of 
my story make all these mistakes and more. I have chosen to use 
their own terms and not to clutter the text with "s/cs." 
I have used the old-fashioned term rail road to indicate rails 
spiked to a plank road with animals furnishing the power. The term 
railroad is used in the modern sense. 
All survey ranges cited in the text are indexed to the Michigan 
prime meridian, which by happy coincidence runs through Sault 
Ste. Marie. Thus the reader can estimate the approximate distance 
in miles east or west of the canal by multiplying the range number by 
six. 
I wish to express my appreciation to a Miami University 
colleague, Professor John L. Thompson of the Department of 
Geography, who aided in the presentation of the cartographic 
material. The manuscript was prepared through grants from the 
Miami University Faculty Research Committee and the Miami 
University Office of Development. 
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1 The Years of Frustration 1839-1850 
Of the five Great Lakes, all but one have retained their Indian 
names. The exception is the largest, which the French explorers 
called simply Lake Superior—the upper lake. It is "upper" in the 
sense of being farthest north as well as in having an elevation 
approximately twenty-two feet above that of Lakes Huron and 
Michigan. Most of the twenty-two-foot fall occurs in one mile of the 
forty-mile course of the St. Mary's River, and it is estimated that 
some five million cubic feet of water flow past Sault Ste. Marie every 
minute. A formidable barrier it would be, effectively isolating the 
upper lake, were it not for the famous canal and locks that constitute 
the vital link. 
Eighteenth-century traders first recognized the need, and a Sault 
canal—of sorts—was already in operation in the days of George 
Washington. Its builder, Scottish trader Simon McTavish, had 
formed the North West Company in 1783 to deal in furs, and the 
company maintained a post on the American side of the St. Mary's 
River. After the American Revolution, McTavish crossed the river 
and built his canal in 1797. It was little more than a ditch with a 
diminutive lock, but it served the canoes and bateaux of the North 
West Company for many years until its destruction in 1814 by an 
armed band of Americans. Its very existence was then forgotten for 
over seventy years until it was rediscovered in 1889. By then, 
however, canal builders of broader vision and greater means had 
come to Michigan.1 
No account of the building of the Sault canal can begin without 
brief reference to the still-changing geology of the Great Lakes. The 
present form of Lake Superior probably developed about 2,300 
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years ago; before that time Lakes Superior, Michigan, and Huron 
were on the same level. A constant process of uplift subsequently 
raised the outlet of Lake Superior about six feet, while at the same 
time the Detroit River found a new and more easily eroded channel 
permitting a greater flow out of Lake Huron and Lake Michigan 
and so lowering the level of both about sixteen feet.2 
The geology of the Sault area is more difficult to describe, 
primarily because geologists usually indicate the St. Mary's River as 
the southern limit of the great Canadian granite shield. The eminent 
geologist Charles Van Hise thought that the boundary occurred five 
miles north of the river. The surface of the shield descends beneath 
the soft sandstone deposits of the glacial age, a fact of great 
importance for a canal builder intending to excavate in the area. 
Whereas the sandstone would be easy enough to remove, the granite 
underneath it would present a much more serious and expensive 
problem. This information was available to the canal diggers of the 
1850s; the annual report of the Michigan state geologist in 1841 
noted the extent of red sandstone in the Sault area and warned that 
it rested on primary rock. Unfortunately the warning was not 
heeded by the impatient builders of the Sault canal.3 
The Superior District was a wild and desolate place when 
Michigan obtained statehood in 1837. The lake itself deserved the 
description attributed to La Hontan—"an ocean in a storm, 
sculptured in granite." Inaccessible though the area was, its 
resources were not unknown, and in 1839 Michigan made plans to 
build a canal and petitioned Congress for a grant of either cash or 
land to aid the project. A select committee of the Michigan House of 
Representatives advised that the time was ripe to build and 
suggested that the job should be completed in one summer, since it 
would be too expensive to keep a labor force at the Sault through the 
winter. At the same time the Michigan Senate made an invidious 
comparison with federal grants made to Ohio for internal 
improvements: Ohio had received 1,511,555 acres, and Michigan 
only 124,800. The petition to Congress also cited the economic loss 
that the nation would presumably suffer if a canal were not built at 
Sault Ste. Marie.4 
If the petition failed, Michigan was prepared to build the canal as 
a state project. In the summer of 1837, John Almy, a Michigan 
engineer, traveled to the Sault at the request of the legislature to see 
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what could be done. Almy had some minor experience in Michigan 
canal work. In 1835 he had designed the canal and lock around the 
falls of the Grand River, a project about one mile in length with a 
drop of three feet. At the Sault, Almy proposed to build three locks, 
each 100 feet long and 32 feet wide. There would be a basin for ships 
to pass between each pair of locks. The canal itself would be 75 feet 
wide and 10 feet deep. Almy estimated that the cost of building such 
a canal would be $112,544. With Almy's report in hand, the 
Michigan legislature appropriated $25,000 to begin construction. 
In September of 1838 the Buffalo firm of Smith and Driggs 
entered into a contract with the state to construct a canal, the work 
to commence the next year. Almy became chief engineer on the 
River Improvements and Sault Ste. Marie Canal Project, as it was 
called, and it seemed that Michigan would at least make a start 
toward eliminating the impasse between Lake Superior and the 
lower Great Lakes. However, the project was never implemented. 
According to Almy's plan the canal would have intersected, and 
thus destroyed, the army's millrace at Fort Brady. The race, under 
the protection of the fort's commanding officer, provided power for 
the post's small sawmill. Acting under instructions from his 
superiors in Washington, the officer and his men evicted the canal 
workers from the premises on 13 May 1839. Nothing further was 
done, and recriminations between Washington and Michigan lasted 
for months. It remained to be seen if Congress would respond with 
land or money to the petition of the Michigan legislature.5 
Several months after the fiasco at Fort Brady, Senator John 
Norvell decided to launch the first major drive for federal aid to 
build a Sault canal. Norvell was the senior of Michigan's three 
members in Congress. A Democrat, he had served Michigan in the 
Senate since the state's admission into the Union. He considered 
Detroit to be his home and had been its postmaster when Michigan 
was still a territory.6 
Norvell's efforts in the Twenty-fifth Congress to obtain a land 
grant had not reached second reading before Congress adjourned. 
Impressed with the need for an early start in the Twenty-sixth 
Congress, Norvell announced his intentions on the first day that the 
Senate sat for business. He would ask the Senate Committee on the 
Public Land to report a bill granting 100,000 acres to Michigan to 
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finance a canal. Although his Senate colleague from Michigan, 
Augustus Porter, had not yet arrived to lend support, Norvell spoke 
from a stronger position than he had held in the previous Congress. 
Senator William Allen of Ohio had moved up to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, and Norvell took Allen's place on the five-man 
Committee on the Public Land. Thus on 31 December 1839 Norvell 
saw his canal bill referred to his own committee. Three days later the 
committee reported the bill to the Senate without amendment.7 
Clear sailing for the bill continued, as the Senate debate on the 
second reading revealed little opposition. Norvell defended his ideas 
briefly. This was to be exclusively a state work, and Michigan was 
not asking for one cent to aid any corporation or monopoly. Norvell 
would agree to an amendment to assure that the state would be the 
sole owner of the canal. As for the need for the canal, Norvell cited 
only the general commerce of the Northwest and the fishing industry 
of Lake Superior. He estimated the cost of the canal at $125,000 if 
built to accommodate sailing ships only, or $250,000 if constructed 
for steamships. His physical description of the canal followed the 
1837 design of Almy, although he increased the cost estimate 
slightly. 
Other senators came forward as friends of the canal project. 
Missouri Senator Thomas Hart Benton said that the object was not 
just a good one but a great one, and likened Lake Superior to the 
Caspian Sea. Senator John Henderson of Mississippi praised the 
purpose of the measure, asking only that the land granted not be 
sold at less than the minimum price of the rest of the public land as 
established by Congress. Norvell agreed to an amendment to this 
effect, and the Senate ordered the bill engrossed.8 
Three days later progress came to a temporary halt. At the call for 
the yeas and nays for final passage, Henry Clay objected. According 
to Clay, the Senate was about to vote away a vast quantity of the 
public domain without hearing a single word in favor of the bill or 
the canal. This nettled Norvell, who observed that if Clay had been 
on the floor of the Senate during the second reading he would have 
heard enough. However, Norvell agreed to a postponement, and 
anticipated a further attack from Clay.9 
The Senate considered the bill briefly on 14 April, and the canal 
forces picked up the support of Ohio's Allen and Benjamin Tappan. 
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John J. Crittenden of Kentucky joined Clay in opposition. The 
Senate approved two more amendments, but again the measure was 
set aside. 
The major debate took place on 21 April, with Michigan's 
Senator Augustus Porter participating for the first time. Like 
Norvell, Porter lived in Detroit. He had been a member of the Sen­
ate only three months, but he was a Whig and thus a good man to 
answer Clay. Porter began his statement with reference to a national 
community-of-interest thesis. The canal would be of great value to 
Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and New York as well as to 
Michigan, which would share with the others the benefits of 
increased trade. As to the nature of this trade, Porter cited the great 
potential in the whitefish industry. He also mentioned the fur 
industry and made some reference to mineral deposits that had been 
reported by tourists. 
Porter then turned to the engineering study made by Almy, with 
whom he claimed a personal friendship. Although he asserted that 
no serious difficulties would be encountered in building the canal 
since the rocks would not require blasting, Porter at the same time 
unwittingly sent up a warning signal that any geologist would have 
read at once. Near the canal, he noted, were large masses of granite, 
so the cost of hauling backing stone for the masonry locks would be 
minimal. A geologist, hearing this, would have considered the 
possibility—or probability—of granite under the canal route that 
would indeed require blasting. Almy's map indicated only 
sedimentary red sandstone, but the warning existed nevertheless for 
those alert enough to see the danger.10 
Clay then moved to the attack. A canal at the Sault, he declared, 
would be about as useful as a canal on the moon. He denounced the 
project as premature and asked why grants should be given to 
Michigan, with a population of only two or three hundred 
thousand, just because similar grants had been made to Ohio, with a 
population of two million. Clay not only rejected for the time being 
the national community-of-interest argument but also erred on his 
population figures; Ohio did not have a population of two million 
when it received land grants in 1827-28. South Carolina's William 
C. Preston joined Clay in opposition, challenging the data, surveys, 
and estimates. He called the Upper Peninsula "terra incognita" and 
feared the revival of a vast program of internal improvements. 
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Preston weakened his case when he denounced the bill for its failure 
to follow the usual system of railroad and canal land grants. 
Although the bill did not provide that alternate sections of land be 
granted along the canal route, such a proposal would have been 
ridiculous for a canal one mile in length. Crittenden, in his criticism 
of the bill, proved to be much more farsighted; he was sure that 
within a few years another 100,000 acres would be needed to 
complete the project.11 
Norvell, in summarizing his defense of the proposal, first 
reiterated the national community-of-interest argument. The 
federal government would have free use of the canal, and a fleet 
could be placed on Lake Superior in the event of war with Great 
Britain. Moreover, the undertaking would develop and cultivate the 
resources of a vast region, much as the Erie Canal had brought 
prosperity to areas far from its actual route. The proposed canal 
would make available an enormous supply of ship's timber, for 
example, to replace the New England supply when this should be 
exhausted. 
Norvell then proceeded to refute Preston's arguments. He 
suggested that the states' rights defenders should be more consistent, 
pointing out that the project had been conceived, designed, and 
finally launched in May 1839 by Michigan alone, without federal 
help. There was to be no partnership between Michigan and the 
United States. Finally, Norvell derided the alternate section plan for 
its obvious lack of practicality.12 
To the backers of the canal it seemed likely that the bill would 
pass the Senate. Since the measure had been amended twice after 
engrossment, a clean copy would be needed. Tappan of Ohio, a 
supporter of the bill, moved to recommit to the Committee on the 
Public Land. Nine days later the committee reported the bill out in 
its clean form, and the Senate passed it without further debate. It 
was a pathfinding victory for Norvell.13 
Unfortunately for the canal supporters, the bill progressed no 
further. House management should have been in the hands of 
Michigan's Isaac Crary. He had served as a Democratic con­
gressman since Michigan's admission to the Union and, as a 
member of the House Committee on the Public Land, held the same 
position of strength in the House that Norvell did in the Senate. 
However, Crary was not nearly as effective as Norvell. With his 
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home in inland Marshall, he lacked the "Great Lakes outlook" of 
the two senators from Detroit. In his one speech in support of the 
canal, he gave lip service to harbor improvement but seemed to be 
more interested in road development in the interior. Even here he 
was ineffective, for he foolishly disgressed with an irrelevant attack 
on William Harrison's conduct of the Battle of Tippecanoe. 
Naturally this evoked a Whiggish outcry in the House, and Crary 
was almost forced to surrender the floor. His point, if he had one, 
was lost. Canal prospects suffered from his ineptitude, and the 
House Committee on the Public Land failed to report the canal bill 
to the full House.14 
Despite Crary's failure, congressional canal backers gained some 
ground. They learned that they could win support from the other 
Great Lakes states, as well as from the lower Mississippi area, 
through the community-of-interest approach. They need only wait 
for a more propitious time. They did not realize that they would 
have to wait twelve years. 
Meanwhile, despite the local setback at the Sault and the 
condition of the economy in general, Michigan renewed its petitions 
for federal aid. In 1840, as the state legislature contemplated the 
abandonment of state-supported internal improvement projects, a 
select committee of the House of Representatives continued to 
advocate the building of the canal, citing the immense forests of pine 
timber, the profitable fishing industry, the creation of a Superior 
District market for farm crops, the rich fur trade, and the 
desirability of counterbalancing British influence with the Indians 
through an increased American population on Lake Superior. 
Finally, the committee noted the presence of copper ore—but again 
displayed a lack of knowledge of Superior District geology in its 
conviction that the copper was "situated at the bottom of a most 
safe, commodious, and beautiful harbor." The legislature then 
passed a memorial to Congress asking for land, money, or both to 
build the canal. Copies were sent to the legislatures of New York, 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois.15 
Michigan repeated such petitions at various intervals. The 
memorial signed by Governor John S. Barry in 1843 stressed the 
community-of-interest thesis: "The construction of the canal 
around the falls of the St. Mary's River, is deemed to be of the 
utmost importance, not only to this state but to all lake states." 
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Again the petition was sent not only to Washington but also to the 
several Great Lakes state legislatures and to the legislature of the 
Territory of "Wiskonsan" as well. Much the same message was 
repeated in 1844 and 1848.16 
Developments in the Superior District in the 1840s did much to 
sustain the Michigan petitions and to reverse Clay's contention that 
the area might just as well be located on the moon. For about six 
years a copper fever raged in the land, and though it was by no 
means as virulent as the California gold fever that followed, it did 
much to attract attention and people to the area. Most of the early 
mining ventures were disastrous failures, but just enough succeeded 
to offer hope for others. For example, the successful Pittsburgh and 
Boston Mining Company paid its first dividend of $60,000 in 1849, 
and a few others were not far behind. It is difficult to estimate the 
number of miners and speculators who went to the Superior District 
between 1841 and 1847, but by 1845 fourteen companies were 
actively engaged in mining near Copper Harbor, and others were 
being organized. By 1844 the War Department established Fort 
Wilkins at Copper Harbor, manned by two companies of the Fifth 
United States Infantry.17 
In the roadless district the little mining communities had to 
depend upon lake shipping to obtain supplies and to haul copper to 
Sault Ste. Marie. With the utmost difficulty workers hauled two 
brigs, the Astor and the Algonquin, around the impasse at the Sault 
and set them afloat on Lake Superior. On 19 September 1844 a 
storm destroyed the Astor. The War Department immediately 
chartered the Algonquin to sustain the men at Fort Wilkins, leaving 
the mining community to fend for itself. Shipping owners relieved 
the shortage in 1845, as the brigs Ocean and Merchant were hauled 
on rollers around the Sault. In the same year shipper Sheldon 
McKnight built the large schooner Napoleon on Lake Superior. The 
latter, accused of rolling enough to pick up fish in her smoke stack, 
would receive a steam engine in 1848. Finally, in an effort that took 
seven weeks, the steamer Independence, with a 365-ton capacity, 
was portaged around the rapids. By the end of 1845 the total 
tonnage on Lake Superior reached 635. As a result there were new 
demands on Congress for a canal.18 
In 1846 the Superior District gained a new canal champion and its 
first newspaper when John N. Ingersoll moved from St. Clair, 
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Michigan, to Copper Harbor. Ingersoll was born in Westchester, 
New York, in 1817, the youngest of four brothers. He was orphaned 
at the age of eleven when his father, a New York merchant, 
drowned. Two years later the boy moved to New York City to learn 
the printing trade from Horace Greeley. The two men became 
lifelong friends, and in 1837 Ingersoll took the famous advice of the 
older man and moved to Detroit. Here he worked as a compositor 
for the Free Press and as a foreman for the Detroit Advertiser until 
1839, when he struck out on his own and for the next seven years 
published newspapers in the Lower Peninsula. In 1846 he moved to 
Copper Harbor to publish the Lake Superior News and Miners' 
Journal. In order to help pay his way (he did not intend to publish in 
the winter months), he obtained a job as enrolling and engrossing 
clerk for the state legislature, and in 1848 he became secretary of the 
Michigan Senate.19 
Once Ingersoll had set up his newspaper in this outpost of 
civilization, his eastern friends, including Greeley, could and did 
reprint his articles, and information of reasonably accurate nature 
began to circulate in the East. True, the New York Express jeered, 
"This is the first instance in which a newspaper precedes 
population." Ingersoll replied, "The motive that prompted the 
above item is on the par with its ignorance. We despise the one while 
we pity the other." For all its jeering, the Express had brought 
knowledge both of the area and of Ingersoll's editorial effort to an 
eastern audience. For his part Ingersoll pledged to protect the 
interests of the district and to foster its development.20 
Greeley noted that Ingersoll was a man "whom it is necessary to 
know to form a proper estimate of mankind," and predicted that 
Ingersoll's paper would be distinguished for its literary and technical 
excellence. It was not long, however, before Ingersoll decided that 
he was indeed located too far in advance of civilization. The army 
abandoned Fort Wilkins on 24 July 1846, and in the spring of 1847 
Ingersoll moved his press to Sault Ste. Marie and changed the name 
of his publication to Lake Superior News and Mining Journal}1 
At the Sault, Ingersoll found a growing community. The original 
landowners had been French, and the land holdings reflected the 
ribbon pattern of French agricultural settlements in the New World. 
Narrow lots extended several miles into the countryside at right 
angles to the St. Mary's River. A fort had been built at the foot of the 
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rapids in 1822. It was named Fort Brady in 1825 and was occupied 
by a small garrison until 1857. A mile and a half to the southeast of 
the fort lay a Methodist missionary reserve of 640 acres. A 
Chippewa Indian reservation overlooked the rapids, and most of the 
villagers lived between the Indian reservation and the fort. A 
traveler in the area in 1846 counted about forty or fifty houses in 
which lived a majority of the area's 200 people. The United States 
operated a customshouse, a post office, and a mineral agency, the 
latter under the supervision of McKnight. Two hotels had been 
constructed in 1845, the Van Anden House by Joshua Van Anden 
and the St. Mary's Hotel by Moses Stevens. Within one year so 
many travelers arrived in the area that these two establishments 
were often forced to turn away guests.22 
Many visitors to the Sault were men of letters or politics. In 1847 
Greeley arrived to visit a copper mine in which he held a small 
interest. On 3 July he delivered a temperance lecture at the Van 
Anden House, but the letters that he wrote for publication were of 
more value to the area. "The Saut seems to me to be the most 
growing place I have yet seen," he wrote. He declared the Polk 
administration's internal improvement policy insane and called for 
the immediate construction of a Sault canal. His fellow Whig editor 
Thurlow Weed of Albany followed a few weeks later with a party 
that included politicians Edward Bates, Thomas King Butler, 
Robert C. Schenck, and Governor William Bebb of Ohio. In an 
editorial Weed called the government's failure to build a canal 
"terribly neglectful." Only Whig diarist Philip Hone, who arrived in 
the company of former congressman George Washington Lay, was 
not impressed. After almost missing his boat as a result of 
misplacing his diary and $500, he wrote of the Sault, "Lejeu ne vaut 
pas la chandelleT On the other hand, author Charles Lanman had 
just written in his book that the construction of the proposed ship 
canal should not be delayed a single year.23 
Of all the visitors Greeley offered the most sobering description 
of the Superior District. He noted that copper was abundant but 
warned against the get-rich-quick speculators, who were also 
abundant. Some of the mines would pay off, but only in the distant 
future. Greeley estimated that ten days of labor must be rendered in 
nonmining activity for every day actually spent in mining. All 
provisions and equipment must be ferried ashore in small boats, and 
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animals would be required to swim. Workers would have to cut 
roads inland and build cabins before the early winter. Winter 
supplies must be brought up from Detroit in large quantities and at 
great expense. Hay cost only six dollars per ton in Detroit; after 
being hauled overland at the Sault, it cost between thirty and forty 
dollars at Copper Harbor. Greeley did not actually reverse his 
advice to American youth, but he warned that young men coming to 
the Superior District had better bring money. A canal was vital, but 
it was not the only improvement badly needed for the development 
of the district.24 
The parade of distinguished callers continued in 1848 and in 
subsequent years. Alexander Wheelock Thayer, the Harvard 
librarian who would later write the nineteenth-century biography of 
Ludwig von Beethoven, paid a visit. Greeley made his second trip to 
the Sault. The great Harvard naturalist Louis Agassiz spent a 
summer on Lake Superior, unaware that his son would win a 
fortune in the same area. The Agassiz party included William Keller 
of the Lawrence Scientific School, Jules Marcou, superintendent of 
the Mineralogical Cabinet in Paris, J. Elliot Cabot, editor of the 
Massachusetts Quarterly Review, Dr. John LeConte, destined to 
become president of the University of California, and several 
members of the senior class at Harvard. On the evening of 17 June 
1848, Agassiz lectured at the St. Mary's Hotel and, as could be 
expected, declared the Lake Superior whitefish to be a new species, 
exhibiting a minute variation from previously known whitefish. 
Cabot, a chronicler of the party, estimated the population of the 
Sault to be about one thousand, of whom the barkeepers appeared 
to be the only ones working. He counted, within view of the hotel, 
seven buildings in which liquor was sold exclusively.25 
More than mere curiosity lay behind these visits. Ingersoll 
extolled the vigorous atmosphere of Sault Ste. Marie and 
pronounced it free from "miasons, fevers, liver diseases, dyspepsia, 
calomel, blue devils, and duns." Not only was the area free from blue 
devils and duns; it was also supposed to be free from cholera. The 
year 1849 saw a fresh wave of this killing disease sweep through the 
East, and perhaps many of the visitors came to the Sault partly to 
escape the epidemic. At any rate, they continued to come, among 
them Senator Truman Smith of Connecticut, Congressman William 
Henry of Vermont, Governor John S. Barry of Michigan, and the 
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editor of the Cleveland Herald. The need for a canal was obvious to 
all the visitors, and most of them were highly articulate. They were 
soon to have a fresh opportunity to express their views.26 
On 3 August 1846 President James K. Polk vetoed the River and 
Harbor Bill and sent a stern message to Congress: "The Constitution 
has not, in my judgment, conferred upon the Federal Government 
the power to construct works of internal improvement within the 
states, or to appropriate money from the Treasury for that 
purpose."27 With his message Polk, the most thoroughgoing 
Jacksonian to enter the White House after 1836, dashed the hopes of 
thousands of westerners and enraged a number of influential men of 
all sections. 
The veto message continued with the familiar lecture describing 
the federal government as one restricted to expressly granted 
powers. Although Polk did admit to the Hamiltonian view that the 
government could implement these powers in ways unspecified in 
the Constitution, his interpretation of this implementation was 
strict indeed. Thus lighthouses could be constructed to save the lives 
of citizens, but harbors and rivers could not be improved at federal 
expense unless they were involved in foreign trade. Polk refused to 
recognize that rivers and harbors could be involved in interstate 
commerce and so qualify for federal aid. Instead he warned of the 
inherent dangers in the River and Harbor Bill: power would be 
dangerously consolidated in the federal government, hostile 
sectional feelings engendered, and the harmony of Congress 
destroyed. Somewhat inconsistently, Polk then summoned up the 
specter of logrolling, which implied at least a modicum of harmony 
in the same Congress. Finally he referred to the Mexican War, then 
in progress, and concluded, "It would seem to be the dictate of 
wisdom under such circumstances to husband our means, and not to 
waste them on comparatively unimportant objects."28 
When a president thus opts for guns instead of butter, someone 
usually becomes critical. In this case the caustic Hone labeled Polk's 
attitude "contumetious," and he and thousands of others traveled to 
Chicago in the summer of 1847 to see what could be done. Among 
the thousands attending the great River and Harbor Convention 
was a small but enthusiastic delegation from Sault Ste. Marie led 
by John Ingersoll.29 
There were other reasons besides the Polk veto for holding the 
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Chicago convention. With the Oregon question settled, ambitious 
merchants anticipated a trade network that might extend to the 
Orient if the federal government would help. Greeley complained 
that Canada's Welland Canal was diverting much of the Great 
Lakes trade to Montreal, and demanded that Washington do 
something about it. Colonel J. J. Abert, commanding the Corps of 
Topographical Engineers, recorded an opinion that the Great Lakes 
constituted a nursery for seamen who would be available to the 
nation in time of emergency, and that the government should share 
the cost of running and improving the nursery.30 
The Polk veto meant the sacrifice of a variety of plans in many 
different parts of the country. Buffalo's harbor badly needed 
improvement, a concern for anyone using the Erie Canal; now 
federal funds would not be forthcoming. The bill had provided 
$75,000 for work on the Hudson River. The merchants of Oswego 
lost a $10,000 harbor improvement project. Other harbors destined 
to go unimproved included those at Ashtabula, Cleveland, 
Sandusky, Grand River, Michigan City, Racine, Milwaukee, and 
Chicago. Ingersoll could well reason that if presidents should 
continue to block all these, his own canal project would have no 
chance. He wrote, "The time is past when even the west alone can be 
trifled with."31 
With nineteen states officially represented, the convention settled 
down to serious business. Each state was permitted a vote equal to 
its numerical strength in Congress. The throng then listened to 
messages of approval from dignitaries who were not able to attend: 
Clay, Benton, Van Buren, and Michigan's Senator Alpheus Felch. 
The message from Lewis Cass, senator from Michigan, was an 
enigma. With his eye on the Democratic presidential nomination in 
1848, Cass refused to endorse the convention; he simply regretted 
his inability to attend. The audience was incredulous, and the Cass 
letter was read a second time. Perhaps no other state had been as 
badly hurt by the Polk veto as Michigan, and Greeley treated the 
Cass message with contempt. Cass's political ambitions remained a 
formidable obstacle for Sault canal advocates for the next four 
32 years.
The convention was determined that unanimous agreement 
should not be endangered by the proponents of specific projects. 
The delegates succeeded in tabling all motions relating to the St. 
Lawrence River, a Pacific railroad, and other improvements. If 
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Ingersoll was disappointed that there would be no action taken on 
his project, he did not indicate it. In a scene described as "animated 
and exciting in the highest degree," the delegates by unanimous vote 
adopted sixteen general resolutions. The first was of little help to 
Ingersoll. Regarding the constitutionality of internal im­
provements, the principle of the "common interests" of the states 
should be evoked when an act of improvement required the 
concurrence of two or more states. A canal at the Sault, of course, 
would require the approval of Michigan only. Ensuing resolutions 
were more favorable to Ingersoll. Since the federal government had 
preempted control over foreign and interstate commerce, the 
government must afford all facilities that the individual states could 
have afforded had the revenue and authority remained with the 
states. The convention demanded that the same treatment be given 
to inland water routes as to Atlantic ports. It roundly denounced 
Polk for his lack of faith in democratic processes. Since the delegates 
were aware of the Whig domination of the convention, they 
proceeded to disclaim any association with a single political party. 
Finally, the convention agreed to establish a permanent executive 
committee to collect and publish facts in the hope of enforcing the 
will of the convention on the president and Congress.33 
The Executive Committee of the River and Harbor Convention 
sent its memorial to Congress in June 1848; the lengthy document 
must have been a disappointment to Ingersoll. It contained no 
specific mention of a canal at the Sault and paid scant attention to 
Lake Superior problems. In fact, the committee cited the mud flats 
of Lake St. Clair at the foot of Lake Huron as the priority project 
rather than the rapids of the remote St. Mary's River. For the most 
part, however, the document concentrated on the constitutional 
question, refuting Polk's veto message without mentioning the 
president by name.34 
The convention had no immediate influence on Polk, and the so-
called Wisconsin Improvement Bill of 1847 had no chance with the 
president. His veto message of 15 December 1847 was simply a 
repetition of the 1846 statement. It was obvious that nothing could 
be accomplished until the nation elected a new president. Whig 
hopes hinged upon a military hero and Polk's determination to 
retire after one term, and the enigmatic Cass loomed larger on 
Democratic national horizons.35 
In the long run the River and Harbor Convention was more 
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influential, for it stimulated the awareness of a national community-
of-interest. Editors would keep alive the inspiration of the 
convention in the months to come. Greeley would cite Ingersoll in 
his columns, Weed would cite Greeley, and the Cleveland Daily 
Herald would cite Ingersoll and others. All would preserve the spirit 
of Chicago until the time for actual accomplishment should arrive.36 
O Failure of State Financing 
And an Act of Congress 
Michigan's problems with the canal project were not unique; by 
1850 the general experience in financing public improvements in the 
Old Northwest ranged from unsettling to disastrous. An internal 
improvement project could be financed by the state alone, as was the 
case with the early Michigan railroads, or it could be financed on a 
"mixed" basis. Ohio, for example, experimented in mixed enterprise 
beginning with the passage of the Ohio Loan Law of 1837. The law 
was based on the principle that the state should stand as a financing 
partner with private investors to build railroads, canals, and 
turnpikes. The Ohio law was not original; older states had tried it 
first. Its greatest defect was the failure of the legislature to place a 
maximum limit on the amount the state could commit. When 
construction costs far exceeded estimates, Ohio faced bankruptcy; 
and yet the transportation system in the state was excellent. Table 1 
indicates the share of public investment in canal construction in the 
United States.1 
Between 1839 and 1850 Michigan went through the same boom-
bust-recovery cycle that affected Ohio and the other states of the Old 
Northwest. In the case of Michigan, banking practice and 
population growth were largely responsible for the familiar pattern. 
A general banking law passed in 1837 made it possible for anyone 
meeting certain conditions to go into banking without a special act 
of the state legislature. It was the first such law in the United States, 
and it coincided with a population boom in Michigan. In the early 
days the state's population growth was slow. The land in southeast 
Michigan was poor, and potential settlers usually pushed west to 
better lands in Ohio and Indiana. The completion of the Erie Canal 
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in 1825 made the farmlands of the Old Northwest more attractive, 
and by 1847 canal trade from western states exceeded that 
originating in New York. The situation was reflected in population 
changes. The federal census of 1840 indicated that in one decade 
Michigan's population had increased sevenfold, to 212,267. The 
combination of easy credit through questionable banking practice 
and population influx led to wild land speculation that could have 
only one result.2 
TABLE 1 
PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN CANALS, 1815-1860 
(in millions of dollars) 
Year Public Investment 
Total 
Investment 
Public Investment 
as a Percentage of 
Total 
1815-34 41.2 58.6 70.3 
1834-44 57.3 72.2 79.4 
1844-60 38.0 57.4 66.3 
TOTAL 136.5 188.2 73.4 
SOURCE: Harvey H. Segal, "Cycles of Canal Construction," in 
Canals and American Economic Development, by Carter Good­
rich et al. (New York, 1961), p. 215. 
Until the bust came the enthusiasm was infectious. The same 
legislature that passed the general banking law launched the state on 
a most ambitious program of internal improvements. Unfortunate­
ly, Michigan followed the example of other Old Northwest states as 
well as the states of the East by committing too much state money to 
the projects. Indeed, Michigan's original state constitution made 
state-financed internal improvements an imperative, and the Michi­
gan legislature authorized construction of three canals and three 
railroads to be financed by the state alone.3 
Population density and sectional rivalry dictated the location of 
the three railroads, all with an east-west orientation. The state 
would construct the Michigan Southern through the southern tier of 
counties, the Michigan Central through the next tier north, and the 
Michigan Northern through the fourth tier. Of the canals one would 
be long, crossing most of the state from east to west and linking the 
waters of Lake St. Clair (and thus Lake Erie) to the Kalamazoo 
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River (and thus Lake Michigan). The other two would be short; one 
would link the Saginaw and Maple rivers, completing the second 
east-west waterway through the Lower Peninsula, and the other 
would bypass the rapids of the St. Mary's River.4 
The same spirit of sectionalism that dictated the location of 
Michigan's railroads dictated the sale of the railroads to private 
ownership in 1846. Political rivalry played no part in this decision. 
After the banking panic of 1837 and the general depression that 
followed, Michigan found it impossible to finance all her internal 
improvements, some at various stages of completion. A bill to 
rescue any one of them would have been doomed to sectional defeat 
in the legislature. In addition, the Michigan Central needed a fresh 
infusion of capital to replace track already worn. Furthermore, 
Michigan experienced the same wave of hostility toward state-built 
internal improvements that was sweeping through the other Old 
Northwest states, although it took several years to formalize this 
new spirit in state constitutions. The reason was simple, and it did 
not matter if the state followed the "mixed" financing system of 
Ohio or the direct system of Michigan. With a few exceptions like 
the profitable Michigan Central, the improvements lost money, and 
tax increases seemed imminent. Under such circumstances the 
doctrine of laissez faire was easily asserted and fell upon receptive 
5ears.
The new Michigan constitution of 1850, reversing the policy set 
forth in its predecessor, prohibited state participation in internal 
improvements: "The state shall not subscribe to, or be interested in, 
the stock of any company, association, or corporation." However, 
the constitutional convention did leave a loophole in the event that 
Congress should be generous in the future: "The state shall not be a 
party to . .  . any work of internal improvement . . . except in 
expenditure of grants to the state of land or other property." Thus 
did Michigan in severe financial straits assume a subsidiary role in 
financing internal improvements. The state would now become little 
more than the disbursing and supervising agent of the federal 
government.6 
During the depression Michigan was forced either to risk 
repudiation of state bonds or to sell, and the state elected the latter 
course. A private company purchased the Michigan Central for 
$2,000,000; another, the Michigan Southern for $500,000. Con­
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struction of the Michigan Northern had not begun, and only minute 
fractions of the two Lower Peninsula canals were completed. The 
proposed canal at the Sault ended in the Smith and Driggs fiasco of 
1839. Even with the sale it took Michigan over half a century to 
redeem its bonds.7 
In spite of economic setbacks, Michigan's population continued 
to grow. The census of 1850 indicated a white population of 395,071, 
with almost 80 percent located in the three southern tiers of 
counties. The census also revealed a population of 890 in Chippewa 
County and 707 in Houghton County, the only counties in the 
Upper Peninsula. In the past when Sault Canal advocates had 
presented their arguments, their emphasis had usually been placed 
on lumber and whitefish, with mineral resources noted almost as an 
afterthought. That day was over, and the presence of over 700 
people in Houghton County could mean only one thing—mining. 
Official reports confirmed this activity. In 1850 the Michigan 
legislature published the report of Stephen V. R. Trowbridge, 
assistant agent of United States Mineral Lands. Trowbridge wrote 
that there were seven copper mines active in the Upper Peninsula, 
that five of these had already made shipments, and that one, the 
Pittsburgh and Boston Cliff Mine, had already paid a dividend. This 
last company employed more than 200 men. Congress had also or­
dered copies printed of several other geological surveys, all indicat­
ing the presence of vast deposits of copper. Canal supporters were 
bound to switch their emphasis to copper, and Sault editor John 
Ingersoll was in the position to take the lead.8 
In the fall of 1848, Ingersoll launched his major press campaign 
for a Sault Canal. Democrats of the Sault had elected him president 
of their caucus, and Ingersoll took the opportunity to lash out at 
Polk. He called the government cruelly oppressive in its failure to 
grant aid for a canal and said that Michigan's maritime coast had 
been almost completely neglected in favor of improvements in the 
East. The caucus applauded Ingersoll's words and pledged support 
for the presidential aspirations of Lewis Cass. Ingersoll was also 
forced to deal with competition from within the state to secure 
federal aid. The House of Representatives had tabled at third 
reading a bill granting 500,000 acres to Michigan to build a canal 
between Lake St. Clair and Lake Michigan, an attempt to revive the 
Clinton and Kalamazoo project of 1837. Obviously Congress could 
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not be expected to make two grants to Michigan at the same time. 
Ingersoll denounced the proposed canal as being strictly a local 
project, whereas the Sault canal would be of national importance. 
Besides, southern Michigan, with two railroads, already had a 
transportation system.9 
Ingersoll was not alone in his efforts. In 1849 the Michigan 
legislature tried a slightly different approach. In an obvious effort to 
attract the attention of the Empire State, it petitioned Congress to 
finance a canal around Niagara Falls and then amended the petition 
to include the Sault canal as well. Trowbridge testified to Congress 
that the impasse at the Sault constituted a serious block to the 
development of the Superior District. United States geologists J. W. 
Foster and J. D. Whitney made a similar report and urged the 
construction of a canal. A meeting of Sault citizens voted to send 
three men, led by Judge Samuel Ashmun, to plead their cause in 
Washington.10 
Eventually Ingersoll reached the end of his financial—if not 
emotional—strength. He recorded his solitary celebration of the 
Fourth of July, 1848, complete with a long series of toasts—all made 
by himself to himself. He ended the publishing year with an 
admission of severe financial difficulties. When, at the conclusion of 
the next publishing year, the situation had not improved, he 
requested payment from his debtors while asking patience from his 
creditors. Apparently this effort was of no avail, and in 1849 
Ingersoll abandoned publishing efforts at the Sault. Meanwhile, in 
October of 1848 a caucus of Sault Democrats had nominated him as 
their candidate for the Michigan House of Representatives on a 
canal platform, and in November he had defeated his Whig 
opponent by a narrow margin. Once he was in Lansing, his 
colleagues recognized his abilities by electing him Speaker. He 
remained a Democrat until 1858 when he switched to the 
Republican party.11 
The Sault was not to be deprived of a newspaper, and a new man 
came forward to take Ingersoll's place. In the spring of 1850, J. 
Venen Brown began to publish the Lake Superior Journal. It was a 
completely new venture in all ways, including a new font and 
advertising that was oriented more toward Detroit and Cleveland 
than toward the Sault. Brown lost little time in pledging his support 
for the canal project. Unfortunately he was not as skilled a writer as 
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was his predecessor; his first sentence in support of the canal ran 
thirty-six lines in print. On the other hand, there was nothing wrong 
with his power of political observation. He regretted that the 
political clash over slavery threatened to divert minds from "more 
legitimate channels of legislation."12 
Brown did not have long to wait before the building of a canal 
became a matter of human necessity and not merely an economic 
convenience. At the opening of the 1851 navigating season, there 
were four steamships on Lake Superior plus a small fleet of 
schooners. The propellers and their capacities were the Manhattan 
(3,000 barrels), the Monticello (2,500 barrels), the Independence 
(2,000 barrels), and the old Napoleon (800 barrels), still catching fish 
in her smoke stack. The aggregate capacity of the schooners was 
estimated at 1,000 barrels. To haul a ship over the portage cost 
between $1,000 and $3,000, depending upon size, and the effort was 
enormous. Thus Lake Superior economics dictated that only a fleet 
of minimum capacity be brought across the portage. Any excess 
capacity would go to waste inasmuch as it would be too 
inconvenient and costly to bring a ship back down.13 
Disaster struck in 1851. The Independence had been driven 
ashore in the previous winter and was not made seaworthy until 
July. Delivery of supplies thus fell behind schedule at the outset. 
Then, on 1 August, the Monticello and the Manhattan collided. The 
Manhattan was saved only by her cargo of lumber, but she was out 
of service for the rest of the year. On 25 September the damaged 
Monticello foundered with a cargo of twenty-five tons of copper 
ore, and her 100 passengers and crew reached shore only after 
undergoing great hardship. Thus, three months before the close of 
navigation, the Superior District lost over half its cargo-carrying 
capacity, which had been miniscule to begin with.14 
Stores began to pile up immediately at the Sault. Shipowner 
Sheldon McKnight ordered the Baltimore north from Detroit to 
replace his lost Monticello, but she could not be portaged around 
the falls until winter. The remaining ships on Lake Superior had to 
carry the burden, and their captains took risks to meet the demand. 
The Napoleon made the last trip into Marquette, where the 
population had been without flour for six weeks. Brown estimated 
that 18,000 barrels of provisions and supplies were stranded at the 
Sault at the close of the navigation season. He pointed out that if 
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three steamers had been lost instead of two, the result would have 
been famine, and cried for government aid in the name of 
humanity.15 
Brown's political fears were now realized. The Thirty-first 
Congress was too preoccupied with problems created by the victory 
over Mexico to worry about a Sault canal. In his inaugural address 
President Zachary Taylor stated that, although he was willing to 
recommend such constitutional measures in support of internal 
improvements as he thought fitting and necessary, the Congress 
itself must regulate domestic policy. What he would have done with 
a Sault canal bill must remain a matter for conjecture. Even as 
ardent a canal proponent as Brown would have had to admit that 
the problems of California, with a population of over 100,000 and 
no territorial government, must receive prior consideration.16 
On 9 July 1850 Zachary Taylor died, and the way was cleared for 
the passage of the Compromise of that year. The Congress had been 
in session for 302 days, its longest session to date, and with the 
passage the pressure eased immediately. Most of the members 
thought that the knotty problems related to slavery had been solved 
for all time. The new Whig president, Millard Fillmore, had realized 
an ambition born at the Chicago River and Harbor Convention, 
where he had endorsed the concept of federal support for internal 
improvements benefiting the national community. If the next 
Congress retained the same amiable mood, perhaps the canal bill 
could be passed before the outbreak of new storms. The president 
would be no problem.17 
In December 1851 the Thirty-second Congress met for the first 
time, with the Democrats in control of both houses. Early in the 
following year, leaders in Detroit prepared to apply pressure for a 
Sault canal. Mayor Zach Chandler called a meeting at City Hall that 
included McKnight, Ingersoll, Brown, Whig politician Jacob 
Howard, and James Joy, head of the firm of Joy and Porter and 
legal counsel for the Michigan Central Railroad. The men drew up a 
petition to Congress and called for a mass meeting in Detroit for the 
night of 9 January. The meeting was a success, and many signed the 
petition, which stressed the national need for copper; Superior 
District iron ore, thought to be the best in the world, was considered 
second in importance.18 
News of the mass meeting spread throughout the Midwest. The 
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Plain Dealer of Cleveland came to the support of the project and 
urged the Ohio legislature to add its petition. In February the 
Indiana legislature entered its plea, with the New York senate 
joining in the same month. In March, United States Senator 
Richard Broadhead of Pennsylvania presented the petition of the 
legislature of his state. Meanwhile, a delegation from Michigan 
traveled to Washington to add its influence. The group included 
shipowners McKnight and E. B. Ward, prominent citizens John 
Burt and Peter White, State Representative Abner Sherman, and 
Brown.19 
Weeks passed, and Congress took no action. The culprit was 
Lewis Cass, whose influence was essential to the passage of a canal 
bill. Cass, the defeated Democratic presential candidate in 1848, 
badly wanted the nomination in 1852 and knew that he must 
alienate as few Democrats as possible. He had brought derision on 
his head by his avoidance of the Chicago River and Harbor 
Convention in 1847, and his conduct in the debate over the 
Compromise of 1850 had also been disappointing. In the end 
equivocation did him no good. Although he led on the first ballot at 
the Democratic Convention of 1852 and reached a peak of 135 votes 
on the thirty-fifth ballot, the Democrats nominated the New 
Hampshire doughface Franklin Pierce on the forty-ninth ballot. 
Greeley realized the significance of the sequence. Now the time was 
ripe for the passage of the canal bill. Passage would have been 
useless under Polk, impossible under Taylor, and inexpedient for 
Cass prior to the convention. Should Pierce become president, the 
situation would revert to the Polk impasse. In fact, although Greeley 
could not foresee it, after four years of Pierce in the White House the 
old hostilities would be so revived as to make passage under the next 
president all but impossible. As long as Fillmore remained 
president, however, canal chances were good. When Cass finally did 
make his first speech for the canal, the Detroit Daily Advertiser 
grumbled, "After being defeated, and disappointed, he has at last 
found out that he owes a duty to his own state."20 
On 11 August, Cass called upon the chairman of the Senate 
Finance Committee to bring Michigan Senator Alpheus Felch's 
canal bill to the floor, and on 16 August the Senate considered the 
subject. Cass refused to defend the bill on the grounds of its obvious 
advantage for internal commerce; instead he resorted to the plea of 
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military necessity. As long as Britain owned Canada, the United 
States must be ready for a war on the Great Lakes. With a canal 
armed vessels could pass to and from Lake Superior as necessity 
dictated. This approach drew an immediate attack from Andrew 
Butler of South Carolina, who sputtered that the nation had been at 
peace with Britain for forty years. Furthermore the British would 
never dare attack Michigan; one speech from Cass, and Michigan 
men would attack the British fleet on horseback. Undiverted by 
Cass's military red herring, Butler correctly identified the commer­
cial nature of the canal venture, and Joseph Underwood of 
Kentucky wondered why, using the Cass logic, the snags could not 
be removed from the Mississippi.21 
As debate continued, Felch offered a major amendment to his 
own bill. Instead of a grant of 750,000 acres to Michigan, he asked 
for an appropriation of $400,000 to build a canal, the entire project 
to be under the direction of the secretary of war. This would convert 
the legislation into a "money bill" instead of a "land bill," a change 
favored by many westerners. Cass and Felch were able to persuade 
only two other Democrats to agree, however, and the Senate 
defeated the money amendment. It then ordered the bill engrossed 
by a vote of twenty-eight to twenty-one.22 
The vote crossed both party and sectional lines. Exactly seven 
Whigs gave Cass his margin of victory, while eleven voted "no." Ten 
Democrats voted against the bill, while twenty-one voted "yes." As 
might be expected, the measure won unanimous support from the 
Old Northwest, but it also found favor in the Mississippi Valley in 
the deep south. Support was unanimous in Louisiana and Arkansas, 
Texas and Alabama contributed one vote each with no dissents, and 
Florida gave both votes. Opposition was unanimous in the south 
Atlantic states (except Florida), Tennessee, and Kentucky. New 
England was divided.23 
On 25 August the Senate bill was considered in the House, where 
it was defended by Michigan's C. E. Stuart. Debate was desultory 
until James Orr of South Carolina asked a pertinent question. He 
noted that the cost of the canal was estimated at $450,000, and that 
the bill entailed 750,000 acres. At $ 1.25 an acre the land should bring 
in $1,000,000. Why? Stuart replied that the Senate had put in that 
figure to assure that in any contingency there would be sufficient 
funds to complete the canal. The land would not be wasted, since 
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any not used for the canal would revert to the United States. Stuart 
thus fooled the House and perhaps himself, for the bill was worded 
to have the opposite result. Since there was no incentive to 
economize on land, Michigan might as well grant all of it for a 
canal.24 
The bill passed the House with ease, 115 to 48. Again the vote 
crossed party lines with a majority of both parties in favor. The 
sectional pattern was similar to that in the Senate. Not a single vote 
was cast against the bill by a congressman from the Mississippi 
Valley. The five negative votes from Tennessee and Kentucky were 
cast by eastern district men. The Atlantic south was all but 
unanimous in opposition, but New England was more favorable, 
voting "yes" fifteen to four. With the exception of Ohio, the states of 
the Old Northwest were not sufficiently populated to carry much 
weight in the House. The burden of passage fell upon Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, and New York, the states that would gain the most 
from the canal. They responded with sixty-three favorable votes and 
only three negative. The community-of-interest thesis had worked 
at last, and Fillmore signed the bill.25 
It was not difficult to account for the support from the lower 
Mississippi. The theory of the all-pervasiveness of sectionalism in 
the decade 1841-52 is an oversimplification.26 The Mississippi men 
might have anticipated the return of the favor at some future date. 
Also, there was the matter of the Fox-Wisconsin project. In 1846 
Congress had granted to the Territory of Wisconsin 260,000 acres to 
build a canal through the portage between the Fox and Wisconsin 
rivers and in general to improve and maintain a water passage 
between Lake Michigan and the Mississippi. A southerner might 
have envisioned New Orleans as a port for the wealth of the Superior 
District once the project was completed. In 1852 he had no way of 
knowing that the perversity of the Wisconsin River would render 
this only a dream. 
In its final form the law carried the formidable title "An Act 
Granting to the State of Michigan the Right of Way, and a 
Donation of Public Land for the Construction of a Ship Canal 
around the Falls of St. Mary's River in said State." Fortunately, 
only public lands were involved at the canal site, or the law's passage 
might have been delayed. In 1820 Secretary of War Calhoun had 
instructed Lewis Cass to procure the extinction of the Indian title to 
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an area at the Sault not to exceed ten square miles. This was 
accomplished, and the Chippewa Indians received a reservation. 
Now, in 1852, the Indians would have to move, since the canal 
would pass through the reservation as well as through government 
lands at Fort Brady. Michigan also received a strip of land 400 feet 
wide along the line of the canal. The act warned that the canal must 
follow the line of the survey already made for that purpose by 
Captain Augustus Canfield, of the Corps of Topographical 
Engineers, in 1839. Any deviation from this line must have the 
express approval of the secretary of war.27 
Canal depth as stated in the law must be 12 feet; the minimum 
width must be 100 feet. The act gave Michigan some leeway in 
determining the dimensions of the locks. Each lock was to be at least 
250 feet long and at least 50 feet wide. By implication Michigan 
could bargain for larger locks if it seemed advisable or opportune to 
do so. As was right and proper, Congress made no further attempt 
to describe the physical characteristics of the canal. Nothing was 
written regarding such matters as basins, docks, and channel 
dredging. Michigan would have to look after the details. 
The land to be granted, totaling 750,000 acres in Michigan, must 
be selected by an agent or agents of the governor. The secretary of 
the interior must approve all such selections, which were to be 
submitted in standard survey form. Rights of prior entry must be 
respected by all concerned. The land granted to Michigan could be 
used for no purpose other than the building of the canal. Before the 
state of Michigan could dispose of any of the land, the route of the 
canal must be established and plats filed with the secretary of war 
and the commissioner of the General Land Office. In other words, 
Michigan could legally distribute the land before the canal was 
actually completed. 
Congress decreed that the work on the canal must be under way 
within three years and completed within ten. If at the end of ten 
years the canal had not been completed, Michigan would be forced 
to pay the United States a minimum of $ 1.50 an acre for all the grant 
land sold to date, and the rest would be returned to the public 
domain. The title of all purchases would remain valid. The 
Michigan legislature must order that an accurate accounting be 
made of the sales and net proceeds of the land. 
Congress made the standard stipulation in transportation grants. 
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All United States vessels must be permitted to use the canal free of 
toll or other charge. Ships using the canal to transport troops must 
also pass free. The Michigan legislature must report each year to the 
secretary of the interior on the operation of the canal. The state 
could charge only such tolls as would be needed for repairs and 
maintenance. This last was not a standard provision, and the canal 
would not produce the revenue of earlier land grant canals.28 
When Fillmore signed the bill, the responsibilities of the federal 
government ended as long as Michigan obeyed the law, and the state 
became the supervising and disbursing agent. It remained to be seen 
if Michigan would be as generous to potential canal builders as 
Congress had been. 
3 Rushed Plans and Hurried Estimates 
The 1852 law's provision for a land grant rather than a money grant 
evoked great bitterness in several places. The Cleveland Daily 
Herald considered the defeat of the Felch amendment as bad as a 
defeat for the bill itself, and the Detroit Daily Advertiser tried to 
make political capital over the issue by citing the votes of the Pierce 
men who voted against the amendment. J. Venen Brown was beside 
himself with rage. In an editorial headed "Saut Canal Bill 
Overboard," he predicted that the House would never pass the bill 
without the Felch amendment. Though proved wrong, he still 
insisted that it would take years before the Michigan authorities 
could find a way to convert the land into a canal. He excoriated Cass 
and Felch for putting up a sham fight for the Sault and demanded to 
know how Cass could have expected to lead the nation when on the 
amendment he and Felch could command the vote of only two other 
Democratic senators.1 
In one week, however, Brown went through an extraordinary 
reversal of opinion. He had bemoaned the fate of the canal on 8 
September, but on 15 September he was exuberant at the prospect. 
This time his editorial was headed "Saut Canal—Good Chance for 
Capitalists." Brown suggested that the legislature authorize the 
governor to receive bids based on the plans and specifications 
prepared by a governor-appointed engineer. The contract could 
then be let out to the bidder with the best surety who would agree to 
build the canal for the smallest grant of land. Brown proposed that 
the land be selected by the contracting party (absolutely legal under 
the law just passed by Congress, which merely required that the 
governor approve of the land agents) and awarded in four 
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installments as the work progressed. Above all, he emphasized the 
ease with which the canal could be built, stating that two-thirds of 
the excavation would be in loose sandstone and the remainder in 
sand and gravel. Limestone of high quality could be obtained from 
islands in the St. Mary's River and easily transported to the site. He 
estimated that the total cost of the project would be $300,000.2 
There was a good reason for Brown's dramatic change of heart. 
On the same page of the Lake Superior Journal carrying his 
enthusiastic message, he published a statement of high praise for the 
firm of E. & T. Fairbanks and its product, the Fairbanks scale. 
Brown also noted the arrival at the Sault of a Fairbanks agent, 
young (twenty-three) Charles Thompson Harvey. The two men had 
met while Harvey was in the area to establish sales agencies for 
Fairbanks, and it was Harvey who realized the potential of the canal 
project for his employer. He obviously sold the idea to Brown, 
whose editorial reversal was clearly more than a coincidence, and he 
set out to do he same with Erastus Fairbanks.3 
There were three talented brothers in the firm of E. & T. 
Fairbanks. Erastus, the eldest, was president and general man of 
business for the firm. Thaddeus, next born, was a man of 
considerable inventive genius. His most famous invention, and the 
foundation of the Fairbanks fortune, was the platform scale. The 
youngest brother, Joseph, was a man of letters who had been 
educated to the bar. By the 1850s the firm was so successful that its 
president looked for new financial and political challenges. He 
probably instructed agents like Harvey to stay alert for profitable 
new enterprises; meanwhile, in 1852 he himself became governor of 
Vermont.4 
Upon being notified by Harvey of the possibility of canal 
construction at the Sault, Fairbanks realized that the project would 
be too great for one man to finance. Accordingly, he set out in early 
November 1852 to call on Erastus Corning, a friend living in 
Albany, New York. Among his many enterprises, Corning was 
president of the Utica and Schenectady Railroad and held a 
financial interest in the Michigan Central. The connection between 
railroads and scales was obvious, and any project that would link 
Fairbanks and Corning would advance the interests of E. & T. 
Fairbanks Company. Fairbanks had, in fact, previously asked 
Corning to use his influence with the superintendent of the 
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Michigan Central to encourage the railroad's adoption of he 
Fairbanks scales.5 
For his part Corning was one of the most powerful financiers in 
New York. Although he considered himself to be primarily a 
merchant, his interests were extensive. He owned the Albany Iron 
Works, had a thriving iron import business, was president of the 
Albany City Bank, and owned stock in six other New York banks. 
Fig. 2. Erastus Corning I, by Charles Loring Elliott (1812-1868). Collection Albany Insti­
tute of History and Art. Reproduced by permission. 
Fig. 3. Charles G. Harvey, 1884. Reproduced from the collections of the Michigan Depart­
ment of State, State Archives. 
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Coming's interests extended to the West as well. In the 1830s he 
obtained a financial interest in the Farmers and Mechanics Bank in 
Detroit, and by 1850 he owned part of the Michigan Insurance 
Company, also in Detroit. He speculated in land both in New York 
and in the West. At the same time Corning by 1852 had acquired a 
prominent position in the Democratic party. A western friend had 
suggested that if Lewis Cass could not obtain the 1852 presidential 
nomination Corning might be offered to the convention as being 
more acceptable to the West than his friend William Marcy. Others 
suggested that Corning might be an excellent candidate for 
governor of New York. It was a remarkable record for a man who 
had been crippled for life in a childhood accident.6 
Fairbanks's trip to Albany proved to be in vain, for Corning was 
out of the city. The Vermont man had to be satisfied with writing a 
lengthy letter outlining the entire proposal as envisioned by Harvey. 
Fairbanks told Corning he thought the canal could be constructed 
for no more than $275,000, but in order to be sure he ordered 
Harvey to prepare to return to the Sault with an engineer for a more 
thorough examination. The compensation for building the canal 
would be 750,000 acres in Michigan. Fairbanks realized that the 
award might seem too great in the eyes of the public; he therefore 
proposed to Corning that a company be formed with an authorized 
capitalization of $600,000. "This sum," he wrote, "might be held out 
as the nominal or probable expense of the work, and the lands 
would not be regarded an extravagant compensation for so heavy an 
outlay." What Fairbanks conceived as a policy of overcapitalization 
to fool the public proved to be the salvation of the organization that 
built the canal. Before long he would need every dollar of the capital 
issue.7 
Fairbanks assured Corning that Harvey had found western men 
willing to carry about one-third of the financial burden. For the 
remaining $400,000, Fairbanks proposed that he and Corning each 
assume responsibility for $100,000, that John Seymour of Utica 
furnish another equal amount, and that the balance be furnished by 
a party mutually agreed upon. As for Harvey, Fairbanks praised 
him for his energy, shrewdness, and business capacity, although he 
had known the younger man for fewer than fifteen months. He 
stated that liberal provisions must be made for Harvey in the event 
that the project proved feasible, since Harvey was responsible for 
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the inception of the idea and would be invaluable in its execution.8 
For Harvey the month of October was a time of anticipation and 
preparation. He notified J. Venen Brown that he wanted to retain 
the editor for advice and help on the canal project (a request he 
would later have ample reason to regret); and when the order came 
from Fairbanks to proceed, he was ready. He returned to the Sault 
in November with engineer L. L. Nichols to obtain a cost estimate.9 
Nichols had some canal experience, but he had no idea of the 
difficulties inherent in a construction project in the remote and 
rugged Upper Peninsula. For three years he had served as resident 
engineer, eastern subdivision, middle division, of the Erie Canal. In 
this capacity he had superintended minor enlargement projects, but 
little more. Long before he had finished with the Sault Canal he 
would be a much wiser man.10 
In December, Nichols submitted his cost estimate. Allowing for 
the most favorable contingencies, the engineer estimated that the 
maximum cost would be $403,500. At this stage Nichols admitted 
that he was doing a certain amount of guessing. He thought that the 
excavation would be 30 percent rock, but he could not be sure. He 
did note that there were numerous granite boulders to remove. He 
assumed, on the basis of the most casual inspection, that limestone 
for the lock walls could be obtained from Lime Island, forty miles 
below the Sault in the St. Mary's River. His greatest error lay in the 
assumption that the working season at the Sault lasted nine months 
a year, a misconception that led to his underestimating the number 
of men needed for the work. A work season of seven months, May 
through November, would have been more accurate. Nichols did, 
however, warn the eastern men that he could not be sure of a number 
of his calculations. If Fairbanks and Corning were not alert to the 
possibility of error, it was their own fault.11 
It would have been easy for any group of canal promoters to be 
lulled into a false sense of security regarding the ultimate cost and 
the time required to complete a canal at the Sault. The great canal 
showpiece in the United States at the time was New York's exploit of 
the 1820s, the Erie Canal—a profitable venture even before its 
formal opening in 1825. Such a success would naturally evoke 
imitation in other sections of the nation, and deceptive cost and 
construction time comparisons were inevitable.12 
How, then, did the Erie project compare with the proposed effort 
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at the Sault? In the first place, the Erie Canal, running from Buffalo 
to Albany, traversed 363 miles as compared with the 1-mile passage 
required in Upper Michigan. The drop in elevation between the 
nominal level of Lake Erie and the Hudson River was 565 feet; the 
comparable drop in the St. Mary's River was 19 feet at maximum. 
The New York engineers were forced to design and construct no 
fewer than eighty-three locks, whereas the Sault engineers would 
need but two. 
The differences in the depth of the two canals required cautious 
comparison. The original depth of the Erie Canal was only four feet, 
and the Sault canal would be twelve. However, the Erie Canal had to 
pass through a cut in a ridge west of Lockport requiring a seven-mile 
excavation, of which two miles were cut through solid rock. The 
depth of this excavation varied from thirteen to thirty feet. Even if 
the entire Sault works were to be cut through solid rock (which was 
not the case), the maximum length of the excavation would be less 
than one mile. Moreover, the Erie engineers faced other problems 
not found at the Sault; for example, the Erie Canal had to be carried 
over several rivers.13 
Two specific comparisons emerged. The total cost of the Erie 
Canal was $7,143,789. The total construction time had been 101 
months. Would it not be reasonable for the Sault builders to assume 
that their canal, less than one three-hundredths of the Erie in length, 
would cost no more than one-eighth of that model? Would it not 
also be logical to assume that the Sault canal could be completed in 
less than one-fifth of the time required for the Erie Canal? It should 
be easy!14 
Corning and Fairbanks had yet another model available if they 
had cared to look for it. The Louisville and Portland (L. & P.) Canal 
on the Ohio River had been completed in 1831, and there were 
marked similarities between this work and the canal proposed for 
the Sault. Both were short, deepwater works designed to circumvent 
falls and rapids. In each case an earlier attempt had failed. As time 
went on, other parallels emerged. The builders of both canals made 
enemies along the way. Both canals were plagued with unrealistic 
cost estimates, and both far exceeded these estimates. Neither canal 
could have been completed without federal aid, although in the case 
of the L. & P. Congress first purchased stock and later purchased 
forfeited stock. Finally, both canals soon became obsolete. There 
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was one major difference between the canals. Congress did not 
restrict the tolls of the L. & P. as it did those at the Sault, and the L. 
& P. made money for its stockholders and Kentucky.15 
The directors of the soon-to-be-formed Sault company were more 
familiar with the Erie Canal. Two of them, Erastus Corning and his 
close associate John V. L. Pruyn, lived in Albany, the eastern 
terminal of the canal. Corning, the railroad organizer, preferred to 
travel by water when he could, a bias that eventually lost him the 
New York Central to Cornelius Vanderbuilt. He was well aware of 
the problems as well as the assets of water communication. Pruyn 
too had an interest in canals, and had assisted in a small way in 
obtaining funds for the enlargement of the Erie Canal in 1853. 
Another New Yorker, John Seymour, came from a family involved 
in Erie Canal projects for two generations. His brother Horatio 
Seymour, governor of New York in 1853-55 and 1863-65, was a 
strong backer of Erie Canal enlargement in 1852, the year before 
John, also well versed in canal problems, was elected a director of 
the Sault project. Their father Henry had been an acting 
commissioner and a longtime power in the Erie. In fact, it would 
have been impossible to rise in New York politics in the era 1815-60 
without having played a role either for or against the Erie Canal.16 
Two more future directors of the Sault project, John W. Brooks, 
of the Michigan Central Railroad, and James Joy, the road's 
attorney, were professionally responsible for detailed knowledge of 
transportation cost problems in the Midwest. Another, John 
Murray Forbes of Boston, though more isolated from canal theory 
and practice by geography, was president of the Michigan Central in 
1852. Of the seven ultimate directors, only Erastus Fairbanks was a 
neophyte in transportation problems. The others could easily have 
been too optimistic in their expections regarding construction time 
and cost thanks to their knowledge of the Erie Canal model.17 
Upon receiving from Washington the news of the passage of the 
canal bill, Michigan's Governor Robert McClelland faced a serious 
problem. Like Fairbanks and Corning he had no plans or 
specifications, but his legislature would require specific information 
before acting. The navigation season was nearing its close; unless 
McClelland could get an engineer to the Sault, the survey could not 
be made until the following May or June. The Michigan legislature, 
which met briefly every year, would meet in January 1853. 
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Something would have to be done at once, or a year would be 
wasted, and such a delay would be intolerable.18 
McClelland knew that in the following year one of two men would 
enter the White House—Franklin Pierce or Winfield Scott. Scott's 
associates deliberately masked their candidate's attitude toward 
internal improvements (and almost everything else), but critics of 
Pierce described him as "the most undeviating foe of internal 
improvements that ever occupied a seat in Congress."19 In addition, 
McClelland knew that unknowns would occupy the offices of 
secretary of war and secretary of interior. (The Michigan governor 
could not dream, in September 1852, that he himself would be the 
new secretary of the interior.) A hostile president or key cabinet 
member could cause serious trouble for the project. 
There were other reasons for haste that McClelland could not 
anticipate. Should the successful bidders on the canal project wish 
to incorporate through an act of an eastern legislature, they too 
might be confronted with a time problem, since an eastern 
legislature might not act until the granting of a canal contract. 
McClelland had to face the Michigan problem first, however, and he 
asked Secretary of War C. M. Conrad for the services of an army 
engineer to make the survey at once. On about 2 October, Conrad 
replied that he had no funds and could not comply with the request. 
At the moment McClelland received this piece of bad news from 
Washington, he also had a stroke of luck. Present with him was a 
competent engineer who grasped the problem at once. Augustus 
Canfield, captain of the Army Corps of Topographical Engineers, 
had graduated from West Point in 1822 and had served the next 
twelve years in the artillery. In 1834 he was made a brevet captain 
and staff assistant in the Corps of Topographical Engineers, and on 
17 July 1838 he became a full captain. His wife was the former Mary 
Cass, daughter of the senator. Canfield was no stranger to the Sault 
area. In 1839 he had completed a survey of the Sault and a general 
plan for a canal. He had simplified Almy's design by reducing the 
number of locks from three to two, and he proposed to add a pier 
and a sand-catcher to the Lake Superior end of the canal.20 
Without waiting for the approval of Colonel J. J. Abert, 
commander of the Corps of Topographical Engineers, Canfield 
sailed north to conduct a fresh survey, which began on 5 October. As 
he later explained to McClelland, he found it necessary to run three 
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survey lines through the portage in order to chart the best possible 
canal route. He had to consider several important factors in locating 
the upper end of the route on Lake Superior. For safe navigation it 
had to be as far from the rapids as possible. To minimize the cost of 
the upper piers and cofferdam, the current must be minimal at the 
point selected. Finally, Canfield was pleased to note that the existing 
docks on the Lake Superior side would not be disturbed, and that 
business could be conducted as usual during construction. 
With two exceptions Canfield confirmed his own design made in 
1839. First, he moved the passing basins from the south side of the 
canal to the north. Since the canal towpath had to be on the south 
side to avoid the rapids, Canfield had made a foolish error in 1839 in 
placing the basins on the same side. No mule born could tow a 
sailing ship out of a south basin when the prevailing winds came 
from the west. The second exception was to shift the course of a 
canal a mere two degrees at the cove to avoid a sandbar in the St. 
Mary's River. Since the canal banks would be of solid earth or rock 
at this point, Canfield, to avoid a washout, made a minor—but only 
minor—violation of the rule that the canal route must not curve.21 
Unfortunately, the two changes created a new problem that 
boded ill for the future. As Canfield noted, the center line of the 
canal passed 50 feet from the river bank at the cove. Since by law the 
canal must be 100 feet wide, the eastern passing basin (now moved to 
the north side of the canal) would extend into the cove. An 
embankment of earth might meet the situation, but any leak in the 
bank would cause serious trouble. If Canfield had realized the 
danger, he could easily have moved the basin farther west. To move 
the canal a major distance to the south was not a viable alternative, 
since this would have doubled its length and run it through the 
village. 
Canfield included in his report several pages concerning such 
technical matters as sand-catching piers, lake fluctuations, and 
machinery requirements, but one fact became obvious. He could not 
make an accurate cost estimate because he could not probe the lock 
location with an iron rod to a depth greater than five feet; the ground 
was too cluttered with heavy boulders. Canfield was quite candid 
about this weakness in his report. Further, he admitted that his 
estimate of $15,000 for transportation of materials was a wild guess. 
At this time he had no idea where to get limestone for the locks, and 
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limestone would be the major bulk item transported to the project. 
Concerning the dimensions and drainage of the locks, Canfield 
made two important decisions: the first proved wise, but the second, 
unfortunately, did not. Anticipating increases in the length of Great 
Lakes ships, the engineer decided to exceed the requirements of the 
law when he specified the locks' dimensions. Congress had required 
that they measure at least 60 feet wide and no less than 250 feet long, 
but Canfield proposed to construct them 70 feet wide and 300 feet 
long. The exceeding of federal dimensions, since it was increased 
even more by the legislature, was the most vital decision in the early 
history of the Sault canal. It would govern ship construction on the 
Great Lakes for decades, just as the dimensions of the locks of the 
Panama Canal governed United States naval construction for many 
years. Further, the length of the ships governed cargo-carrying 
capacity. Canfield's decision, reinforced by the legislature, played 
an important role in Lake Superior economics until the completion 
of the Weitzel Lock in 1881. 
For maintenance and repair there must be a way to drain the 
entire canal, and Canfield made a poor decision when he decided to 
meet the problem by constructing a caisson gate as near to Lake 
Superior as possible. The gate would be nothing more than a great, 
floating (when empty) watertight box. When not in use it would be 
pumped out and floated away to storage. When needed, it could be 
towed into place and sunk by refilling. It would then fit snugly 
between the canal sides and rest on the canal floor. In theory the 
mechanism was quite simple, but in practice it required such 
accurate masonry and carpentry that Canfield would have done 
better to order a simple guard gate. 
Canfield estimated a total cost of $557,739.10, after allowing a 5 
percent factor for contingencies. As it turned out, he would have 
been much closer to the actual cost if he had used a factor of 100 
percent. Army engineers as well as their civilian counterparts have 
long had a reputation for underestimating the costs of proposed 
projects. In 1836 the House Ways and Means Committee censured 
army and civilian engineers for misleading Congress with low 
estimates, and in 1845 a friend of the Reading Railroad criticized the 
low cost estimates of a potential rival canal project and wrote: "It is 
difficult enough to get new projects requiring large investments, and 
to carry them out. . . . These sorts of projects will not bear any 
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kind of discouragement, but on the contrary require all kinds of 
encouragement. Engineers must live; they, therefore, very naturally 
think it is fair to err on the safe side, for them." In this case Canfield's 
estimates were as ill-formed as Nichols's, but both men were quite 
straightforward in acknowledging their points of ignorance.22 
When Cass returned to Washington for the lame-duck session of 
Congress, he carried with him, for Colonel Abert, a set of drawings 
of the canal made by Canfield. In the meantime Canfield received 
the unanimous thanks of the Michigan legislature for his services to 
the state.23 
Legislation and a Contract

The development of plans and estimates for the canal project was 
one thing; ensuring its political survival was quite a different matter. 
Business and political rivalries were intense in Michigan in January 
1853, and both would have a bearing on the canal contract. 
Once it had become politically safe (or politically irrelevant) for 
him to do so, Lewis Cass pushed the canal bill through Congress. 
Then he stumped Michigan in behalf of canal supporter Robert 
McClelland. After the election the defeated candidate for governor, 
Whig mayor of Detroit Zachariah Chandler, blamed Cass for his 
loss, and the Detroit Daily Advertiser openly questioned whether 
Democrats could be trusted with the canal project.1 
Business rivalries were no less threatening to the project. The 
moment the Michigan Central Railroad's attorney James Joy 
appeared on the Lansing scene in behalf of canal bidders, the 
identity of these bidders would be revealed. The Michigan Central 
had a natural set of enemies in the Midwest, the officers of the 
Michigan Southern. The two railroads were constantly at war until 
1857, cutting rates, granting discounts, and fighting for business.2 
In addition, there was no secret about the cooperation between 
the leaders of the Michigan Central and those of the about-to-be 
formed New York Central Railroad. John Murray Forbes and 
Erastus Corning had taken control of the Michigan Central in 1846, 
and Forbes had been elected president. If Corning were to complete 
his consolidation of the New York Central in the mid 1850s, the 
Michigan Central could serve as a feeder—a bleak prospect for 
supporters of the Michigan Southern.3 
Several members of the Michigan legislature exhibited concern 
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about the railroad situation before the session opened. When a few 
approached Corning, Joy advised him to reassure them and refer 
them to the good offices of Joy and Porter (Joy's partner) in Detroit. 
To further coordinate his activities in the East and the Midwest, 
Corning sent Harvey to Detroit with a letter of introduction to John 
W. Brooks, superintendent of the Michigan Central, and to Joy. He 
also sent some sound advice, suggesting that as little commotion as 
possible attend the matter. Corning did not want to attract 
attention.4 
Despite the presence of Harvey, the critical figure at this stage of 
the canal project was James F. Joy. Joy had been born in New 
Hampshire, and had received his law degree from Harvard in 1835 
and moved to Detroit. During the early 1840s he was a leader in the 
effort to sell the Michigan Central to private buyers. John Brooks 
recognized Joy's ability when that project succeeded and persuaded 
him to enter the railroad business as general counsel of the Michigan 
Central. The railroad proved to be a hard school for the man 
described by Forbes as a "keen, clever energetic, Western lawyer." 
For the next years the principal goal of the Michigan Central was to 
obtain access to Chicago. Accomplishing it meant charter battles in 
the legislatures of Indiana and Illinois, with the Michigan Southern 
fighting every inch of the way. Finally Joy and Brooks solved the 
problem by purchasing control of the New Albany and Salem 
Railroad in Indiana, the chief asset of which consisted of a vague 
charter. Thus the Michigan Central reached Chicago. In 1853 Joy, 
at forty-two, was a veteran of legislative struggles, and already he 
and Brooks were casting their eyes farther west.5 
Canal interests were well represented when the Michigan 
legislature assembled in January 1853. Herman B. Ely attended as 
the representative of Chippewa County and the Sault. Judge 
William A. Burt had secured election from Macomb County, and 
his was a name to reckon with. In 1844 he led the party that had 
discovered iron ore in what would become known as the Marquette 
range. Following this discovery, he had invented the solar compass, 
an invaluable instrument for surveying in iron fields. In the 
preceding October he had assisted Canfield in the canal survey. Now 
he would be chairman of the Committee on Internal Improvements 
of the Michigan House of Representatives. Serving with Burt on this 
committee was Orrin Poppleton, an advocate of long canal locks. 
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Another member who kept Joy informed of legislative proceed­
ings when the attorney was absent from Lansing was Deodatus 
Whitwood.6 
On the evening of 29 December 1852, friends of the canal project 
held a meeting in Detroit with John Burt, a son of the judge, to see 
what general agreements could be reached in order to guide the 
legislature. From the session the group developed a consensus. The 
canal locks were to be as long as possible and at least sixty feet wide. 
A state commission should be appointed with the power to enter 
into contracts, appoint engineers, and inspect the finished project. 
The only disagreement arose over the matter of taxing the lands to 
be granted to the canal builders. One group held that the land should 
be taxed at once so that the tax burden would not fall unfairly on 
non-canal lands. Another group feared that if the lands were not 
tax-exempt for a least a limited period, as was the usual procedure in 
the sale or grant of all public lands, the state might have trouble 
finding anyone willing to build the canal. This issue would have to 
be settled by the legislature.7 
The following days were hectic ones for Joy. He agreed to help 
steer a canal bill favorable to the Corning interests through the 
legislature, but he would not invest in the project for himself or his 
friends. Harvey offered Joy a draft of a canal bill, which Joy 
amended for submission in Lansing. The little group in Detroit then 
decided on a division of labor: Brooks was to go east as soon as 
possible to consult with Corning on engineering details, Joy 
departed for Lansing with the drafted bill, and Harvey remained in 
Detroit. It was not intended that Joy linger in Lansing. The Illinois 
legislature was also in session, and the Michigan Central group had 
four measures pending in Springfield that required his attention. In 
Michigan, in addition to the canal problem, Brooks wanted an 
amendment passed to the Michigan Central charter; moreover, 
Whitwood probably needed the lawyer's guidance. Joy must have 
wished at times that he were twins, but his experience was typical of 
the entire canal project, in which a few men were trying to reach a 
number of goals at the same time.8 
Harvey did not relish his share of the duties and complained to 
Corning. In Harvey's own words, the friends of the canal project 
feared that his presence in Lansing might have an "injurious 
tendency" on the members of the legislature. Apparently Joy and 
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Brooks did not share the confidence in the bumptious young man 
that Corning and Fairbanks had displayed. Harvey did have the 
opportunity to consult with shipowner Eber Ward and learned from 
Ward that Ohio contractors would bid on the canal project. Ward 
indicated that he favored the Corning group, and the latter thus 
gained another valuable ally.9 
Finally Joy summoned Harvey to Lansing with the understand­
ing that the young man would keep out of sight. Rumors of fat 
profits to be made on the canal project circulated in the state capital. 
There were fears that speculators might seize the land without 
building the canal. Some legislators proposed so many restrictions 
and conditions in the canal contract as to make the project almost 
impossible. Joy, who was familiar with such situations, did not want 
Harvey to interfere. By 20 January he succeeded in having the canal 
bill introduced in the Michigan House.10 
The legislature had to make the final decision with regard to the 
length of the locks. Canfield had proposed to exceed federal 
requirements by building 300-foot locks. Others, including Brown 
at the Sault, held out for 350 feet. This figure upset Eber Ward, who 
pointed out to William Burt that obstructions in the St. Mary's 
River would restrict the class of steamers anyway. Ward thought 
that 260 feet would be an adequate length—and for his ships it 
would have been. Brown, anticipating the dispute, had warned that 
only second-class steamers could use the shorter locks. He averred 
that ships of lake size needed room and should not be permitted to 
bang against timber gates as Erie Canal barges sometimes did. A 
conference committee of the legislature succeeded in ironing out the 
last of these differences on 2 February, and McClelland signed the 
bill on 5 February. The locks would be 350 feet in length.11 
The legislature made no attempt to prescribe details of the canal 
other than to specify that the locks must be 350 feet long and 70 feet 
wide. Federal law set the depth at 12 feet. As was standard practice 
by the 1850s, the lawmakers also created a five-man commission 
whose members, along with a state engineer, would have 
considerable authority. The commissioners and the engineer were to 
be appointed by the governor with the consent of the state senate. 
They would have "the entire and absolute control of the 
construction of said canal." Since it was hardly expected that the 
entire five-member board would move to the Sault for two years, the 
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real authority under the law would be vested in the state engineer. 
Not only was the commission authorized to receive proposals for 
the canal's construction and to enter into contracts; it was also 
obliged to consider the responsibility of the persons offering to 
contract. Here the Corning group held a decided advantage. 
Security for performance was required. The contractors were to 
defray the necessary expenses of the commissioners and the salaries 
and expenses of the state engineer and his assistants. The state 
would then pay the commissioners and the engineers. 
The legislature agreed with Harvey's contention that the canal 
could and should be completed in two years, whereas Congress had 
permitted ten. The contracting party would be permitted to 
subcontract any part of the work it wished, but it was still 
responsible for completion in two years. Failure to complete would 
throw the contractor on the mercy of a future legislature. Although 
such a time limit would serve to discourage the fainthearted, it 
would also test Harvey severely. He would soon have to prove his 
own estimate or bring others down with him. 
The governor was authorized to appoint agents to select the 
750,000 acres required for the project. Most vital to the Corning 
interests was the provision granting to the contracting party the 
right to nominate such agents. The governor must appoint those 
recommended if he considered them qualified. Thus, if the governor 
was willing, the contracting party could nominate its own friends 
and, in effect, select the land it would receive. This was the only way 
the system could work. The state could not grant alternate sections 
along a canal only one mile long. On the other hand, no responsible 
party would enter into the agreement if some disinterested official 
could award 750,000 acres of swamp. The Michigan legislature 
decided not to relinquish the land until the project was completed, 
although federal law would have permitted Michigan to do so. Thus 
the contracting party would have to depend upon its own financial 
resources for the entire two-year period.12 
The law did not mention the tax status of the grant land, so Joy 
had more work to do in Lansing. One week later the legislature 
passed the desired supplementary act. The grant lands would be 
exempt from taxation for a period of five years, the standard 
provision with federal lands. If the contractors should sell the land 
within five years, then it would be taxed at once. The amount lost 
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from this policy of exemption would be charged to the general fund. 
However, the supplementary act also provided that the general fund 
be reimbursed from the canal tolls for this loss. Thus the burden of 
the loss would fall upon those who would gain the most from the 
canal, the Great Lakes shipping men.13 
With this favorable legislation passed, Joy could turn to other 
matters. Soon after the passage of the Michigan laws, Brooks and 
Coming's partner, Gilbert C. Davidson, were elected to the board of 
directors of the Chicago and Aurora Railroad; Joy was elected 
president. In the preceding year Joy, with the backing of Corning 
and Fairbanks, had struggled to gain control of the Central Military 
Tract Railroad. This fight was successfully concluded in August 
1852, and the railroad combination that would be called the 
Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy began to take shape under Joy's 
legal guidance. Two months after the passage of the canal bills in 
Michigan, the New York legislature granted the necessary measure 
to create the New York Central Railroad. Corning, who held a 
majority of the proxies, had personally taken charge of the lobby in 
Albany, and on 6 July 1853 the stockholders elected him president. 
Thus, in the highly critical months of 1853, several of the canal 
principals could give only a portion of their time to canal 
problems.14 
Harvey was confident of success as he left Michigan after the 
passage of the laws. He traveled to Utica, New York, for another 
consultation with Nichols, then to Albany to see Corning, and 
finally to St. Johnsbury to visit his original employer, Erastus 
Fairbanks. By this time Harvey had lost all interest in selling scales, 
but it was necessary for the eastern canal backers, including 
Fairbanks, to agree upon the specific form of their proposal.15 
Although the canal commission would receive bids until 1 April, 
by the middle of March Brooks began to worry. He warned Corning 
that the bids were beginning to arrive in Detroit, one of them 
postmarked Pittsburgh. Brooks, obviously aided by an informer, 
assumed that the bid came from one of the copper interests. He 
urged Corning to send a representative to Detroit before the 
opening of the bids.16 
Joy, more confident, predicted victory eight days before the 
Corning group presented its proposal and four days before he had 
even seen the proposal in its final form. Harvey reported by wire that 
 51 LEGISLATION AND A CONTRACT
all the eastern negotiations were completed and that he was on the 
way back to Detroit with the papers. On 30 March the canal 
commission held a meeting in Detroit attended by Brooks, who 
noted the presence of Whig politician Jacob Howard. Correctly 
identifying Howard as an enemy of the Corning group, Brooks 
realized that he would need Joy's help with the commission. He 
asked Joy to return from Chicago at once, reminding him that bids 
had to be presented by noon of the following day.17 
Joy and Harvey presented the proposal to the commission before 
the deadline. For the completion of the canal, the Corning group 
asked for the maximum payment that the law permitted, the entire 
750,000 acres tax-exempt for five years. There was no reason for 
them to do otherwise, for the state of Michigan would gain nothing 
by bargaining. Any land not used for the building of the canal would 
revert to the public domain under federal law. The state expected to 
recoup its tax losses from the canal tolls. 
So successful had Joy been in dealing with the commission that 
several sources independently predicted victory for the Corning 
proposal. One was the Detroit Free Press, which announced—on 
the day before the commission opened the bids—the awarding of the 
contract to the Corning interests and concluded, "We may, 
therefore, look upon the completion of the canal within two years as 
a FIXED FACT." Another was Captain Canfield, who knew on 4 
April that he was to be far more than an observer in the undertaking 
and reported to Colonel Abert that the Corning group would 
probably get the contract. Canfield, newly appointed engineer for 
the state of Michigan, wrote that the commission had been in 
session all of 4 April considering eight bids. He listed the names of 
Coming's associates, calling "all of them half million men." Since 
the Michigan law required the commission to consider the 
reputation and reliability of the bidders, Canfield had put his finger 
on the source of Coming's strength and Joy's optimism. He 
concluded to Abert, "If they take the contract it makes certain that 
the work will be done in a most satisfactory manner."18 
The commission's decision, therefore, was hardly surprising. On 5 
April it awarded the contract to the Corning group. The result was a 
new flurry of activity in Michigan and Albany. The announcement 
of the award did not automatically bring about the signing of the 
contract, and the opposition of Coming's enemies now became a 
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public matter. Edwin C. Litchfield of the Michigan Southern 
Railroad, with his attorney Jacob Howard, obtained injunctions in 
Ann Arbor, Jackson, and Detroit against the awarding of the 
contract. Litchfield had been an unsuccessful bidder, and he was 
obviously determined to harass the Corning group with his charge 
of corruption. Coming's friend Frederick Bronson called the 
injunctions "all moonshine" and correctly pointed out that the 
Litchfield group was actually helping Corning without realizing it. 
Although the contract was dated 5 April 1853, the two-year 
construction period would not begin until it had actually been 
signed and approved by Michigan's new governor, Andrew 
Parsons. The delay would give Harvey some extra time; it remained 
to be seen if he would take full advantage of it.19 
Harvey's first concern was the land grant. Sault editor J. Venen 
Brown had warned him that there might be a land rush in the Upper 
Peninsula as soon as the navigation season opened in 1853, and that 
the company had better be ready to move fast. In a letter undated, 
unsigned, and headed, "Read and Burn," Brown admitted that his 
paper was suffering financially; he therefore proposed a deal. He 
would look after the Corning group's land interests and give the 
project favorable publicity if Harvey could find some way of 
offering compensation. Seeing an opportunity to gain an advantage 
over other land-seekers, Harvey decided to take .advantage of the 
dubious offer. He boarded the steamship Albany and headed north 
as soon as the decision of the commission had been announced. 
With him he took a certificate, signed by Governor Parsons on 5 
April, making him a canal land agent.20 
Harvey was also concerned with obtaining a source of high-grade 
limestone for the facing of the canal locks. Brown assured him that 
he owned such land on Lime Island and knew of other suitable 
deposits on Drummond's Island. Both locations were within forty 
miles of the Sault. Harvey took with him a land warrant so that he 
might purchase these sites outright. As he had anticipated, however, 
the St. Mary's River was still jammed with ice, and the Albany could 
steam no closer to the Sault and its land office than forty miles. 
Rejecting the hazardous overland hike, Harvey forwarded by 
messenger a number of documents and a letter of instruction to 
Brown. He ordered Brown to file in behalf of the Corning group for 
as much as he could of the best mineral land available, including 
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property contiguous to all operating mines near Lake Gogebic, 
5,000 acres at the mouth of the Chocolay River, land near the iron 
fields at Marquette, and "Jackson's Iron Mountain." Harvey also 
forwarded the land warrant, instructing Brown to purchase the 
limestone sources. To support Brown in these ventures, Harvey 
forwarded his certificate of appointment as land agent, as well as a 
letter deputizing Brown as a canal land agent.21 
It was probable that Brown realized at once the illegality of the 
last document. Harvey had no authority to appoint land agents; 
only the governor could do so. At any rate, Brown acted swiftly and 
filed for the mineral lands in behalf of the Corning group. The 
legality of this move would be a matter for others to worry about. 
The land warrant posed a different problem. Brown had decided 
to purchase the mineral lands in his own and Harvey's name. Having 
conducted a search for limestone, however, on 10 May he bought 
four lots on Drummond's Island in his name alone! He later 
explained accurately to Harvey that the deposits of limestone on 
Lime Island were not suitable for the project and that he did not 
want to waste Harvey's warrant on useless land. In June the 
unsuspecting Harvey placed Brown on his payroll at a salary of 
$2,000 per year, retroactive to 1 January 1853. When he left the St. 
Mary's River in April to return to Detroit, Harvey was satisfied that 
he had beaten the land-hungry speculators. Not the least worried 
about Brown, he reported to Corning, "Everything relating to the 
canal enterprise here seems to be in the best possible shape."22 
Harvey then prepared to go east once again. Considering that 
nothing had been done in Detroit to prepare for the actual digging of 
the canal, he was headed in the wrong direction. He was no longer 
needed in the East, where men more competent than he were 
available to deal with the New York legislature and the details of 
organizing a company. His post instead should have been Detroit. 
Since the navigation season usually opened in early May, he should 
by then have had an advance crew of hundreds equipped with tools 
and ready to go to the Sault. These could be followed by as many as 
1,000 men by 1 July. Such preparation would have taken much 
organizing in Detroit in April, yet Harvey elected to be elsewhere. It 
would seem that he failed to grasp the magnitude of the task ahead. 
The Litchfield injunctions forced a minor change in Coming's 
plans. Instead of waiting for a signed contract with the State of 
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Michigan, he would have to obtain a charter in Albany before the 
New York legislature adjourned. That Corning proceeded to do this 
without delay was a good indication of his opinion of the 
injunctions. 
There were a number of reasons why Corning in April 1853 could 
obtain almost anything he wanted from his legislature. At that time 
William Marcy was serving his second month as secretary of state, 
with jobs to fill. Corning and Marcy were on friendly terms, and 
John V. L. Pruyn, Coming's associate, had served as intermediary 
between Pierce and Marcy before Pierce had selected his secretary 
of state. As a result Corning found his mail filled with requests for 
federal jobs. For the time being he was in a favored position in the 
New York Democratic party.23 
Nor would Corning have any difficulty with the Whig opposition. 
With Fillmore in retirement, Thurlow Weed and his associates led 
the party. Weed could hardly have blocked the completion of a 
Sault canal, since he had been strongly advocating one in his own 
newspaper since 1847. Further, in spite of political rivalry, Corning 
and Weed were personal friends. Also helping Corning was the fact 
that both New York's Whig senators had voted for the canal bill in 
Congress. Whig editor Horace Greeley's favorable stand on the 
matter was well known. The Whigs were hardly in a position to 
reverse themselves, especially when the matter did not directly 
concern New York. Thus Corning obtained his canal charter law, 
just as ten days earlier he had won the New York Central charter 
from the same legislature. Harvey, in Albany, notified Joy.24 
The act of the New York legislature was simple enough, and for 
the first time the Corning group had an official name. Their 
organization was to be called "The St. Mary's Falls Ship Canal 
Company."25 It was created for only two purposes: to enter into a 
contract with the State of Michigan to build the canal, and to 
facilitate the "taking, holding, improving, selling, and conveying 
the . .  . lands as granted." The capital stock issue of the 
corporation was set at $400,000, with the directors at liberty to 
increase the issue to $1,000,000 at a later date. Individual shares 
were to have a par value of $ 100, and the sum of $5 per share must be 
paid at the time of the subscription for the stock. As soon as the 
capital stock had been subscribed, the company could elect a board 
of directors and officers; and, at the time of organizing, the company 
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must have a minimum of $20,000 available to begin construction. 
The law called for seven directors to hold office for one year as 
elected by the stockholders. Notices of the annual meeting must be 
placed in a newspaper in New York City and in the State of 
Michigan. The directors had the authority to issue further calls on 
the stock until all the stock subscribed for had been paid in full. 
Failure to meet such a call carried the penalty of forfeiture of the 
stock and all payments made to date. The law set a limit on bonded 
indebtedness at $250,000.26 
While Corning was overseeing the law's passage in Albany, Joy, 
on railroad business in Chicago, was attempting to direct his Detroit 
law partner in clearing up the vexatious injunctions. The canal 
contract was held in the safe of the Michigan Central Railroad in 
Detroit, pending the end of harassment. On 28 April, Joy ordered 
Porter to get the Detroit injunction dissolved. Then, "without a 
word being said to anyone about it," Deodatus Whitwood was to 
take a copy of the dissolving order and the contract to Lansing for 
the approval of the governor. Joy emphasized that no one in Detroit 
must know where Whitwood had gone or for what purpose. Upon 
learning that Harvey had returned to Detroit, Joy ordered him to 
help Porter; but in spite of their efforts, the Detroit enemies of the 
canal were able to obtain a delay.27 
The hearing on the Jackson injunction came next, and Joy could 
wire Corning that at least one of the nuisances had been eliminated. 
He then instructed Porter to take the contract to Michigan canal 
commissioners Shubael Conant and Henry Ledyard for their 
signatures, since these two men happened to live in Detroit. 
Whitwood would then take the papers to Lansing. Again Joy was 
frustrated, however; Brooks wrote in exasperation that the 
commissioners would not execute the contract until all the 
injunctions had been dissolved. Brooks suggested that the canal 
commissioners be persuaded instead to write a letter requesting the 
company to begin the project. It was his opinion that such a letter 
would constitute a contract and would "give us all courage at 
once."28 
Corning had courage enough for everybody. Perhaps he 
remembered the words of James Joy as the Michigan Central fought 
to gain entry into Chicago: "These are times when bold action is the 
only safe action." In any case, he proceeded with the financing and 
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organizing of his company as if the injunctions did not exist. The 
stockholders must meet in New York City. The company must hire 
an engineer. Brooks, who objected to certain engineering 
specifications and had advanced his own plan for financing the 
company, must be dealt with. Forbes and Joy must be included on 
the team. Corning had to attend to all these matters in April, May, 
June, and July 1853, and these were also the months of the 
formation of the New York Central. John V. L. Pruyn estimated the 
combined values of the railroads involved in the merger to be in 
excess of $30,000,000. Corning could hardly give his first attention 
to canal matters.29 
It had been Coming's intention that the first and most important 
stockholders' meeting be held on 10 May. But Harvey, who should 
have been quite aware of the stipulations of the New York law, had 
neglected to insert the required notice in a Michigan newspaper 
before leaving Detroit for Albany. Corning assumed that the notice 
had been published; his first intimation of the slip came when 
Brooks rushed a newspaper notice to Albany for his signature. 
Brooks was more alert than Harvey, and he wanted to avoid a new 
legal tangle in Detroit. The delay forced Corning to reschedule the 
meeting, first for 12 May and then for 14 May. The result was a 
growl from St. Johnsbury. Governor Fairbanks had canceled his 
appointments for 10 May in order to go to the meeting; now he 
wanted to know the reason for its postponement. Further 
complicating matters was the illness of Pruyn, who would look after 
such matters in the future with meticulous care. Altogether, it was 
hardly an auspicious beginning.30 
Meanwhile, Corning continued his efforts to organize the new 
company. He managed to persuade Forbes to take a financial 
interest in the project, and in turn Forbes agreed to approach 
Nathaniel Thayer, a major stockholder in the Michigan Central and 
New York Central railroads. Corning then asked Forbes to be a 
director of the Canal Company. The request brought the reluctant 
reply, "It is inconvenient to go on but I will if you consider it 
important." Corning considered it important, and on the back of 
Forbes's telegram he wrote seven names: J. W. Brooks, James F. 
Joy, Erastus Fairbanks, John M. Forbes, John F. Seymour, E. 
Corning, and John V. L. Pruyn. Joy had once refused to take a 
financial interest in the canal project; but Corning had managed to 
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convert him in four months, and he now subscribed for 312 shares. 
Brooks subscribed for 400 shares, an enormous number for a 
railroad superintendent, although his salary was unusually high. 
(He apparently had some peculiar ideas on how to finance the 
project so as to minimize the demands on the Brooks bank account.) 
Corning was helped in the subscription drive by the general 
condition of the railroad stock market in 1853. Forbes considered 
the market bearish and the western situation overdeveloped, but 
business editor Henry Varnum Poor noted that western railroad 
stocks were selling well above par. Certainly there were fewer stock 
bargains in 1853 than there had been in 1850. At any rate, Coming's 
efforts produced the board of directors he wanted. When the 
stockholders finally met in the offices of Duncan, Sherman & 
Company on 14 May, they elected the seven men whose names 
Corning had written on the back of Forbes's telegram. The directors 
then elected Corning president, Brooks vice-president, and Pruyn 
secretary-treasurer. Finally, upon a motion of Forbes, seconded by 
Seymour, the directors elected Harvey the general agent of the 
Canal Company with broad executive powers.31 
With the company organized and $20,000 in its till (and more to 
come in sooner than Brooks anticipated), Harvey might have been 
expected to head for the Sault with an advance working crew within 
hours of the adjournment of the meeting. He had already wasted 
enough time in Albany watching Corning handle the New York 
legislature. Nor were the injunctions an excuse for delay; they were 
obviously a farce, and Corning enterprises did not always stand 
upon ceremony in such matters. For example, Pruyn had altered the 
rate structure of the Utica and Schenectady Railroad on instruc­
tions from Corning four days before the signing of the New York 
Central merger agreement, although, strictly speaking, he had no 
right to do so. Nevertheless, Harvey continued to waste valuable 
time by proceeding to New England to negotiate loans for Joy and 
Porter. Brooks too was badly out of position, but he had a good 
excuse. Immediately after the stockholders meeting, he had 
undergone surgery in Boston, and he was now recovering under the 
watchful eye of Forbes. The Boston financier warned Corning that 
Brooks "needs some relief which we must contrive and manage for 
him or he will break down." He was right, but Brooks's real ordeal 
was still to come. The best thing that Corning could have done for 
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Brooks would have been to get Harvey to attend to business in 1853. 
This he failed to do, although Harvey did return to Albany in time to 
consult with Corning and Nichols after the latter had consented to 
serve as engineer for the Canal Company.32 
In giving Harvey a large measure of authority over the canal 
project, to say nothing of acquiescing to his travels, Corning was 
following a procedure born of necessity. He was, among other 
things, a highly successful merchant. Buying and selling had given 
him the financial base from which to branch out into railroading, 
canal building, and land speculation. Like all successful merchants 
of the era, he had to pay strict attention to the minute details of 
business. Success, however, brought the problem of distance and the 
necessity of making firm commitments and establishing authority 
many miles from Albany. Communications were often difficult, and 
telegraph messages were not always private. To add to the difficulty, 
Corning was forced to spend a great part of his life walking with the 
aid of crutches as a result of a childhood hip injury. 
Corning solved the problem by using rare judgment in his choice 
of partners and associates. These were given considerable authority, 
and as a rule they held Corning in high esteem. He was also willing to 
intercede with associates over whom he had no direct authority. In 
1847 Corning recognized Brooks's difficult position as superinten­
dent of the Michigan Central while Forbes ran the railroad from a 
desk in Boston. Corning told Brooks that he considered him to be 
the "responsible agent" of the railroad and advised him to demand 
more authority from Forbes. Brooks, who was in his late twenties at 
the time, must have appreciated this word of confidence.33 
With Harvey, therefore, Corning followed a well-established 
practice that usually worked for him. As the last of the injunctions 
was dissolved, it remained to be seen if this time Coming's—and 
Fairbanks's—judgment was as sound as usual. Governor Parsons 
approved the contract on 19 May. Thus 19 May 1855 became the 
target date for the completion of the canal and a cardinal date in the 
lives of Corning and his associates.34 
5 Complacency 1853 
On 3 June the advance party finally embarked for the Sault on the 
steamboat Albany. Since navigation had opened in the first week of 
May, Harvey had wasted one month of valuable time. On board the 
Albany were Harvey, Canfield, and two newcomers to the project, 
Major James L. Glenn and Charles W. Chapel. Glenn was an early 
resident and prominent citizen of Cass County, Michigan, who had 
served as sheriff and state representative in the 1840s. Educated as a 
civil engineer, he was appointed to a commission to plan and survey 
Lansing and to erect a statehouse in 1847. He had had no experience 
in canal construction when, in 1853, he was made assistant state 
engineer, responsible to Canfield and the canal commission. 
Chapel, a resident of Utica, Michigan, had been the co-owner of a 
flour mill. His only experience with "canal problems" had been his 
successful lawsuit against the State of Michigan for the diversion of 
his water supply. In 1852 he employed Joy and Porter as legal 
counsel, and he probably came to the attention of the canal 
company through Joy. The company hired him to be superintendent 
of excavation, a job that would not be very demanding as long as he 
had adequate manpower and tools. With the party sailed about one 
hundred workmen.1 
Of all the people aboard the Albany, Canfield was in the most 
unusual position. All the others knew that he was now the chief 
engineer for the state and were aware of his authority under the 
canal law. They assumed that he would play a passive role, objecting 
only if the specifications were violated or poor workmanship 
displayed. What they probably did not know was that Canfield was 
under direct orders from Colonel Abert to "superintend the 
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construction of the canal at Saut Ste. Marie," and sooner or later he 
might exert executive authority to carry out Abert's orders. It was a 
difficult situation, not helped by the fact that Canfield wore several 
hats and was trying to do a number of jobs at once. He had surveyed 
and designed the canal, and now, as state engineer and superinten­
dent of canal construction, he would have to approve his own 
handiwork. In addition, he was directing the dredging of Lake St. 
Clair, 400 miles away at the foot of Lake Huron, where he had left 
his draftsman in charge. Finally, he had general supervision of all 
lighthouses and harbor work on Lake Superior. Such an overload 
was Canfield's reward for exceptional ability and experience.2 
The Albany docked at the Sault on 6 June, and preliminary work 
began at once. It would first be necessary to erect a number of rough 
shanties to house the work force, another task that should have been 
done in May. The construction took almost two weeks; meanwhile 
the engineers scoured the countryside for limestone. On 11 June the 
steamship London arrived from Detroit with 40,000 feet of lumber, 
cattle and carts, and twenty-four workmen, including twelve 
carpenters. Still to come were wheelbarrows, picks, shovels, and 
crowbars from Albany.3 
If Sault editor Brown realized the significance of the tool shortage 
he reported, he refrained from comment. Every week his newspaper 
carried columns of advertising for Detroit stores and warehouses 
that would probably stock all the equipment needed at the Sault, 
since these same tools were essential to the mining industry. If they 
could be brought to the Sault from Detroit in three or four days, 
why wait for delivery from Albany, 700 miles away? 
Though Brown did not know it, Corning was implementing 
another of his standard practices. He would serve as president of the 
Canal Company without salary, but all the iron tools and supplies 
must be bought at his own Albany warehouses and foundry, 
enabling him to make a good profit, though not an exorbitant one. 
His iron foundary, already the major supplier for the Michigan 
Central and the Utica and Schenectady Railroads, was about to 
assume a similar responsibility for the New York Central as well. In 
the 1850s this was considered legitimate business practice; 
moreover, the general quality of Coming's merchandise was 
excellent. He was building for his own future, not planning to dump 
a shoddy railroad on someone else. The practice would not come 
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into question until the 1870s, after a number of shoddy railroads had 
been peddled, and by 1875 it would be roundly condemned. In the 
case of the canal, however, the problem was timing rather than 
inferior merchandise. Knowing that the tools must come from 
Albany, Harvey should have made arrangements in April and May.4 
Slowly, much too slowly, the labor force built up at the Sault. By 
the end of June, there were only 232 men, including supervisors, 
engineers, and a housekeeping crew. July passed with the number 
climbing to 340. In the month of August, 115 more men arrived, but 
in September only 4 new hands were added. On 22 September, 
Harvey reported in round numbers the allocation of his work force. 
He had 300 men in the excavation, 40 carpenters and helpers next to 
the lock pits, 45 lumbermen in the forests, and 35 men in a nearby 
quarry. The numbers were woefully inadequate, yet on 23 August, 
Harvey reported excellent progress.5 
Had Harvey grasped the magnitude of the task before him, the 
application of the most elementary mathematics would have thrown 
him into shock. On 1 August, Brooks reported from Detroit that 
188,000 cubic yards of excavation remained to be done. It needed 
only a simple equation to point out the danger ahead: 
percent of excavation completed _ man-days of work completed 
percent of excavation remaining man-days of work remaining 
Harvey knew both factors on the left side of the equation; he knew, 
or could establish from his pay records, the man-days completed; he 
knew how many construction days remained to complete the 
contract, allowing a factor for inclement weather. He needed only to 
solve the equation to form a good estimate of his manpower 
requirement—but apparently Brooks solved it for him. Editor 
Brown could marvel at the four "monstrous cranes" in operation, 
but he did not know that Canfield had recommended ten for the lock 
pits alone. Brown began to use the ominous word "granite" as early 
as 2 July, when Harvey ordered granite boulders drilled so that they 
could be blasted to celebrate the nation's birthday. It was a grand 
but empty gesture. What was needed was more manpower.6 
The situation would not alarm Brooks until September, when he 
was to rush more men to the work site from Detroit. Despite 
difficulties in recruitment, in the ten days prior to 5 November he 
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sent about 350 men to Harvey, but by that time the work season was 
nearly over. Moreover, competition for labor in the Upper 
Peninsula was keen. Mineowners were looking for men who might 
be willing to spend the winter working in the copper fields, and they 
were not above hiring canal men traveling on the boats between 
Detroit and the Sault, even men whose fare the Canal Company had 
paid. At the same time, however, the work force in the United States 
was growing. In 1852 more than 360,000 people emigrated from the 
British Isles, with above 80 percent coming to the United States, a 
migration that continued until the panic of 1857. The wave of 
German immigrants, numbering 215,000 in 1854 alone, was about 
to reach its crest. A labor supply was available, but the Canal 
Company would have to work to get it.7 
Low wages and poor morale were the chief deterrents to 
maintaining an adequate work force. Harvey offered standard 
wages for extra-long work days. The men who boarded with the 
company, as most did, received $20 a month; day laborers earned 
$1.10 per day. In comparison Corning paid his labor on the New 
York Central about $1 per day after the general wage reduction of 
1857. Years earlier, laborers on the Erie Canal had received from $8 
to $12 per month. True, the Sault Canal Company fed and sheltered 
most of its men, but many years later Harvey estimated the cost of 
boarding the men at only 19c a day per man. (Brooks estimated the 
cost at 33c.) Men who did not live and board in the company's 
shanties could buy supplies through the company store, where 
Harvey undersold the local merchants, much to their displeasure. A 
barrel of flour, for example, cost $ 10 on the local Sault market, and 
Harvey sold it for $8. Brooks, Corning, and Fairbanks would not 
have tolerated gouging of workers at the company store, an ugly 
practice that began in a later era. The chief morale problems were 
twofold. First, the company expected its men to work eleven and a 
half hours a day at a time when the standard work day was ten 
hours. Then, after a month of monotonous toil, the workers had 
nothing on which to spend their wages except whiskey. Thus the 
labor force dribbled in slowly until Brooks saw the urgent need for 
more men. By October masons were reporting in squads of two or 
three, and those skilled in their trade were making $3 per day while 
those less skilled received $2.50.8 
Other problems beset Harvey, among them bookkeeping 
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difficulties. He had neglected to secure the services of a bookkeeper 
until it was too late for him to attend to the matter himself. He then 
asked Fairbanks to get the address of a man in Pittsburgh who 
might do, and Fairbanks discovered that no such person existed. 
Fairbanks then called upon Corning for help. Eventually C. E. 
Bigelow took the job and reported on 1 August that the company 
books at the Sault were in such disorder that he could not vouch for 
the accuracy of what he was doing. By that time the company had 
already spent over $36,000. Harvey's careless habits with money had 
also gotten him into trouble with Pruyn, the company's secretary-
treasurer. Before leaving for the Sault, Harvey had drawn a sight 
draft on Pruyn for $10,000, and Pruyn did not know what to do with 
it. He complained to Corning that "these matters should not be done 
in this loose way," and suggested that in the future Brooks 
countersign Harvey's drafts, a suggestion that would not find favor 
with Harvey.9 
The men had been at work for barely two months when they 
decided that the work day was too long for the money received. On 1 
August the labor force went on strike, demanding that the Canal 
Company adopt the standard ten-hour day or increase the wages by 
$6 a month for the eleven and one-half hour day. However, they 
quickly learned that when they were boarded by their employer and 
lived in his shanties, they acquired certain disadvantages in a strike. 
Harvey later wrote, "Feeling that to seccumb [sic] to such a 
movement was to entail a series of strikes and compromises on the 
progress of the work, I refused mildly but firmly to change the Co. 
terms whatever,—stopped their monthly pay and removed the 
deposits' [sic] of food and bed clothing from the shanties before the 
succeeding meal." The men could work or starve. Eighty opted for 
the first choice the following morning. Harvey watched over the 
workers, as the strikers threatened to stone them. After an hour or 
so he was satisfied, and ordered the work stopped and the men fed 
for the first time in twenty-four hours. By the end of the day, nearly 
all were back in the excavation. According to Harvey, "The main 
cause was the influence of the grog shop keepers who disliked the 
temperance rules of the Co. one of whom I had arrested, and kept in 
jail till he asked forgiveness with due humility." Another day and 
half had been lost.10 
As the summer passed, Brooks, in Detroit, was not yet aware that 
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the project was in serious trouble. His railroad responsibilities did 
not permit him to go to the Sault until the second week in August, so 
for the most part he had to rely on the enthusiastic reports from 
Harvey. Harvey needed a stream tug, and Brooks bought him the 
Dart. Harvey also requested a small fleet of scows to haul lumber. 
Brooks tried to purchase them "ready made" from the Ohio Canal at 
Cleveland and expressed annoyance to Corning that he had not 
been warned in advance that the scows would be needed. On 1 
August, encouraged by Harvey's optimism, Brooks told Corning 
that 100,000 cubic yards of earth and rock would be excavated in the 
next four months.11 
In early July, Harvey had decided to subcontract the major task 
of providing the heavy timber and planking for the lock floors, 
gates, caisson gate, piers, and wharves. By the time the local 
lumbermen had submitted their bids, July was over. Upon opening 
the bids of 1 August, Harvey discovered that no one had attempted 
to bid on the entire lumber requirement. It should have been a 
warning to him, for the entire job was too great an undertaking for 
any one of the experienced men of the Upper Peninsula. 
Characteristically, Harvey decided that the Canal Company could 
provide its own heavy timber "at a saving of 3%" (hence the sudden 
need for the scows). Only the planking would be subcontracted, at a 
rate of $ 11.50 per thousand feet of pine and $ 16 per thousand feet of 
oak. Harvey reported that he had located a fine stand of pine and 
had at once procured it for the company.12 
Meanwhile, land problems began to plague the Canal Company 
as a result of Harvey's illegal and impetuous delegation of authority 
in April. The land that Brown had reserved for the company on 27 
April had suddenly been returned to the public domain and then 
immediately reclaimed by Harvey on 21 June. It was a rather clear 
admission on Harvey's part that the Brown claims might not be 
valid. But what of the rights of those who had entered the canal 
lands under the assumption that Brown had acted without 
authority? A cry of protest arose from several with land interests in 
the Upper Peninsula, led by State Representative Abner Sherman, 
and he and his friends appealed to Washington. The secretary of the 
interior was none other than former Michigan governor Robert 
McClelland, a friend of the canal project; he ruled in favor of the 
Canal Company on 27 January 1854. The Brown claims as reentered 
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by Harvey were sustained, but the company now had a bitter enemy 
in Sherman.13 
As the construction season approached its end, it was time for the 
Canal Company directors to take stock of the progress made. As a 
result of his several visits to the Sault, Brooks had spurred Harvey 
into increased activity and had sent him additional workers. By the 
middle of August, Harvey had assigned all available labor to the 
lock pits. Excavating the pits was vital to the time schedule, since the 
flooring timber could not be put in place until the excavation was 
completed. In turn, the masonry work could not commence until the 
flooring was in, nor could it continue after the first heavy frost of 
winter. Harvey should have concentrated on lock excavation in 
June to the exclusion of everything else except dock work. The rest 
of the canal, a simple ditch, could be excavated later while the 
masons were at work in the locks. Again Harvey had failed to plan 
ahead.14 
Canfield tried to improve the situation by designing and con­
structing a bailing wheel powered by the water of the rapids. By 
keeping the locks reasonably dry, this released men from the 
onerous task of pumping for more important work. Canfield, with 
his numerous obligations, was forced to spend part of his time 
supervising the St. Clair dredging project, but even while in Detroit 
he worked on models of canal locks. He fell ill in July, and at the end 
of the summer reported, "I never in my life was so busy as I am just at 
this time."15 
Harvey did not realize it, but in spite of all his problems he was 
having good luck with the weather. Although at least some rain fell 
on half the days in June, the weather for the next four months was 
excellent for construction work. The highest temperature recorded 
in Fort Brady in July was 81 degrees; in August, 86. It rained only 
fifteen times during these important sixty-two days. Fall was mild, 
and the Dart was able to haul timber up the St. Mary's River until 
19 December. The men on the project remained in good health.16 
Nevertheless, Nichols made the first discouraging report from the 
Sault on 15 September, with a warning that the work might not be 
completed on time. He noted that about one-seventh of the time 
allotted had passed and that about two-sevenths, or 64,000 cubic 
yards, of excavation had been completed. However, the remaining 
excavation would be far more difficult and expensive. Much would 
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be in rock, which must be lifted greater distances as the work 
progressed. Furthermore, the job would certainly be slowed down 
by winter weather. As to the locks, the best that Nichols could 
promise was that the foundation would be complete in the upper 
lock and some of the masonry put in place. How much would 
depend upon the weather. The lower lock was in bad shape; more 
than 20,000 cubic feet of excavation remained to be done. No 
masonry work would be undertaken in the lower lock that year, and 
the foundation placement would again be determined by the 
weather. 
Nichols then turned his attention to the coming year and 
produced some of the estimates that Harvey should have completed 
months before. If all the face stone for the locks was to come from 
Maiden, in Canada near Detroit, a great shipping effort would be 
needed. Here Nichols indicated that he doubted the availability of 
prime limestone from Drummond's Island, a doubt that proved to 
be only too well founded. All the face stone must be at the Sault by 1 
October 1854 to complete the masonry work before frost. Face 
stone weighed 4,000 pounds per cubic yard, and 5,000 cubic yards 
would be required. This meant that the Canal Company must 
import 11,500 tons of limestone. A schooner of 200-ton capacity 
needed three weeks for a trip from Detroit and back. In the five 
months of shipping time available before 1 October 1854, one 
schooner could haul only 1,400 tons of stone. Thus, by Nichols's 
simple calculations, the Canal Company would require the services 
of eight schooners! Little wonder that after reading Nichols's report 
Corning began to press his stockholders. 
Transporting backing stone for the lock walls would also present 
a problem, according to Nichols. This stone, which need not be of 
high quality, could be obtained from several places on Drummond's 
Island. However, 23,000 tons would be required, which was more 
than the Dart could handle in one season. Nor did Nichols make any 
allowance for the possibility that the Dart might be grounded or 
plagued with mechanical problems. Calculating the amount of stone 
one mason could set each day, he warned that at least 125 masons 
would be needed to complete the job. 
There were a few bright spots in Nichols's report. He predicted— 
mistakenly, as it turned out—that Harvey would have all the heavy 
timber at the Sault by the end of the working season, and that the 
Dart could be released for other work. The planking was expected 
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on contract on 20 September, but would not be needed until the 
heavy timbers were in place. Nichols reported that Harvey intended 
to retain 300 men during the winter to work on the excavation. He 
made only one comment regarding the supervision of the project. 
"We need a thorough, energetic, and experienced boss mason to 
take charge of the quarrying, cutting, and laying of the masonry who 
we should employ at once." Nichols might have added that, if the 
face stone had to come from Maiden, the company would need two 
such men.17 
Harvey of course saw a copy of the report and, in a covering series 
of letters, began to prepare his defense. He stated outright that the 
excavation and timber work during the 1853 season had been 
entirely under his direct control. He complained about the 
difficulties of working 400 miles from his base of supply and 
explained that it was hard to keep a full work crew on hand because 
other parties tried to hire the men away from the Canal Company. 
Nevertheless, and in spite of the cold facts of Nichols's arithmetic, 
Harvey promised that the masonry would be finished early in the 
next season. It would seem that, even with some practical experience 
behind him, Harvey still could not grasp the magnitude of his 
responsibilities. He concluded to Joy, "I fully concur with Mr. 
Nichols that it will require extraordinary exertion . .  . to open the 
canal one year from this fall, but I think it can and will be done"1* 
Others were not so sure. Canfield reported quietly to Colonel 
Abert, "The work has not progressed as rapidly during the summer 
as it should have done in order to assure its completion within the 
limited time. I think it possible that it may be done—but I am not 
confident that it will be." Brown also began to doubt that the canal 
would be completed on time. He began editorial attacks on Harvey, 
making the obvious criticism that the Canal Company had not 
employed enough men during the summer. Since he knew more 
about the rigors of a Sault winter than did Harvey or Nichols, he 
predicted that very little work would be accomplished after 1 
December.19 
It must have been obvious to the Canal Company directors that 
Harvey would have to be replaced or at least given a more limited 
assignment. There had been too many promises leading to too many 
failures and half-successes. Brooks and Corning set out to find a new 
superintendent in the late fall of 1853. 
Harvey, aware of the move, defended himself to Corning. Here­
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tofore, he had taken great pride in his complete authority at the 
Sault, and in later years he would again claim this authority with 
equal pride; but in November 1853 his defenses were completely 
down. Although noting that Brooks had never indicated any 
dissatisfaction with work progress, he stated to Corning that he had 
never expected to do all that was forced upon him and agreed that a 
new man should be placed in charge of construction.20 
In his plea to Fairbanks, Harvey expressed more reluctance about 
his possible replacement. He wrote of his fear that Brooks "may 
effect some change in my position before I have an average chance to 
show what I can do." He asked for the opportunity to stay on until 1 
June 1854 and then step aside for another man if Brooks was not 
satisfied with the work accomplished during the winter. Finally, 
Harvey reminded Fairbanks (who probably did not need to be 
reminded) that the brothers in St. Johnsbury had championed him 
when they barely knew him and that his failure would reflect upon 
them.21 
However, Brooks was determined on a replacement, and the man 
he wanted was John T. Clark, an engineer with experience in canal 
construction. Clark had served as resident engineer, eastern 
subdivision, middle division of the Erie Canal, and had received a 
promotion to division engineer. He had served in this post for two 
years, supervising the enlargement of the canal in his district. He left 
the canal in 1853 to become chief engineer of the Great Western 
Railroad. Now, at a directors meeting in Albany on 1 December 
1853, he became the Canal Company's choice as a replacement for 
Harvey. Brooks wrote to him, "We want a smart pushing man to go 
up to the Sault St. Mary next spring and take charge of the 
construction of our canal." He offered Clark $5,000 to complete the 
job. The figure was unusually high, and later Brooks had to defend it 
to Fairbanks. As it turned out, Clark was not available, and Harvey 
was given a reprieve.22 
One promise to the Canal Company Harvey more than fulfilled. 
He had hoped to retain 300 men at the Sault over the winter, but 
when the last boat left for Detroit, he found that he had about 400 
willing to remain. Some were axemen, who continued to supply 
timbers for the piers and lock flooring, but most labored in the 
excavation. No harder work existed in the Sault winter, and the 
difficulties must at times have seemed insurmountable. When 
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Harvey ordered that a ditch be dug to the required final depth along 
one side of the canal for its entire length, the ditch filled with water in 
a severe rain storm. By the next morning it was solidly packed with 
ice, and Harvey lost his simple and convenient depth gauge. Often 
the workers' first job, upon reporting to the excavation site early in 
the morning, was to locate the tools they had left the day before; 
time and again these tools would be buried under a deep blanket of 
snow. The men soon learned to take sightings upon the cranes or 
other prominent structures before leaving their tools for the night. 
Harvey reported the frustration that often accompanied the 
excavation of the final two inches of rock. The men would first have 
to dig through two feet of ice simply to reach the rock. They then 
were likely to discover that the final two inches in fact constituted 
the top part of a granite boulder eighteen inches thick, all of which 
would have to come out. And yet Harvey advised Fairbanks that the 
current working force would complete the canal, except for the 
masonry, by 1 August 1854.23 
During these winter months all hands at the Sault ate breakfast 
before daylight and went out to work as soon as it was light enough 
to see. Harvey permitted the men only three-quarters of an hour for 
dinner at noon; they then worked until dark. Since the winter 
operation cost the Canal Company $8,000 a month, Harvey insisted 
on working in all but the most bitter weather. He did permit the men 
to rest for one-quarter of the day on 2 January, a Monday, when 
they ate an extra supply of fresh meat and apples in honor of the 
New Year. Harvey told Fairbanks that the men were so content with 
this treatment that they voted unanimously to bring the Maine Law 
(prohibition) to the Sault. He never tried to peddle such nonsense to 
Brooks or Joy, but he knew that Governor Fairbanks had brought 
the Maine Law to Vermont. 
Thus the year ended with the canal project far behind schedule, 
assuming it had had a schedule to begin with. Nor could the 
directors have been much heartened by a fresh attack from Lansing. 
The auditor general of Michigan wrote denouncing the tax-free 
status of the grant lands and asking if the reward of 750,000 acres 
was not sufficiently generous to assure the prompt completion of the 
6 Courting Disaster 1854 
With Harvey still in control of the canal project, at least for the 
winter, the work struggled on. Nichols and Glenn stayed at the Sault 
to give engineering guidance, but Brooks returned to his railroad 
administration in Detroit, where he was all but cut off from 
activities at the canal site. Then, without warning, came an 
unpleasant jolt for everyone connected with the project. On 24 
January, Secretary of War Jefferson Davis ordered Captain 
Canfield to go at once to San Francisco and report for duty to the 
commanding officer of the Department of the Pacific. To confuse 
matters even further, one hour later Canfield received a telegram 
simply stating, "The California order is countermanded. You are 
retained on the canal."1 
One would expect that such a telegram would be signed by Davis 
or even by the president himself, but instead it was signed by 
Congressman David Stuart of Michigan. It put everyone involved in 
the project in Michigan in a quandary. Canfield could not accept 
Stuart's telegram as an order, but he remained in Detroit pending 
clarification. The Michigan canal commissioners were displeased, 
and Brooks distressed, at the possibility that a new engineer might 
insist on drastic changes in the canal design. After waiting in vain for 
new orders from Washington, Canfield wrote to Stuart asking for 
clarification and received a second telegram on 16 February: 
"California order revoked today. D. Stuart." Canfield's father-in­
law, Senator Cass, wrote on 17 February confirming the news, but 
there was still no official order from Davis or Abert.2 The relief of 
Canfield could hardly have been Abert's idea. The year before he 
had urged Congress to increase his staff with additional engineers. 
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Under an act of Congress passed in 1824 entitled "An Act to procure 
the necessary Surveys, Plans, and Estimates upon the subject of 
Roads and Canals," the president was authorized to use army 
engineers like Canfield on such projects as the Sault Canal. The act, 
a result of Henry Clay's efforts, gave the president wide discretion as 
to what constituted works of national importance. Abert, however, 
complained that he did not have enough men to supervise the pro­
jects properly and that Canfield, among others, was overworked. 
The culprit was probably Jefferson Davis himself. He considered 
that the practice of using army engineers to direct internal 
improvement programs was unconstitutional. Such projects, 
according to Davis, were entirely the responsibility of the states, and 
the government in Washington must do nothing to help.3 
Obviously someone had brought considerable pressure on 
President Pierce to obtain the revoking order, for Pierce was as 
much an enemy of federal aid to internal improvements as was his 
secretary of war. The Michigan canal commissioners and Governor 
Parsons surely asked David Stuart for help. They had told Canfield 
that they could do nothing with the contractors if he left Michigan, 
and had even asked him to resign his commission, a suggestion that 
the captain rejected out of hand. Stuart was in a good position to 
intervene; the power of army engineers working in cooperation with 
Congress is well known to students of government. It is even more 
likely that the Canal Company exerted pressure on Pierce through 
John E. Thayer of Boston. Pierce had spent the eve of his election to 
the presidency resting in Thayer's home; by 1854 the president, now 
a tragic figure, needed the personal support of every friend he had. 
John Thayer, like his brother Nathaniel, was a major stockholder of 
both the Michigan Central and the New York Central railroads and 
thus was in close contact with Forbes and Corning. When the issue 
was finally settled, Brooks told Fairbanks, "The President took the 
matter in hand and directed the Secretary to recall [sic] the order."4 
Finally, on 9 March, Abert sent Canfield his orders to stay in 
Michigan, along with a copy of the letter from Pierce to Davis. But 
the secretary of war was not yet through with Canfield. He had 
delayed, from 16 February to 9 March, in transmitting Pierce's 
revoking order. Now he ordered Abert to find out why Canfield had 
not obeyed his original orders immediately. The implication was 
obvious. Had Canfield obeyed immediately, the Canal Company 
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and Pierce would have been faced with a. fait accompli. Canfield 
refrained from asking Abert how he was supposed to get to San 
Francisco in the middle of winter. Instead he threw himself on the 
mercy of his commander and cited his long record of service and 
obedience to orders. This was not sufficient, and Canfield was 
ordered to report to Washington.5 
In the end Davis had his way in a manner no one had anticipated. 
Canfield returned to Detroit on Sunday, 16 April, suffering with a 
cold. The cold worsened on Monday, and by Tuesday morning 
Canfield was dead. Of him the Detroit Free Press wrote: 
He was a most accomplished engineer, with remarkable inventive 
genius, and great resources in his profession—a gallant soldier, a man of 
high honor and chivalric feeling, and a warm friend. For firmness and 
decision of character, and yet extremely modest deportment, he was 
remarkable. He has left no superior in the service where he passed the 
most of his life. The loss of such a man can not easily be repaired. It was a 
public misfortune, as it is a private calamity.6 
The Free Press was correct. It would not be easy to replace 
Canfield, but Brooks put his mind to it at once. Through January he 
had continued to ponder over a replacement for Harvey. Since John 
T. Clark was not available, he settled on William J. McAlpine, a 
distinguished civil engineer and a veteran of the Erie Canal. Brooks 
emphasized the importance of obtaining as chief engineer for 
Michigan a man whose reputation was solidly established in the 
engineering world. To get a lesser man, he warned, would be to run 
the risk that such a man might try to build a reputation by making 
changes in Canfield's plans. Any major change, or several minor 
ones, would end all chances of completion on time. If McAlpine 
could not come, Brooks wanted Corning to try once again to get 
Clark. In the meantime, editor Brown came forth in support of 
Major Glenn for Canfield's post. By this time Brown's hostility to 
the canal directors and Harvey was well publicized, and, with Brown 
as his champion, the Canal Company might have reason to fear 
Glenn's appointment. For the time being, Governor Parsons made 
no appointment at all.7 
At the Sault, Harvey continued to complain about Brooks's 
treatment of him, and it was obvious that the two men were falling 
out. Brooks suggested that Harvey had deliberately ignored 
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instructions in 1853, and Harvey resented the criticism. Late in the 
winter Harvey sent the manager of McKnight's steamship line east 
to visit Fairbanks and Corning. Ostensibly he was to obtain another 
bookkeeper, but in his letter of introduction Harvey wrote, "Any 
information given by him respecting the progress of the canal can be 
relied upon as impartial and correct." No doubt the information was 
encouraging.8 
In spite of assurances from Harvey, however, things continued to 
go wrong in early 1854. Brooks was unable to give adequate 
attention to canal matters and sent Corning a list of his February 
commitments to explain why he could not attend the directors 
meeting of the Canal Company. He simply could not supervise both 
the canal project and his railroad. Also in February the subcon­
tracted quarry work fell behind schedule, and Brooks decided in 
March to cancel the contract. Only half the stone work was 
completed, and the company would have to take direct charge. 
Meanwhile, further bad news came down from the Sault. Harvey 
had anticipated using rock from the excavation for most of the lock 
backing stone. However, this rock did not prove of sufficient quality 
to meet the specifications, and the bulk would have to be hauled in 
from Drummond's Island. Finally, to Brooks's exasperation, 
Harvey had miscalculated his lumber resources. Either he had 
underestimated the amount of pine needed, or he had overestimated 
the resources of the land from which he was taking the trees. In 
either case, the supply was exhausted when only half the timber for 
the lower lock was cut. Brooks set off to find a new source of pine 
near Detroit while Harvey went out on the same mission at the 
Sault. Brooks insisted that Harvey not be told that they both were 
looking for pine; he feared that Harvey would stop looking if he 
heard of the duplication of effort, and he wanted a second supply 
available at the Sault should his pine be lost at sea on its way north.9 
Even the weather, which had been so favorable to the project in 
1853, turned bad. A storekeeper at the Sault reported that the St. 
Mary's River was more filled with ice than it had been in sixteen 
years. This would mean an unusually late date for the opening of 
navigation. Harvey complained that the weather in March was most 
severe. He reported that a hurricane struck on 17 March with such 
ferocity that workmen with their loaded barrows were hurled into 
the excavation by the force of the wind. The mean temperature 
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recorded at Fort Brady for March 1854 was seven degrees lower 
than for March 1853. Snow fell on fourteen days, and ice deepened 
in the excavation. Still, Harvey was enthusiastic, claiming excellent 
progress and an ultimate cost that would be below estimate.10 
Fairbanks by no means shared Harvey's confidence. He now had 
more time to think about the affairs of the Canal Company, since 
the voters of Vermont had retired him from public office after one 
year as governor. Apparently the people of Vermont were not as 
enthusiastic over the Maine Law that Fairbanks had signed as was 
their governor. Fairbanks wrote to Corning that his "solicitude was 
not so much in view of anything left or liable to be left undone 
. .  . as in view of the disastrous consequences of failure." There 
was no question in his mind as to where the fault lay. He deeply 
regretted the failure of the Canal Company to appoint a competent 
superintendent in the previous year; Harvey obviously could not 
handle the job. Fairbanks then made several suggestions to Corning 
that ultimately saved the company. The Canal Company must 
secure the undivided services of John Brooks for at least three 
months after the opening of navigation; another man must be given 
the sole responsibility for the procurement of a proper labor force; 
and the entire supervisory structure must be put in order. Fairbanks 
concluded by expressing the hope that from now on all the directors 
would pay more attention to the project and make a personal 
inspection at the Sault at the earliest date. Corning sent the letter on 
to Brooks after adding the words, "I beg to say that I fully concur." 
Brooks, however, immediately protested that he could not leave the 
affairs of the railroad.11 
Before the directors could meet in May, they received another 
discouraging report from Nichols. Excavation was proceeding too 
slowly along the entire length of the canal, and six feet of ice in the 
lock pits prevented workmen from putting the timbers in place. 
Nevertheless, Nichols hoped to have the ice removed in ten days. He 
also acknowledged Brooks's order to construct a second dock at the 
lower end of the canal so that the work would not be held up for lack 
of docking space when the great shipping effort began. Finally 
Nichols reported that work had begun on the cofferdam in Lake 
Superior. Two heavy sea walls of rock had been carted out on the ice 
to form a 450-foot enclosure. As soon as the ice melted, this rock 
would serve as the foundation of the dam.12 
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If this sounded like a peculiar way to build a cofferdam, Brooks 
apparently was unaware of it. He was more concerned with the fact 
that Harvey, as usual, had failed to plan ahead. In this case the 
problem was the location of the second dock. Harvey had pushed it 
out into the St. Mary's River in a direct line with the canal, where it 
would have prevented the work of underwater excavation until all 
the stone had been landed. Brooks notified Fairbanks that he had 
been forced to overrule Harvey by ordering the dock moved farther 
north, although the change involved an additional week of work. He 
wrote, "It will not due [sic] to let any part of the work get in the way 
of any other part." He also promised to try to arrange his railroad 
affairs so that he could give more attention to the canal.13 
In early May the directors of the Canal Company finally took the 
necessary steps to reorganize the project. It was agreed that Brooks 
should go to the Sault and take direct charge of the entire operation 
for the summer. No doubt Forbes did not relish the idea of losing his 
superintendent for that period, but he would have liked even less the 
idea of watching the value of his Canal Company stock drop to zero. 
Director John Seymour agreed to take on the responsibility of 
finding a suitable labor force and getting it to the Sault, for which 
the directors agreed to pay him $3,000 and expenses. Harvey could 
keep his title as general agent, but he would carry out only the chores 
Brooks thought him capable of performing without wrecking the 
company. George S. Frost had been appointed a canal land agent by 
Governor Parsons in June 1853, and the directors now gave him full 
responsibility for all land claims in 1854. Finally, directors Fair­
banks and Seymour agreed to visit the project in June. Except for 
Brooks, they were the first directors to make a personal inspection.I4 
John Woods Brooks would bear the ultimate responsibility; after 
May 1854 the success or failure of the canal project rested squarely 
on his shoulders. He was still a relatively young man and would 
celebrate (if he had time) his thirty-fifth birthday at the Sault on 2 
August. He was a native of Stow, Massachusetts, and had received 
an academy education and then studied engineering under Loammi 
Baldwin, the father of civil engineering in the United States. At the 
age of twenty, Brooks became the chief engineer for the Boston and 
Maine Railroad. Later, as superintendent of the Auburn and Ro­
chester Railroad, he made the acquaintance of Corning. In 1846 he 
joined Joy and Corning in persuading Forbes and others to buy the 
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Michigan Central Railroad from the state of Michigan. He then 
served as superintendent of the Michigan Central from 1846 to 
1855.15 
While Brooks waited impatiently for the opening of navigation to 
the Sault, he received a bit of news that would have encouraged him 
had he not been acquainted with Harvey's habits of exaggeration. 
According to the agent, all the timber needed for the locks was now 
at hand. Harvey admitted that he had helped himself to Canadian 
timber, since he had exhausted all the nearby sources of pine. 
Unfortunately Harvey's "at hand" did not mean at the Sault, as 
Fairbanks later noted.16 
The navigation season finally opened when the ice cleared out of 
the St. Mary's River in the second week of May. Brooks notified 
Corning that he would go to the Sault on 15 May. Coming's partner 
Gilbert Davidson planned to accompany him in order to make a 
firsthand report in Albany and to see if the project needed anything 
that the Corning enterprises could furnish. Joy, meanwhile, wanted 
Brooks to go to Chicago on railroad business, and Brooks had to tell 
his friend what life would be like for the next few months. Before 
boarding his ship in Detroit, he wired, "I can not go to Chicago any 
way. Sault uses me up completely." He also urged Corning to call a 
directors meeting at the Sault at the earliest possible date.17 
There would be no directors meeting at the Sault that year, but 
Fairbanks and Seymour arrived during the first week in June. They 
were just in time to watch the first of the great timbers for the lower 
lock foundation set in place. Each longitudinal timber was one foot 
square and rested one foot from its neighbor. None ran the full 
length of the lock, 350 feet, since pine does not grow to that height; 
but each was as long as nature provided. Once the longitudinal 
timbers were in place, the carpenters bolted them to solid rock. On 
top of these timbers went the transverse beams, also one foot square 
with one-foot gaps between. Workmen bolted the transverse beams 
to the rock and filled the intervening spaces with well-packed sand 
and gravel. Carpenters would next spike the regular lock flooring, 
three-inch-thick pine, to the beams. Only then could the masons set 
to work on the walls. Brooks estimated that less than one-fifteenth 
of the oak timber was at hand, and oak timber must be used directly 
under the sidewalls.18 
Fairbanks considered the situation critical. In his report to 
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Corning, he stated that the project fell short of expectations in all 
respects and cited an example of the many frustrations that beset 
Brooks. In spite of the promise from Harvey that all the timber was 
at hand, 4,000 badly needed feet were still resting, as late as 6 June, 
on land near Hay Lake, waiting for the Dart. The two bargeloads of 
timber being shipped from Detroit were also long overdue. The 
steamer escorting the barges had foundered in the lake, and the Dart 
had gone to the rescue. Brooks, Seymour, and Fairbanks decided to 
purchase another tug for the company. As soon as the timber was 
really at hand, the Dart and her sister ship would be needed to tow 
the schooners with the face stone up the St. Mary's River, a distance 
of sixty miles.19 
Brooks estimated that the floor of the lower lock would be 
completed by 9 June. Fairbanks wrote that he would be pleased if it 
were completed by 15 June, but on 17 June the carpenters were still 
waiting for the heavy timbers to arrive to complete the foundation. 
The failure to have timber cut and on hand was inexcusable. Just as 
serious was the fact that none of the backing stone had arrived from 
Drummond's Island and none of the face stone from Maiden. Worse 
yet, for the first time the ominous word "cholera" was used as 
Fairbanks told Corning that isolated cases had been reported near 
the company quarry. To date none of the company's men had 
contracted the disease, but Fairbanks warned Corning of what 
might happen should this killer appear at the Sault. As to the rest of 
the project, none of the difficult underwater excavation had been 
done, and above water Nichols estimated that 35,000 cubic yards 
remained to be hauled out of the ditch. Once the lock floors were 
completed, the carpenters could use the rest of the summer to build 
the upper docks and the caisson gate. Fairbanks completed his 
pessimistic report and signed it. Then he reopened the letter to add 
that the missing Dart and her two barges had just been located, 
aground, on a mud flat twenty-five miles below. "We must have two 
more tugs—not just one," he concluded.20 
By the end of June, the usually optimistic Cleveland Daily Plain 
Dealer began to doubt that the project would be completed that 
year. It recorded that only a fraction of the required stone had 
arrived from Maiden, and it blamed the company's troubles on the 
workers, who were "a little worse than beasts of the field—they 
guzzle down the meanest kind of poison whisky in quantities. 
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Several . . . working on the canal have fallen victim to intemper­
ate and filthy habits and a complete recklessness of diet." The Plain 
Dealer refrained from pointing out that there was little else for the 
men to do. In 1854 there was not even a completed church at the 
Sault, but grog shops abounded.21 
On 15 July, Brooks sent out a major warning. "With our present 
force we can not finish the canal this year." Seymour's efforts to find 
men must be reinforced. Brooks ordered Joy to find a person 
qualified to recruit at least forty men along the line of any railroad, 
or in Chicago. The pay would still be $1 per day and board, with the 
company paying the fare to the Sault. Brooks also called for fifteen 
more masons plus a foreman. He concluded, "They are needed now 
and not ten days hence if it is possible to get them here in 8 
[underscored twice by Brooks] days." With this message began a 
frantic scramble for labor that lasted into the fall of 1854.22 
At the outset Brooks could not "borrow" construction workers 
from the Michigan Central Railroad, since the road did not have a 
construction crew in its employ. Railroad building was sporadic in 
nature, and the roads usually relied on specialized construction 
companies to do their building. The Canal Company would be 
forced to find its own men, and Joy was not the only one to help. 
Brooks also called upon the Michigan Central's agents in Detroit, 
Buffalo, and New York, Seymour in Utica, and a Mr. Clark in 
Albany. He sent a special messenger to bring eighty men from 
Montreal, and he asked Fairbanks to find from fifty to seventy good 
laborers in Vermont. He warned all concerned that it would not do 
to send men unescorted to the Sault. From his experience he knew 
that Upper Peninsula mineowners would approach such men on the 
boats from Detroit and hire half of them.23 
Seymour did his job well. He entered into agreement with the New 
York agent of the Michigan Central to transport the men on the 
railroad's steamboats from Buffalo to Detroit, where Whitwood 
would take charge. The Michigan Central would receive $1 per man 
transported and 20c per meal served. By 4 August, Seymour had 
paid out over $ 1,000 of Canal Company funds for transportation of 
labor to the Sault. On the day before Brooks had announced that he 
now had a sufficient work force and that the project was advancing 
as well as could be expected.24 
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Brooks had no idea that disaster was heading to the Sault along 
with its new labor force. In light of today's medical knowledge, it is 
not surprising that cholera struck at the project. It would have been 
a miracle if it had not. In 1854, however, it was assumed that the 
disease was the end product of sinful or vicious living, a judgment of 
God. The relationship between vice, poverty, and cholera was firmly 
established.25 
The warning signs were everywhere in 1854 at the Sault, but no 
one could—or would—read them. The area around the shanties was 
filthy; men working eleven and a half hours a day had little energy or 
inclination to spend much time in housekeeping chores. Fairbanks 
had noted the presence of cholera near the company's quarries in 
June, and in the same month George Porter notified his partner, 
"Cholera is rife in this land." "This land" was Detroit, and the bulk 
of the labor force had to pass through it on the way to the canal. 
Both the Detroit Free Press and the Cleveland Daily Plain Dealer 
emphatically denied that cholera had reached the Sault. The Plain 
Dealer attributed the few deaths that had occurred among the 
workingmen to intemperate habits. In July, Brown claimed that the 
health at the Sault was never better, with no illness in the village and 
little in the work camp. On 29 July he published a statement signed 
by two Sault doctors and a three-man board of health to the effect 
that rumors of cholera at the Sault were false.26 
The disease struck hard in August. Journalist Brown reported the 
first case on 5 August, making the standard statement that the 
stricken man was a "miserable drunkard" to begin with and noting 
that he had recovered. For almost a month no more was said. Other 
than the various ship captains, who would certainly be reluctant to 
mention the disease, Brown was the only voice of influence speaking 
from the Sault. If he had published the full extent of the ravages of 
cholera at the canal site, he would have seriously, perhaps fatally, 
injured the Canal Company's efforts to replace the sick and dead 
men with fresh workers. Moreover such news would destroy the 
image of the Sault as a cholera-free health retreat. Brown elected to 
remain silent through the critical period. He published a "cure" for 
cholera in September without indicating the present need for the 
treatment recommended. When Harvey jumped into local politics in 
October, Brown advised him to spend more time keeping his own 
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votes alive, without hinting as to what was wrong with the voters. 
Finally, in October, he reported the total number of deaths at the 
Sault for the last fourteen months without listing any of the causes. 
Eight strangers passing through the village, twelve citizens of the 
Sault, and eighty-eight canal workers had died. Brown claimed that 
many of the latter would have died anyway, because of their 
"reckless habits."27 
As Brooks knew, far more than eighty-eight of his men were dead, 
and still more were too sick to work. H. D. Ward, supervisor of 
construction and second only to Brooks, died of cholera. C. E. 
Bigelow, the company's chief clerk, took his family back home to 
Connecticut because of bad health. Brooks told Joy that panic had 
swept through the ranks of the workers, and for a time he could keep 
only half the men at their tasks. Of his entire force of 1,700 men, over 
one-tenth died, and there were no estimates of the number who 
recovered but were too weak to work. Even the weather favored the 
disease. The mean temperature for the month of September was 
eight degrees higher than the year before. A high of ninety-eight was 
recorded for the month at Fort Brady. Rain fell on sixteen days. It 
was fortunate for the company that Brooks did not succumb. He 
wrote, "I keep on my feet the whole day, every day and a twelve hour 
walk per day is what I am not used to, and although the stock I hold 
in this enterprise is worth . . . $40,000 I have many times 
regretting [sic] going into it." To add to Brooks's problems, part of 
the labor force staged a riot on the nights of 20-21 August. A number 
of men were arrested, and one was so violent that he had to be 
lodged in the Fort Brady guardhouse. The real culprits were 
ignorance and poor camp sanitation. In contrast, the health of the 
soldiers at Fort Brady remained normal through the entire year.28 
The cholera epidemic spurred new recruiting efforts to replace the 
sick and dead men. From Albany alone 472 men left for the Sault 
between 7 September and 30 September 1854. Seymour employed 
"laborlookers" to find men, just as Brooks and Frost had hired 
landlookers to explore for possible grant lands. The story of Joseph 
Knoblock was typical, at least up to a point. Seymour employed him 
in August to look for canal labor. His first trip took him through 
Syracuse, Rochester, and Buffalo, and by the time he reached 
Detroit he had picked up 33 men. Whitwood took charge of the men 
at Detroit, and Knoblock returned to Utica for more employees. 
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After three days there, he stopped in Oneida, Rochester, and 
Buffalo, and returned again to Detroit, this time with 35 workers. It 
was the last trip that Knoblock ever made. He died in Detroit on 2 
October, after working for the Canal Company less than two 
months. In December a friend of his widow asked Seymour for 
payment of Knoblock's last expenses; the amount was $44.94, 
including the cost of his burial in Detroit. During the next four 
months Seymour made several small payments, the sum of which 
was approximately the amount claimed less the burial cost. A man 
could die in the service of the Canal Company, but he was buried on 
his own time.29 
Brooks described the workers as they arrived at the Sault. "They 
are sick, starved, lean, lank, slim, light of build, fallow, about half of 
them will weigh under 100 lbs. They look as if they had come from 
abroad or an emigrant [sic] ship lately." He told Seymour that he 
wanted no more such recruits. In Detroit, Whitwood too began to 
doubt the value of the emergency drive for workers. He wrote to 
Seymour, "The men hired in N.Y. are generly to [sic] weak and 
small for such heavy work." However, "as the cry is for men! men! 
you had better continue to forward more." Seymour, faced with 
conflicting requests, decided to continue the search.30 
In spite of cholera and the weather, Brooks pushed on with the 
construction. An observer described him as being a perfect 
Napoleon in the way he worked his men. The comparison was 
appropriate enough, since Forbes wrote that Brooks was having 
more difficulty that summer than Lord Raglan was experiencing in 
the Crimea. Brooks warned Joy that he must remain at the Sault for 
the rest of the season, unless the directors decided not to finish in 
contract time. The completion date of the work became a source of 
much conjecture, with the Daily Plain Dealer making the most 
pessimistic prediction. Estimating the date as August 1855, the Plain 
Dealer remarked, "The ship canal is a big work for so small a one."31 
By 22 July, Brooks could report that though the masonry in the 
upper lock was more than half finished, it had barely been started in 
the lower. He anticipated that the cofferdam would be completed at 
Lake Superior in three more days; he intended to use a horse-
powered punch to break up the underwater rock. At the lower end of 
the canal, a temporary cofferdam was in place, with a steam pump at 
work. As soon as the south pier was no longer needed for unloading 
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stone, the dam would be extended for the final excavation. Brooks 
sent Fairbanks a sketch of his work at this end of the canal. At the 
same time Brown warned all concerned in the Upper Peninsula to be 
sure to lay in their winter supplies early. Because of canal needs, 
there would be great pressure on transportation facilities of all 
kinds.32 
Meanwhile, there was good news from Lansing. After a lapse of 
several months, Canfield's position as chief engineer for the State of 
Michigan was filled when, in early July, Governor Parsons 
appointed John T. Clark, Brooks's original choice for the job. The 
Canal Company officers thus attained another goal, although 
Major Glenn retained his original post as assistant state engineer. It 
remained to be seen if Clark would be as cooperative as Brooks had 
hoped.33 
In Detroit, Whitwood was confident of success. He had reported 
on 28 September that the last of the face stone had left Maiden. 
Brooks hoped to have the masonry completed by the middle of 
October, and Whitwood promised that the last of the timber for the 
gates would leave for the Sault on 29 September. The Canal 
Company was lucky that Whitwood, who was responsible for the 
forwarding of the men and supplies in 1854, had remained in good 
health. He wrote, "Fortunately I am well while many choice spirits 
connected with the Canal Company have gone to their long 
home."34 
During the fall some of the directors decided to see for themselves 
how the canal progressed, and on 11 October, Fairbanks, Corning, 
and Seymour arrived at the Sault on an inspection trip. It was 
Coming's first and only visit during construction. The result of this 
inspection was a letter written to reassure the stockholders. 
Its authors could report that the masonry work in the locks had 
been completed except for the top coping stone. The cofferdams 
were both secure, and the underwater excavation could begin. The 
directors stated that they were sure the entire project would be 
completed by contract time next May. In order that the 
stockholders might appreciate the magnitude of the undertaking, 
the writers noted that "the combined length of both sides of the locks 
is considerably more than one-quarter of a mile of solid faced 
masonry and ten feet thick at the base all of which is laid in hydrolic 
[sic] cement and in the quality of its stone and style of finish is not 
inferior to any in the State of New York."35 
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It was a carefully worded letter giving no hint of mismanagement. 
The directors praised both Brooks and Harvey, even though they 
blamed the latter in private for their troubles. In spite of their 
description to the stockholders, they clearly failed to grasp the 
magnitude of the project; a look at the drawings and specifications 
and a little simple arithmetic would have improved their judgment. 
Finally, the report made no mention of the progress at the upper 
caisson gate. 
As the stockholders contemplated the report, its inaccuracies 
were already becoming sadly apparent at the Sault. Two weeks after 
the directors had declared the cofferdams to be secured, Harvey 
reported that the Lake Superior dam had collapsed for the third 
time. "Words had better not express my chagrin," he wrote. 
Anticipating future developments, he added that no amount of 
money could tempt him into staying a second winter, although if the 
directors should require it, he would not be at liberty to refuse. 
Brooks meanwhile ordered the bulk of his labor force to the 
Superior end of the canal to rebuild the cofferdam and start 
underwater excavation.36 
It seemed to Brooks that everything conspired against him in 
November. On the first day of the month, many of the men refused 
to report to work and instead paraded the streets of Sault Ste. 
Marie, carrying banners in honor of All Saints Day. The parade 
soon deteriorated into another labor strike. Rumors circulated that 
wages would now be reduced from $26 to $20 per month. The men 
had not been paid in October, and another rumor circulated that the 
Canal Company did not intend to pay until spring, so as to keep the 
workers on the job all winter. Brown encouraged the rumors by 
printing them. The strike lasted three days before Brooks could get 
his full force back to work—and then the storms came.37 
Brooks had two hopes in mid-November. He wanted Clark and 
the canal commissioners to visit the project that fall and make a 
statement strong enough to persuade Michigan to release the grant 
lands. He also hoped for twelve to sixteen more construction days, 
enough to allow him to put a ship through the canal. Neither hope 
was realized. Clark refused to go north, and Brooks did not get the 
time he needed. Snow fell on fourteen days in November, and a low 
of one degree above zero was recorded at Fort Brady. This time the 
upper cofferdam held, but so violent were the storms that water 
rushed over the top. High waves swamped the horse dredge at the 
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lower end of the project, with the loss of three horses. It took 
Brooks's men three days to raise the dredge. Fairbanks wrote, "I 
learned that poor Harvey is to remain at the Sault another winter. It 
must be a sad disappointment to him and Mr. Brooks that Mr. 
Clark and the Commission failed to go up."38 
The directors had a further reason for wanting the lands granted 
to them in 1854. A major change in political fortunes was in the 
making. The year before, Vermont voters had retired Fairbanks 
from public office for signing a Maine Law. Now, in 1854, the 
people of New York voted Horatio Seymour out of office for 
vetoing one. As a result, John Seymour would no longer be the 
brother of the governor of New York. Meanwhile, as the Canal 
Company was losing ground politically, its old enemies were 
gaining—for reasons that had nothing to do with the canal. While 
Brooks was struggling at the Sault in July, a political convention 
met in Jackson, Michigan. Here Michigan Whigs, Free Soilers, 
and Democrats disgusted with the Pierce administration united to 
form the Republican party. Canal Company enemy Jacob Howard 
emerged from the convention a leader. He became the Republican 
candidate for attorney general of Michigan, and in November the 
entire Republican slate swept to victory. The result was that the 
Canal Company would face a hostile attorney general and an 
unknown governor, Kinsley S. Bingham, in 1855. The only sure 
friend the company would have in office would be United States 
Secretary of the Interior Robert McClelland.39 
Clark and the commission ignored all pressure to visit the project 
in 1854. Brooks had warned Joy earlier in the year that the 
commission had decided not to endorse the canal until it could see 
how the project withstood the winter of 1854-55. The decision was 
reasonable, and the commissioners refused to reverse it. While the 
directors worried over the commission, time ran out on Brooks. 
Navigation closed down much earlier than usual, and by 1 
December the bulk of the work force was back in Detroit and paid 
off for the last time. Seymour had sent the last payroll, $54,875, to 
the Sault in two ships to halve the risk of loss. Harvey remained on 
the project with about one hundred men, while Seymour wrote, "If 
Clark had gone up I would have been satisfied."40 
Perhaps the most satisfied man on the ship coming down from the 
Sault was Charles W. Chapel, who had just been elected to the 
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Michigan legislature. His excavation was completed to the one 
percent that Harvey could handle within the next four months. In 
his pocket he carried a gold watch and chain presented to him by 
Brooks. The watch was inscribed: 
St. M. F. S. C. C.

to

C. W. CHAPEL

FIDELITY AND ENERGY

With this fine timepiece Chapel would have no excuse for being late 
for legislative roll calls, some of which might involve the affairs of 
the Canal Company. Brooks himself carried with him a less 
felicitous token of the arduous summer. He spent Christmas in 
Boston, sick in bed, under the eye of John Murray Forbes. Many 
days passed before he was well enough to travel again.41 
7 The Treacherous Editor

The relationship between Harvey and J. Venen Brown played a 
major role in the affairs of the Canal Company during the 
construction years. Harvey had trusted Brown, putting him on the 
company payroll to give favorable publicity and making him a canal 
land agent. After Harvey's arrival at the Sault in 1853, Brown 
entered no more claims as the agent of the company, but he 
supervised the work of the landlookers and turned the results over to 
Harvey for filing. As late as September 1853, Harvey expressed 
confidence in Brown's general oversight at the Sault land office. 
During the summer Brown's newspaper carried glowing accounts of 
the canal's progress and of its general agent. The editor called 
Harvey "indefatigable" and praised the engineering achievements of 
Captain Canfield. Brown's eastern exchanges could reprint these 
reports, and his support would therefore be helpful if the company 
were to float a bond issue. However, the amicable relationship was 
soon to change.1 
A dispute between Brown and Harvey began in October 1853. It 
worsened during the following winter, and by the spring of 1854 
Brown had become hostile to the Canal Company and its general 
agent. The disagreement arose over the ownership of the limestone 
quarry on Drummond's Island, where Harvey expected to get most 
of the facing rock for the canal locks. Although the quarry was 
registered in the Sault land office as the property of Brown, Harvey 
considered that it belonged to the Canal Company. When the two 
men visited the quarry in October 1853, Brown demanded $5,000 
from the Canal Company for the right to extract stone. Harvey, on 
the other hand, insisted that the company already had the right, 
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since Brown, as company agent, should have claimed the land for 
the company and not for himself. Harvey proposed instead that the 
company give Brown all the improvements made on the site, 
including the dock, as soon as the canal project was completed. He 
estimated the value of these improvements to be $2,000.2 
When the two men could not reach an agreement, Harvey sailed 
for Detroit to obtain help from Brooks. Once again Brooks had to 
abandon his railroad duties to attend to canal business. In 
November 1853 he returned to the Sault with Harvey to conclude a 
deal with Brown. The Sault editor would permit the company to 
extract as much limestone as it needed at a price to be set by a 
committee of three. Brown and Brooks would each select one 
member of this committee, and the two selected would try to agree 
on a third.3 
This agreement was defeated before it had a chance to go into 
effect. Upon his arrival at the Sault, Brooks conferred with Harvey 
as to the nature of the land on Drummond's Island, especially the 
two lots giving access to the quarry. The two men then called upon 
Ebenezer Warner at the Sault land office to obtain the exact 
description of the access land, after which they undertook to prepare 
papers to claim and purchase the lots outright. But they had not 
worked fast enough. On the day before the Brooks-Brown 
agreement was to be signed, Brown had purchased the access land 
for himself. At the time he was still in the employ of the Canal 
Company and was supposedly looking after its interests. The lots, 
both in Township 42N, Range 6E, together with the lots Brown had 
claimed for himself in May, effectively sealed off the quarry from the 
St. Mary's River. This was more than enough for Harvey and 
Brooks. They terminated Brown's association with the Canal 
Company before the end of November.4 
It was fortunate for the company that Brooks had discovered 
another source of high-quality limestone earlier in the year near 
Maiden, Canada West, across the river from Detroit. Now, 
however, the company would be forced to ship tons of stone a 
distance of over 300 miles, whereas Drummond's Island was only 35 
miles from the Sault. Harvey's reckless judgment and Brown's greed 
had cost the company dearly. The company also had acquired an 
unscrupulous enemy at the Sault. 
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The 2 January 1854 issue of the Lake Superior Journal was the 
last one in which Brown listed himself as land agent for the Canal 
Company in the Upper Peninsula. Although anxious to attack 
Harvey and the administration of the company, the Sault editor was 
handicapped because his journal appeared but once a month during 
the winter. In the meantime Harvey prepared for a rumor campaign 
should Brown choose to launch one in Lansing. He wrote to 
Deodatus Whitwood that he had a letter from Brown dated 18 
January 1854 demanding $8,000 blackmail as his price for re­
fraining from a paper war against the Canal Company. Since 
Harvey's own letter to Whitwood was dated 4 January 1854, the 
Brown letter could have existed only in Harvey's fertile imagination. 
Brown in any case was too clever to have written such a letter; 
nevertheless, Whitwood was free to spread the story around Lansing 
as a weapon against him.5 
Harvey's action had been unscrupulous; Brown's attack was no 
less so. In his first charge he accused Harvey of manslaughter. When 
the last boat sailed for Detroit in the late fall of 1853, three men had 
been left behind, lost in the woods on Drummond's Island. Two of 
these men survived by living on acorns, but the third died. Brown 
claimed that, having failed to look for the men, Harvey was to 
blame. Further, Harvey had sent a work party of fifty men to 
Drummond's Island in the middle of the winter. They had crossed 
the ice with scant provisions, anticipating relief from the Dart. Now 
they were in a precarious position because of the late opening of the 
navigation season, and Harvey was doing nothing to save them. 
"How often are we to have such inhumanity exhibited among us?" 
Brown demanded, well aware that sometimes eastern newspapers 
reprinted his Sault reports and that the Canal Company directors 
received the Lake Superior Journal. His attempt to make the 
company repugnant in the eyes of the general public and undermine 
whatever confidence the directors still had in Harvey failed, 
however, and no one paid any attention to the manslaughter 
charge.6 
Having exhausted this charge, Brown turned to an accusation of 
theft. In May 1854 he notified the prosecuting attorney of Chippewa 
County that Harvey had trespassed on the school section of 
Township 46N, Range 2E, near Hay Lake (now Lake Nicolet). 
From this section Harvey had removed timber in the value of untold 
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thousands, thus robbing generations of little children. Brown 
rejected Harvey's contention that he had bought the land from 
Governor Parsons. He also notified the state authorities of Harvey's 
guilt and published the story in his newspaper.7 
The governor could not ignore such a serious charge. Because of 
the unusual circumstances existing at the time of Michigan's 
admission to the union, Congress had given Michigan governors 
more responsibility for the school lands than most governors 
possessed. Parsons therefore sent Judge Amos Gould of Shiawassee 
to the Sault to investigate. The judge soon discovered that Brown's 
charges were correct. The magnificent stand of pine that Harvey had 
located a year before, when he decided not to subcontract for heavy 
timber, stood on Section 16 of the township in question. Brown had 
been quite aware of this for almost a year, since, as land agent for the 
Canal Company, he had tried to buy the property from Ebenezer 
Warner in 1853, only to discover that Warner could not sell school 
land. Upon arrival at the Sault, Judge Gould observed a quantity of 
pine that had been taken from the school land, and he charged 
Harvey with theft. The latter admitted to everything but pleaded the 
urgency of the canal project and its importance as a public work. 
Not only was the timber essential for the canal, but it was also easily 
accessible and therefore less costly than timber extracted from 
farther inland. Harvey must have been persuasive, for the judge 
decided that the Canal Company could keep the timber upon 
payment of $1,000 damages and $200 expenses. When paid this 
amount, Gould notified the prosecuting attorney that the state was 
satisfied, and Harvey continued to extract timber from the school 
land.8 
In the following year, however, a select committee of the 
Michigan State Senate investigated this strange transaction. It 
heard testimony from Brown, Gould, and Samuel Whitney, who 
was a witness to the timber theft. After deliberation the committee 
decided "that the Company despoiled this section of its present 
value by cutting off timber because it was believed they could get it 
in this manner cheaper than they could elsewhere get it." The 
committee estimated the value of the timber to be $5 per acre and 
proposed to exonerate the company if it would agree to buy the 
section at $4 per acre. (The company had already tried to buy the 
land, in 1853, and had assumed in good faith that Gould had the 
90 TO BUILD A CANAL 
authority to complete the deal in 1854.) The state senators seemed to 
be more interested in embarrassing Governor Parsons than in 
making trouble for the Canal Company, and they denounced his 
handling of the situation. They also noted, however, that Harvey's 
arrangement with Gould had created animosity toward the Canal 
Company in parts of the state. Brown's newspaper campaign was 
succeeding.9 
In venting his wrath at Harvey, Brown forgot that he might bring 
himself down further than his target. On the day he denounced the 
timber theft, he took a step toward ending his own career at the 
Sault. In an effort to further undermine the canal, he urged press 
and business interests in Chicago to lobby for a railroad with a 
southern terminal in Chicago and a northern terminal in Marquette, 
Michigan, on the shore of Lake Superior. Such a railroad would 
bypass the Sault canal and give to Chicago the trade of the Upper 
Peninsula. Brown wrote, "The completion of the Sault Ste. Marie 
canal will, by a natural law of commerce tend to deepen the current 
trade in channels already alluded to [Cleveland and Detroit], unless 
force is applied to divert it into other channels—perhaps even to 
create other—and Chicago has that force." Nevertheless, in the 
same issue of the Lake Superior Journal most of the advertising 
space had been purchased by the merchants and businessmen of 
Cleveland and Detroit. In fact, the Chicago plan was nothing but a 
pipe dream. The Chicago and Northwestern Railroad would not be 
able to push a line into the Upper Peninsula until 1872, and even this 
would be faint competition for the canal.10 
It is not surprising that when Fairbanks visited the Sault in June 
1854, he had another purpose besides inspecting the canal's 
progress. The Canal Company directors had decided that Brown's 
editorial assaults could no longer go unanswered. On 27 May, 
Brown had reported that the company was using soft sandstone 
instead of limestone for the lock facing, which, he said, "will be 
likely to last about as long as they will be in making the wall." He 
also condemned the Maiden limestone, saying it would crack at the 
first frost—a questionable claim, since at that time the limestone 
had not even arrived at the Sault for Brown to examine. Brown 
called the owners of the company "foreign capitalists" who never 
came near to observe the progress of the work, but on the day he 
published this accusation, three directors were at the Sault.11 
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Some of Brown's criticisms were justified, however. He pointed 
out that the movement of stone was too slow because the company 
would not pay for prompt freighting. While noting that the actual 
building of the locks was the most difficult, expensive, and tedious 
part of the whole undertaking, he also observed that as yet no 
underwater work had started at either end of the canal. Cofferdams 
would be required, and these would not be easy to put up or to 
maintain. But the greatest error of all, Brown claimed, lay in trusting 
Harvey, who had no experience in canal construction and whose 
operations were often penny wise and pound foolish. In response to 
an article in the Detroit Inquirer, Brown retorted, "The prospect of 
the completion of this canal is much stronger, we presume, with 
those who found their opinion on the report of the Agent or 
interested persons, than with those familiar with the management 
and progress of the work." As a rule the Inquirer had published 
optimistic reports about the project, but now it pointed out that 
"financial arrangements were not being well digested." Brown held 
that "improper digestion" applied to all phases of the project, and 
declared that the Canal Company would have absolutely no 
grounds on which to apply for an extension of time from the 
Michigan government.12 
These attacks frequently had the desired effect, and Fairbanks 
could not afford to ignore them. As early as April 1854, Samuel 
Churchill in New York City warned Pruyn that the canal 
stockholders of the city were upset and beginning to ask questions 
about the management of the company. Churchill, who was one of 
the New York incorporators of the Canal Company, enclosed a 
clipping from the Journal of Commerce, about the Maiden face 
stone cracking in the frost. He suggested that a public statement 
might be made by one of the canal officers to calm the stockholders, 
and in June, Fairbanks prepared such a statement and had it 
published over his and Chapel's signatures in the Detroit Tribune.u 
It must have pleased Fairbanks when the Detroit Free Press 
picked up his report and published a highly favorable account of the 
canal's progress. The paper gave Harvey and Chapel much credit for 
their energetic efforts, noting that Brooks, Fairbanks, and Seymour 
had just examined the books, vouchers, and general progress and 
had "expressed their unqualified approbation of the whole, as 
creditable to the integrity, energy, and fidelity of the agent, and the 
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skill and faithfulness of the engineers and overseers of the work." 
Finally, the Free Press reported that three-fourths of the stone had 
been quarried and dressed and that full credit for this accomplish­
ment should be attributed to the skill and energy of Brooks.14 
On 1 July, Brown lashed back at the Canal Company. In his 
editorial he claimed that he had reprinted the entire Fairbanks-
Chapel statement as published in the Detroit Tribune, though 
actually he had not done so. Brown charged that Fairbanks was 
using his reputation as former governor of Vermont to cover up for 
the miserable failure of the company. He called the description of 
the Maiden face stone by Fairbanks and Chapel a lie and continued 
to insist that the stone was completely unsuitable for the Sault 
climate. Fairbanks had claimed that the contractors and the general 
public had no idea of the difficulties to be encountered while 
working at the Sault; Brown responded that it was not to the 
contractors' credit that they had rushed willingly into a job they 
knew nothing about. This was true enough. Brown lied, however, 
when he insisted that the difficulties had been well known in the 
area before the contract was signed. In fact, both he and his 
predecessor, John Ingersoll, had understated the potential problems 
because they wanted the work done as soon as possible and were 
reluctant to scare away potential builders. Responding to what he 
called a charge of blackmail in the Fairbanks-Chapel letter, Brown 
jeered that the Canal Company was in no position to pay blackmail 
to anyone. It had already paid the Michigan legislature, first for the 
original canal bill and then for the supplementary legislation placing 
the grant lands on a tax-free basis for five years. Moreover, the 
company had paid off the canal commission for the contract. Brown 
suggested that what funds remained must be carefully preserved to 
bribe a future legislature for an extension of time. Thus there would 
be no money left to pay off Brown. Finally, Brown repeated the 
entire story of the theft of lumber from the little schoolchildren, a 
story that Fairbanks and Chapel had found it convenient to 
ignore.15 
As the paper war went on, Brown held two advantages; he was the 
only reporter at the Sault, and from time to time there was truth in 
his allegations. He only weakened his case when he indulged in gross 
exaggeration, as in the matter of the bribery charges. The company's 
major advantage lay in the reputation of its officers, especially 
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Fairbanks in the Midwest and Corning in the East. If the canal could 
be completed on time and to specification, the Canal Company 
would have the ultimate answer to Brown. 
Sometime in the summer of 1854, Harvey decided to dabble in 
Upper Peninsula politics, a decision Brown was not long in 
discovering. Brown declared that the Canal Company intended to 
enter candidates for all the legislative positions in the Upper 
Peninsula and that Harvey, with his control over the horde of canal 
workers, would dominate. "They will do as they did to the last 
legislature, resort to every species of bribery and corruption to carry 
their ends," he predicted. To strengthen his case, Brown described a 
new fraud being perpetrated on the people of Michigan. He stated 
that in 1853 Harvey and other agents had claimed far more than the 
750,000 acres to which the company was entitled and had filed these 
claims in the various land offices in Michigan. Now that the 
company had had time for a thorough examination of the land, it 
was rejecting the least valuable acres. Brown claimed that he had 
opposed this fraud in 1853 and had lost his job as land agent in 
reprisal. He did not explain why he had waited eight months to 
make this revelation.16 
There was some truth in the charge that the Canal Company had 
overclaimed its allotment. George Frost, who assumed responsibili­
ty for all claims, ruled off about 10,000 acres in the Upper Peninsula 
when he filed his list with the secretary of interior. The total claim in 
the Upper Peninsula was 252,958.10 acres, so the claim deducted did 
not constitute a significant fraction. However, the bulk of the 
deleted claims, 6,440 acres in Delta County, hardly represented the 
most valuable of the lands. Brown could charge fraud, but there 
were at least two other possibilities. In a time and place of poor 
communications, with several men filing claims at the Lower 
Peninsula's three land offices and Harvey filing at the Sault, no one 
knew precisely when to stop. In addition, Harvey and the others 
may have been careless.17 
The new charges did not seem to bother Harvey, who on 6 
September went to Eagle River, Michigan, for business and political 
reasons. He wanted to construct a road from Copper Harbor to a 
location on the Ontonagon River, so that copper could be hauled 
out of the district. At Eagle River he formed a resolutions committee 
to petition the legislature for aid. He also attended the Democratic 
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caucus that selected the candidate for representative from 
Houghton County. If Harvey had the influence that Brown 
attributed to him, he did not use it on 6 September. The Eagle River 
men nominated Canal Company enemy Abner Sherman by a 
unanimous vote.18 
Brown was not pleased with Harvey's political adventures, 
nevertheless, and he anticipated trouble at the Sault Democratic 
nominating caucus. He wrote, "One might suppose that the Co. 
could find enough for their agent to do near or on the work, 
especially one of such uniform kindness in taking care of the sick 
and dying. The cause of humanity, and perhaps that of the Co. 
would be served in kindly endeavoring to keep their voters alive till 
after the convention." Brown feared that hundreds of canal workers 
would pack the Sault caucus, and he must have been embarrassed at 
what actually happened. The Sault Democratic caucus nominated 
Charles W. Chapel, the superintendent of canal excavation. 
However, there were only twenty-two votes cast, with Chapel 
receiving twenty. It was hardly a packing job. Nevertheless, Brown 
chided Sault residents for their lack of citizenship in permitting this 
outcome and claimed that only six permanent Sault men had 
attended the caucus. If so, four of the six voted for Chapel, who 
subsequently won election over his Whig opponent.19 
Such a defeat must have rankled, for it was open proof of Brown's 
inability to influence his own townsmen. The officers of the Canal 
Company, meanwhile, had been clever enough to participate in 
local charities at the Sault and win the influence that Brown lacked. 
Harvey had solicited his directors for funds to help build a 
Presbyterian church, the first church of any denomination in the 
community. By the spring of 1855 the treasurer of the Presbyterian 
society could acknowledge gifts totaling $580 collected by Harvey 
from the directors. The church was debt free and under construc­
tion. 
Such an accomplishment carried more weight with Sault 
residents that did Brown's various charges. The citizens of the Sault 
were more amused than annoyed at Harvey's timber-poaching 
activities. In the eyes of these westerners, it was respectable to help 
oneself to timber held in absentee ownership, as the Canal Company 
directors would soon learn to their regret. As to land fraud, since the 
average westerner in the 1850s thought that land resources were 
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inexhaustible, the rejection of a few acres by the Canal Company in 
favor of better lands was not important. Again, Brown could charge 
manslaughter, but true westerners never got lost in the woods when 
the last boat was about to sail. Canal Company workers could even 
suffer and die of cholera, but in the eyes of the community, these 
were lowly immigrants paying the price of their own debauchery. 
The Sault people did not understand that the workers had brought 
the disease with them from Detroit. Finally, only a few may have 
realized that with the canal Sault Ste. Marie would stagnate through 
loss of the forwarding trade, for Brown had once said that with a 
canal the Sault could look forward to a growth equal to Detroit's. 
Try as he might, Brown could not sustain a popular case at the 
Sault against the Canal Company, and in October he decided that he 
had had enough and launched an effort to sell the Lake Superior 
Journal. He offered, for $3,000, to dispose of the entire establish­
ment, including type, press, an "extensive job office," lists of from 
eight to nine hundred subscribers, a list of advertisers, a complete 
back file, and goodwill. He suggested that the paper be moved to 
Marquette, Michigan, where he hinted that a down payment of 
$1,000 could be raised immediately from new subscribers, of whom 
he promised to find fifty during the coming winter. Finally, he 
realized that the Journal's stock of goodwill was in several places at 
a low level, and he openly admitted that new advertisers would come 
forth only if the paper acquired a new editor.20 
O Precarious Financing

While Harvey and Brooks struggled with the rapidly mounting 
difficulties at the Sault, Corning and Pruyn faced financing 
problems in Albany. All the Canal Company stockholders had paid 
$5 per share at the time of subscription, and Pruyn had issued his 
first call for an additional $5 on 23 June 1853. Further calls 
followed. In September, Pruyn announced that transfer books 
would soon be open, should a stockholder wish to sell part or all of 
his holdings. At the same time he called for $5 on 15 September and 
another $5 on 15 October, but even this was not nearly sufficient to 
meet the expenses that Harvey would incur at the Sault. Corning, 
who must have been shocked at the September report of Nichols, 
decided to try to borrow from his own stockholders in early 
November. Any stockholder who would pay all or part of his 
subscription in advance of the calls would receive 7 percent interest 
per year on the sum paid in excess of the call. With this notice went a 
call for $10 due 25 November and another $5 due 10 December. 
Thus in less than eight months the company required the 
stockholders to pay 35 percent of their subscriptions. Since the 
directors had decided to capitalize at the maximum permitted by 
law, $1,000,000, Corning demanded $350,000 in this short time 
period. At this rate canal costs would soon overtake Nichols's 
"worst contingency" estimate of $403,500 and Canfield's $557,700.l 
Corning must have anticipated from his reports that canal 
expenses would mount rapidly in 1854. Up to 1 September 1853 
Harvey had spent only $75,000, but over one-third of this amount, 
$29,000, was spent in August alone. Brooks also kept an account in 
Detroit, but his expenditures should not be as large as Harvey's. The 
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major expenditure that Harvey reported from the Sault was for 
excavation. This item amounted to $11,979, less than 10 percent of 
the total excavation cost as estimated by Nichols, and represented 
another warning that the project was going too slowly. Harvey's 
other expenses included more than $4,800 for twenty-five horses 
and a cutter and more than $7,500 for boarding supplies. Everything 
was more costly at the Sault, since horses and food had to be shipped 
from Detroit. Corning, as he studied the reports, was wise to spread 
the stock calls out as much as possible so that the entire burden 
would not fall in 1854.2 
Nevertheless, several stockholders felt the pinch of the demands 
from Pruyn. Brooks, who had once thought that he would need to 
pay no more than 20 percent of his 400 shares, was especially 
concerned. Finance was not Brooks's strong point (which was 
perhaps the reason why Forbes still retained tight control over the 
Michigan Central Railroad from Boston), and he had assumed that 
the Canal Company could borrow as much of the remaining 80 
percent as was needed using the unpaid stock pledges and 600,000 
acres of land as collateral. Now Brooks complained of the pressure. 
He wanted to sell 100 shares of his canal stock if he could get $60 per 
share, but he was becoming increasingly involved in Harvey's 
problems and could not attend to the matter in person. As an 
alternative he asked Corning if he could borrow $10,000 from 
Coming's bank in Albany, using his Michigan Central stock as 
collateral. Probably other stockholders were as hard-pressed as 
Brooks. In 1853 Forbes, Fairbanks, and Corning were involved in 
the financing of the Hanibal Railroad, and Joy faced calls not only 
on his Canal Company stock but also on his stock in the Chicago 
and Aurora Railroad and the Illinois Central Railroad. To add to 
the problem, some of the eastern stockholders were upset by the 
news reports from the Sault. There was a danger that Brown might 
win his campaign after all, and Fairbanks had to devote much time 
and energy to dispelling the stockholders' fears.3 
As anticipated, the expenses for the project continued to rise at an 
alarming rate in 1854, considering what remained to be done. The 
Canal Company had opened a land office in Detroit under the 
general supervision of George Frost, and as early as May 1854, it 
recorded expenses of $108,366, including an expenditure of over 
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$6,500 to pay the legal fees to dissolve the injunctions of the previous 
year. Payments and advances to landlookers amounted to $1,314, 
although the major effort to locate land was yet to come. The 
general expenses of the land office ran to more than $23,800, and by 
4 May almost $11,000 had been paid to obtain stone at Maiden, a 
figure that would mount rapidly as the summer progressed.4 
Harvey also reported heavy expenses at the Sault. As of 30 May 
1854 he accounted for $385,442. The major item was still the cost of 
excavation, which he recorded at over $103,000. The increase in the 
working force was reflected in the cost of boarding the men, which 
now exceeded $62,000. Many teams were needed to haul building 
materials over the railroad and to furnish power to the cranes, and 
Harvey had paid over $17,000 for horses. Hauling, trimming, and 
placing the timber came to $26,598, and the masonry to more than 
$4,700, although on 30 May the masons had barely started work in 
the upper lock. Another item that would increase rapidly in the 
summer was the expense of freighting, which on 30 May stood at 
$21,697. Items that did not yet appear, because the work had not 
started on them, were the caisson gate and the underwater 
excavation. With one year's work still ahead, the cost had risen to 
within $18,000 of Nichols's estimate and $172,000 of Canfield's.5 
Obviously more money would be needed in the treasury of the 
Canal Company, but Brooks continued to protest against further 
calls on his stock. From Coming's Albany City Bank he had 
obtained a sizable loan, which fell due in January. Corning covered 
for him. At the same time Brooks began to request the release of the 
grant lands to the company, despite the legal stipulation that the 
canal must first be completed and accepted. He insisted that the 
western stockholders had anticipated the early release of the land, 
although this must have been difficult for Corning to understand, 
since Joy had been present at the writing of the Michigan law. 
Harvey too was hard pressed to meet the payments on the stock 
allocated to him. He had invested $ 15,000 in the project to date, and 
this constituted his entire fortune. He had to ask Fairbanks to take 
charge of his personal finances, deposit bonds in his name if 
necessary, and sell 20 percent of his canal stock. "There is the most 
possibility," he wrote to Fairbanks, "that I shall need your kind 
offices in meeting canal assessments altho I shall try to use them as 
light as possible."6 
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Harvey was not in a good position to ask for favors, but Brooks 
was, considering all that Corning and Fairbanks expected of him. In 
their meeting of 15 January 1854, the directors decided to take 
advantage of the New York corporation law authorizing the Canal 
Company to assume a bonded debt not to exceed $250,000. The 
stockholders would be permitted to purchase $100 bonds of the 
company for $80. As Fairbanks later complained, the stockholders 
did not rush forward to seize the bargain, and for good reason. A 
railroad company, although it ran only fifty miles between two 
cities, would have real physical assets plus the chartered right to 
conduct its business. The Canal Company, however, had no 
physical assets at all, except for the Dart, tools, shanties, and some 
stolen timber. Its right to build the canal would expire in a little over 
a year, and there was a danger that the company, by then, would 
have nothing to show for all its expense and trouble. It had the 
expectation of owning 750,000 acres, but as yet it did not own one 
square foot of the land. Brown insisted that this expectation was a 
pipe dream, and if he, an on-the-spot observer, should prove to be 
correct, an investment in a Canal Company bond would be money 
thrown away.7 
The company now reverted to its original policy of making calls 
on the stock, a development that brought a protest from Fairbanks, 
who thought he had taken a fair share of the bonds whereas others 
had not. He did not consider it fair that he must now meet a 20 
percent assessment, due 1 June, after paying for the bonds. 
Correctly anticipating that the new tugs, added supervisors, and 
mounting costs in general would necessitate even further calls, he 
proposed an alternate scheme. Let Brooks, Joy, Seymour, Corning, 
Fairbanks himself, and perhaps two others form a confidential 
association that would then borrow to meet the combined 
assessments, using the Canal Company stock as collateral. 
Fairbanks even submitted a sample form that the association might 
use. The notes would be due 1 August 1856, with a yearly interest 
rate of 7 percent. The association would place 5,000 shares of Canal 
Company stock in the hands of trustees and expect to obtain a loan 
of $150,000. Fairbanks reminded Corning that the company must 
not underestimate the value of the lands if it ever got title to them, 
observing that "there is little doubt that we have in the mineral 
ranges a vast amount of valuable mines, the value of which has never 
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been fully appreciated." He communicated his thoughts to Brooks 
as well as to Corning; Brooks jumped at the idea of avoiding further 
stock calls and urged Joy to join in such an association.8 
Fairbanks continued to pursue his plan through the summer, as 
Pruyn warned that further stock calls would be required. The July 
meeting of the directors was held in Springfield, Massachusetts, for 
the convenience of Fairbanks and Forbes. Fairbanks officially 
offered his plan to the directors and was authorized to investigate 
further. He then wrote to banks in Boston, Springfield, and 
Hartford. These responded with an aggregate offer of between 
$70,000 and $75,000, and Fairbanks took the offers with him to the 
31 October meeting of the directors in Albany. He got no further. 
Pruyn objected "in a most decided manner against giving his private 
endorsement, and stated his conviction that there was no other way 
but to make another call." Forbes agreed with Pruyn.9 
It was possible that the Michigan Central trio was in better 
financial condition by the end of October than they had been in July, 
when Brooks had confided to Corning, "I am in need of the money 
and no time this summer to look for it for myself." During the 
critical years for Canal Company financing, 1854 and 1855, business 
editor and analyst Henry Varnum Poor noted that the Michigan 
Central had deviated from its usual practice. Up to this time Brooks 
and Forbes had provided complete reports for Poor to publish, but 
now their reports were entirely inadequate. Poor wrote that the 
railroad had continued to pay high dividends in 1854 and 1855 
without any rise in gross receipts. Its construction account had 
increased $4,000,000, although it did not add a single mile to its 
system. Forbes made no report on reserves for depreciation, 
renewals, or contingencies. Poor was forced to assume that the high 
dividends were paid from capital rather than from profits.10 
Whether or not there had been financial juggling on the Michigan 
Central, the Sault Canal was built at least in part with the railroad's 
profits. Three of the Canal Company's directors—Forbes, Brooks, 
and Corning—were major stockholders of the road, and it is 
probable that two more—Joy and Pruyn—held shares. Apparently 
John Seymour was also in a favorable financial position. During the 
spring and summer of 1854, he accepted at least three notes from his 
brother Horatio for a total of over $ 10,000.n 
Having rejected Fairbanks's plan for raising additional funds, the 
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directors decided that it would be necessary to explain the mounting 
cost of the work to the stockholders in order to prepare them for a 
further call on the stock. First, they listed the increased cost of 
provisions and labor. Then came the greatly increased transporta­
tion charges resulting from the failure to find suitable limestone for 
the locks within a reasonable distance. (The directors did not 
mention the Brown-Harvey dispute over the limestone on 
Drummond's Island.) Third, it was claimed—falsely—that ill health 
among the work force in the first year of construction had made it 
difficult to maintain an adequate supply of labor. The work force 
had, in fact, been decimated during the second season by the cholera 
epidemic that raged for eight or nine weeks. Finally, the directors 
warned the stockholders that the cost of exploring and evaluating 
the grant lands was higher than anticipated. All this was in 
preparation for the final blow; the work would use up almost all the 
company's capital.12 
The directors now took the last step in financing the project. They 
instructed Pruyn to issue the final call on the stock, and he complied 
on 2 November. Fairbanks hinted his annoyance and assumed with 
some justification that Pruyn had spoken up at Coming's request. 
The final call had pushed even Fairbanks beyond his financial limit, 
and he wrote that he would have to borrow most of the sum.13 
9 The Final Push

In January 1855 the directors of the Canal Company took drastic 
action. They had dealt successfully with the Michigan legislature in 
the past, and now they decided to appeal to that body for the 
immediate grant of the lands. 
Apparently it was thought that Attorney General Howard, 
though still an enemy of the Canal Company, would have little 
influence on the lawmakers. Moreover, Corning and Pruyn finally 
secured the cooperation of Michigan's chief engineer, John Clark, 
who had returned to New York from Detroit for the winter. Clark 
agreed to submit a report to the legislature supporting the 
company's request. In preparing this report he must have used the 
figures and estimates of the Canal Company. He had not visited the 
project in November for a firsthand view, and Major Glenn would 
not have given him statistics favorable to the company. Corning 
committed one of his rare tactical errors when he permitted Clark to 
date his report from Albany. A Michigan enemy of the Canal 
Company could easily point out that Clark's home was in Utica, and 
that the report might just as well have been signed by Erastus 
Corning.1 
In his report Clark stated that the canal followed specifications 
with one exception—the stones used in the lock backing were not as 
large as required. They were, however, the best the country 
afforded, and Clark assured the legislature that they had been 
placed with great care. The gates, he stated, had been built according 
to the design of Captain Canfield. He noted that "the great width of 
the chambers of the locks had rendered it difficult to devise a plan 
for the gates, capable of resisting the pressure of the water." Here 
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Clark either forgot his lessons in hydraulics or assumed that the 
legislature knew nothing about lock gates. The maximum pressure 
on a gate at any point is determined by the depth of the water held 
back and not by the canal width.2 
Clark next listed the work that remained on 28 November 1854. 
This included 4,600 cubic feet of rock excavation in the canal itself 
and almost 6,000 cubic feet of underwater excavation. The caisson 
gate was not ready, and the lock gates were not set in place and 
painted. Clark estimated that the cost of work remaining would be 
$24,000.3 
Finally Clark reported on all the extra work, not included in the 
contract, that the Canal Company had completed. This included 
excavation to enlarge a ship basin, special embankments, and 
additional masonry. The cost of the additional work amounted to 
$47,000, and Clark recommended that the company be paid that 
sum. Furthermore, since the value of the extra work exceeded the 
value of the contract work still to be done, Clark made the 
recommendation that Corning wanted: "It seems to be no more than 
just and reasonable, that the compensation named in the contract 
for the performance of same, should be rendered; and I am free to 
say, that such has been the uniform practice pursued in similar cases, 
on the public works of this, as well as other states, where I have had 
the supervision of them as engineer." With these words Clark signed 
his report, and Seymour prepared to take it to Lansing.4 
Unfortunately for Corning, however, his Michigan enemies were 
hard at work in Lansing. Brooks, recovering from his illness in 
Detroit, was probably warned by Charles Chapel that there was 
trouble in Lansing. On 10 January he sent a peremptory telegram to 
Joy, who was attending to railroad business in Chicago: "Go directly 
to Lansing without coming here." Brooks could not participate 
himself because he was having his teeth pulled. Upon arrival in 
Lansing, Joy found that J. Venen Brown, Jacob Howard, and 
Samuel Whitney (the witness to Harvey's timber theft) were stirring 
up as much trouble for the Canal Company as possible. They had 
obtained the signatures of the majorities of both houses of the 
legislature to a petition calling upon Governor Bingham to replace 
Clark with Major Glenn as chief engineer for the state. The petition 
protested against Clark's appointment and reminded the governor 
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that Glenn was "a citizen of this state" At the same time Brown and 
Whitney began their testimony before a senate select committee 
regarding Harvey's theft of timber from Section 16 land.5 
Brooks was naturally alarmed at the turn of events. The 
substitution of Glenn for Clark at so critical a stage would seriously 
endanger the prospects of the Canal Company in Lansing, and 
Brooks above all others wanted the lands released at once. He urged 
that Corning call a directors meeting in Detroit to consider the 
emergency, and Corning agreed. On 24 January, Corning, Brooks, 
Fairbanks, and Seymour met in Detroit and decided to reinforce 
Clark's report with a petition to the governor and legislature 
requesting the immediate grant of the 750,000 acres. They also 
decided to call upon the aid of shipowner Eber Ward and former 
Detroit mayor Zach Chandler. Chandler gave Ward a letter of 
introduction to Governor Bingham, which stated that "Capt. Ward 
is of the opinion that the Canal Co. has had a pretty hard time and is 
entitled under all circumstances of the case to the lands immediate­
ly." Chandler denied that Ward had any financial interest in the 
Canal Company and noted that the shipper was ready to execute a 
$100,000 bond to add to the surety that the canal would be 
completed on time. The petition, Clark's report, and Chandler's 
letter were entrusted to Joy, Porter, Seymour, and Ward, since 
proper timing in Lansing was important. Friends of the Canal 
Company had placed a bill releasing the lands with a favorable 
senate committee, but the three canal men decided to delay action 
on the bill until the school land problem could be settled.6 
Seymour's first responsibility lay with the governor, while Joy 
worked with the legislature. By 6 February, Seymour was able to 
notify his associates that Governor Bingham, resisting the petition 
of the legislature, would not replace Clark as chief engineer. In 
agreeing not to interfere, the governor assured Joy in front of 
witnesses that Clark would not be removed until after the canal was 
accepted. The saving of Clark was a major victory, but the fear 
persisted that Bingham might change his mind at a later date. 
Brooks, for one, considered Bingham a weak character easily 
dominated by Attorney General Howard, but Seymour realized that 
it would not do to irritate the governor with further pressure. It 
would, however, be possible to attack Howard and expose him as 
the legal counsel for Brown, should such a step become necessary.7 
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By the end of January, the select committee issued its report 
exonerating the Canal Company of responsibility for the timber 
theft. Joy and Seymour then decided to push the senate land bill 
through the legislature as quickly as possible. Seymour arranged for 
the printing of copies of Clark's report and the Canal Company's 
petition, all to be held for distribution. Bingham agreed to present 
the petition to the senate, but the canal men had not reckoned with 
Howard. On the night of Saturday, 3 February, the attorney general 
forced a meeting of the Michigan cabinet, which included the 
principal executive officers of the state. Whatever arguments 
Howard used, they were successful. The cabinet by unanimous vote 
overruled the governor on the immediate issue of the 750,000 acres. 
Faced with this show of solidarity, Bingham, Joy, and Seymour 
backed down. Defeat in the senate was now probable, and it would 
not be safe for the Canal Company to push Bingham any further 
against the wishes of all the other executive officers. Seymour 
discarded the company petitions, but permitted the submission of 
Clark's report to the senate; it could do no harm. Joy, Porter, 
Seymour, and Ward prepared to leave Lansing.8 
Brooks was appalled at the turn of events. He wrote to Joy, "I can 
not abide the idea of not getting our lands if it is possible to get them. 
You must consider what will be the position of affairs if we don't get 
the canal done technically. There are many chances of this and you 
must look to that as a likely result." Joy, Porter, and Seymour, 
however, were pleased with their efforts. Seymour wrote that the 
state politicians were now aware that Howard was playing a dog-in­
the-manger role. It could be recalled that Howard had acted for the 
Michigan Southern Railroad interests in obtaining the injunctions 
in early 1853. Now, as attorney general, he was also acting as 
Brown's legal counsel. It would only be necessary to apply 
counterpressure and establish Howard as Brown's attorney of 
record. Seymour noted one final accomplishment besides the saving 
of Clark. Someone at the Sault in November had had the presence of 
mind to take a number of daguerreotypes of the canal locks. These, 
together with face stone samples, were circulated in Lansing, and 
Seymour wrote that the pictures and samples impressed even the 
enemies of the Canal Company.9 
The legislature had another chore that was not the concern of the 
Canal Company, which would no longer be responsible or even 
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interested once Michigan accepted the completed canal. The 
lawmakers must provide for the administration of the canal 
according to federal law. On 12 February, Bingham signed the 
necessary legislation. It placed the general oversight of the canal in 
the hands of a board of control consisting of the governor, the 
auditor general, and the state treasurer. This body was charged with 
establishing the operating rules of the canal and the control of its 
funds. The law set the canal toll at 4c per ton for each ship's enrolled 
tonnage, but the board of control had the authority to revise this toll 
in the future. By federal law Michigan could charge only the amount 
needed to maintain the canal and pay for its supervision.10 
More important, the Michigan law authorized the governor, with 
the consent of the senate, to appoint a supervisor of the canal at a 
salary not to exceed $1,500 per year for a two-year term of office. It 
would be the superintendent's responsibility to see that the tolls were 
properly paid, the canal kept in good order, and the rules established 
by the board of control enforced. The superintendent must keep a 
record of the names and types of vessels using the canal, the names 
of the captains, and the tonnage of each ship. For several years after 
the passage of the law, the superintendents exceeded these orders by 
enumerating the cargoes as well. Eventually, as canal usage 
increased, the latter practice had to be abandoned. Actually the job 
would not be an onerous one, at least for the first few years, since the 
superintendent was entitled to employ workers to handle the gates 
and attend to routine tasks. Sault editor Brown wanted the position 
and had Howard's backing with the governor as well as the support 
of a petition signed by thirty men. To the delight of Brooks, 
however, the governor rejected the advice of the attorney general 
and gave the job to John Burt. Brooks and Burt had maintained 
friendly relations during the years of construction, and Brooks 
considered the new superintendent to be fair and honest. By 
coincidence, sometime between November 1854 and May 1855, 
Burt and a Mr. Chase purchased the Lake Superior Journal from 
Brown. It is possible that Brown's failure to get the superintendent's 
job with its $1,500 salary was the determining factor in the sale. In 
any case, by May of 1855 the JournaPs drumfire of criticism directed 
against the Canal Company management was reversed, and 
Brown's career as a Sault editor was ended.11 
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In addition to their problems in Lansing, the Canal Company 
directors were concerned with the details of the anticipated transfer 
of lands from the public domain to the state of Michigan, and then, 
they hoped, to themselves. George Frost had taken to Washington 
the extensive list of lands the company had requested, and on 20 
November 1854 he filed it at the Washington land office of the 
Department of the Interior. Everyone then waited impatiently for 
Commissioner John Wilson and Secretary McClelland to act. The 
secretary had ruled favorably on the disputed claims of Harvey and 
Brown ten months before, but, as usual, Brooks was worried. He 
had warned Fairbanks in July 1854 that Brown would attempt to 
block the grant in Washington. Now, in January 1855, while 
advising Fairbanks to say nothing in public, he informed the 
Vermonter that the Washington authorities were still delaying a 
decision.12 
In his anxiety Brooks imagined demons where none existed. Since 
the Brown-Howard combination had been defeated in Washington 
the year before, the two men were now concentrating their efforts in 
Lansing. The problem in the land office in Washington had nothing 
to do with the conflict in Michigan. It was caused instead by the 
complicated nature of the Canal Company claims. It was necessary 
for clerks to check each individual claim against the records. No 
individual claim could be larger than one section (640 acres), and the 
Canal Company had made 1,422 claims in the Upper Peninsula 
alone. Many were for quarter-quarter sections of 40 acres, and some 
were for lots even smaller. Checking these would have been a time-
consuming task in even a smoothly run office, and in early 1855 the 
Washington land office was not the best-administered department 
in the government. Its head was John Wilson, a Whig appointee of 
the previous administration whom Cass had persuaded Pierce and 
McClelland to retain because of his knowledge and efficiency. By 
1855, however, Wilson was dabbling more and more in Know 
Nothing politics, and in June of that year Pierce would fire him. In 
spite of the confusion in Wilson's office, the Canal Company was 
actually fortunate. When Congress was not in session, Pierce proved 
to be an inveterate meddler in minor administrative details that 
should have been left to others. As the year progressed, he became 
involved in diplomatic reorganization, naval efficiency, and an alley 
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fight between Winfield Scott and Jefferson Davis. To the advantage 
of the Canal Company, he permitted McClelland to run the 
Department of the Interior without interference.13 
In February the Washington land office completed its work and 
sent the patents for 750,000 acres to Michigan over McClelland's 
signature. Brooks, who received certified copies from Washington, 
was pleased to note the accuracy with which George Frost had 
worked. Of the entire request only about 2,000 acres had been 
disallowed; these were found to be part of the "swamp lands" 
already granted to Michigan. For the time being the patents 
remained in the office of Michigan Secretary of State John 
McKinney, but Brooks, fearing a new wave of injunctions, was 
determined that there should be no delay in delivering them once the 
canal had been accepted. He noted that the standard Michigan 
patent forms could not be used since their forfeiture provisions 
would not apply to the canal grant lands because of their taxfree 
status. To expedite matters, Brooks volunteered the services of 
Frost to devise a new form that would be suitable for the unusual 
situation. The Michigan land office men, pleased at the opportu­
nity to get out of an unpleasant job, accepted the offer. As Brooks 
told Fairbanks, "With all the papers ready for signature I think we 
can well say to the authorities 'as it will take but a little time to 
execute these papers please do so before asking us to surrender the 
canal!!' "14 
In his eagerness to avoid delay, however, Brooks had overlooked 
an essential detail. The Michigan land office authorities quite 
properly insisted that the attorney general of the state approve the 
new patent forms as devised by Frost. The requirement gave 
Howard a fresh opportunity to cause trouble. He simply sat on the 
forms for weeks, doing nothing, and without his approval Frost 
could not begin the tedious process of listing the individual claims. 
When John Burt checked in behalf of the Canal Company, Howard 
replied that he could not make up his mind as to the legality of the 
forms. Furthermore, he questioned whether the proper assignment 
of the contract had been made from the New York incorporators to 
the directors of the Canal Company. Corning assured Bingham that 
the company was prepared to furnish proof "at any time and place it 
may reasonably be required to do so." Proof was indeed demanded, 
and Brooks and Joy forwarded the certified copy of the assignment 
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to Bingham on 28 April. Next, the attorney general told Burt that he 
could not find the state's copy of the canal contract in Lansing. 
Brooks philosophized, "No legal paper can be so drawn that a 
lawyer intending to cavil at it will not find in it the means of 
disapproving of its form and its sufficiency for the purpose 
intended." At this point he feared that a writ of mandamus would be 
required before the Canal Company could get its lands.15 
While Howard pretended indecision on the land forms, the Canal 
Company decided to apply counterpressure. On 19 March attorneys 
representing the company filed a complaint against Brown in circuit 
court in Detroit. For its legal action the company selected the firm of 
Lathrup and Duffield. Either Joy and Porter were too busy with the 
railroads, or it was decided to retain attorneys who had no interest in 
the canal. In its complaint the Canal Company demanded that 
Brown be ordered to surrender the limestone quarry on Drum­
mond's Island. It was the contention of the company that Brown, 
acting as its agent, should have claimed and purchased the land for 
the company and not for himself. Harvey had sent Brown the 
commission of the governor designating Harvey as a canal land 
agent for Michigan, a letter deputizing Brown to the same office, 
and a blank land warrant. In his deposition Harvey swore that he 
had met Brown for the first time at the Sault in November 1852, and 
at that time they had discussed the availability of high-grade 
limestone for the canal. Harvey also made this statement: "I had 
charge of all of the company's land matters, financial matters, 
construction of the canal in the Upper Peninsula. It was also my 
province to appoint agents and others under myself." It was then 
safe for him to claim far more than his share of credit for the project, 
and he continued to do so for the rest of his life.16 
The court issued a subpoena for Brown, now a resident of Wayne 
County, to appear 1 May 1855 to defend himself. The defendant 
retained the firm of Howard and Mandell to represent him, and 
Jacob Howard thus officially became attorney of record for Brown. 
With but one exception Brown agreed to the facts as stated in the 
complaint. He claimed that he did not realize that the Canal 
Company would require a great quantity of limestone, and that he 
had purchased the Drummond's Island quarry for himself rather 
than for the company. When he later discovered the need of the 
company, he offered to sell the limestone, but Harvey would agree 
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to pay only a pittance. Brown claimed, correctly, that Harvey had 
no right to delegate his authority as state land agent. He went so far 
as to state that Harvey was not himself a legal land agent because his 
commission, though signed by Governor Parsons, lacked the seal of 
the State of Michigan. Brown testified that he did not have a binding 
contract with the company until June 1853, when Harvey hired him 
for $2,000 to look after the company land interests. He stated that 
prior to the contract he had had no legal responsibility to the 
company and that after the contract he had acted in good faith as the 
company's agent. He did not defend himself regarding his claim of 
the access land on Drummond's Island in November 1853, when his 
contract was still in force.17 
The case dragged on until the summer of 1856 and never reached a 
conclusion. The court received the deposition of Joseph Kemp, who 
stated that Brown had hired him to look for suitable limestone as 
early as November 1852. Kemp's testimony, along with letters 
introduced as evidence by the plaintiff and signed by Brown, refuted 
Brown's defense based on ignorance of the need for limestone. Sault 
land agent Warner testified as to the circumstances of Brown's 
claiming the access land under the noses of Harvey and Brooks in 
November 1853. The presentation was sufficient for the officers of 
the Canal Company, and they stopped the proceedings against 
Brown. They had more land than they knew what to do with, and 
they could afford to let Brown keep his quarry, for all the good it 
would do him. What was more important, they had accomplished 
their purpose. They had brought pressure on Brown and Howard at 
the proper time, and they had formally established Howard's 
affinity with Canal Company enemies. Any official act of the 
attorney general would be viewed in that light.18 
On New Year's Day in 1855 Harvey submitted his regular report, 
this time with a warning note. There was ice in the canal, and it was 
not caused by freezing rain or snow but by water seeping through the 
banks of the canal from the river. By February, Harvey realized the 
significance of this seepage. The problem was the river cove, the risk 
that Canfield had been forced to accept in October 1852. Harvey 
warned Seymour that the canal banks were weak for a distance of 
about four hundred feet above the upper lock. Along this length the 
proposed water level in the canal (the level of Lake Superior) would 
be above the level of the land. The canal water would be retained by 
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the banks already constructed. However, the bottom of the canal 
would be below the water level of the river. Thus a double danger 
threatened. When the canal was drained, water from the river might 
force a breach in the banks. When the canal was filled, water might 
break out in the reverse direction. In either case the bank might 
progressively crumble under the pressure of the water until the lock 
masonry was reached. Heavy pressure on the side of the masonry 
thus exposed might wash it away as well and destroy the entire 
canal; even the village itself could be flooded. Harvey asked that 
Seymour notify Clark of the danger, although technically, the 
company was safe because the banks had been built to greater 
thickness than specified.19 
In spite of the risks, Harvey hoped to fill the canal in early spring. 
He had a good reason: the dredge had completed most of its work on 
Lake Superior, and he wanted it moved to the lower end. He 
proposed to set the upper caisson gate in place, use the dredge to 
break up the upper cofferdam, and then open the valves of the gate 
to admit the water slowly. He would then pass the dredge down 
through the canal and close the caisson gate again. Not wanting to 
take sole responsibility for this maneuver, he asked Seymour to 
consult with Clark as to alternative courses of operation. Clearly 
Harvey had at least listened to Canfield's warning against removing 
the cofferdam until the canal was protected in some way. Moreover, 
the situation forced him to evaluate the work progress at the upper 
caisson gate, and he was not pleased with what he found.20 
Up to this point Harvey had usually been willing that Seymour 
show his letters to Clark so that responsibility could be shared. 
Whenever he discovered that a serious error had been made by the 
Canal Company, however, he warned Seymour to show the letter 
reporting it only to those on "our side." The situation at the upper 
caisson gate was such a case. 
As designed by Canfield and constructed by the company, the 
gate was a huge, watertight box, seventy feet long, crossing the canal 
completely- Its width, eight feet at the bottom, tapered to three feet 
at the top. It was fourteen feet high. When towed into place and 
filled with water, the gate would form an effective dam across the 
canal. It would hold 3,080 cubic feet of water weighing over ninety-
six tons. When it was time to fill the canal, sluice gates near the 
bottom of the caisson would let water through the gate. Then the 
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gate would be pumped free of water and towed aside to a niche in the 
canal wall for storage. The chief problem was that the gate would 
have to fit perfectly between the canal walls and make a watertight 
juncture with the canal bottom.21 
The sill upon which the gate would rest when in use was thus of 
considerable importance. Canfield ordered that heavy transverse 
timbers be set two feet apart in hydraulic mortar. Each timber would 
span the width of the canal, and each timber end must extend four 
feet under the masonry sides of the canal. The timbers must be 
dressed to a width of ten inches on the top and twelve or fourteen 
inches on the bottom so that the weight of the mortar would hold 
them down. Planking two and one-half inches thick could then be 
spiked to the timbers to form a floor upon which the caisson would 
rest.22 
The trouble came in the execution of Canfield's orders. The sill 
could not be prepared until the excavation had been completed, and 
the excavation at the upper end of the canal had fallen behind 
schedule. As a result the carpenters could not set the timbers until 
after the first severe frost. Harvey reported to Seymour that the 
mortar had not set properly because of the cold weather, and he 
feared that the caisson gate would afford no protection once the 
upper cofferdam was removed. The water would flow as freely as 
ever under the gate. Harvey therefore asked the directors to obtain 
an extension of time for the completion of the canal. He proposed to 
scrape away the ice and lay several canvas sails over the sill in the 
hopes of obtaining a watertight fit. Then, if the directors could 
obtain an extension, a proper mortar job could be done in the 
spring. At the same time Harvey asked for instructions so that he 
could move the dredge through the canal. On this point he warned 
Seymour, "And let him [Clark] refer as little to Col. Glenn's 
judgement as possible as the Col is bound not to have us get through 
our job in time if he can block the game in any way."23 
Once again Harvey proved his ineptitude as an engineer and 
planner. He had not learned from Brooks's statement that it would 
not do to let one part of the work get in the way of another. Harvey 
proposed to use the dredge to break up the upper cofferdam and 
then to pass the dredge through the canal. In practically the same 
breath, he proposed to do a proper mortar job on the caisson sill the 
following spring. But, with the upper cofferdam gone, the sill would 
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be under a minimum of ten feet of water! It was also difficult to see 
what sail canvas would do that planking would not accomplish. If 
the timbers were washed away because of mortar failure, the canvas 
would go too. Finally, Harvey should have been aware that neither 
Clark, the canal commission, nor the governor had the power to 
extend the completion date. The job simply had to be finished by 19 
May. 
All this presented another problem for Brooks, and to add to the 
trouble, he was now getting conflicting reports from the Sault. It 
was understandable that nerves would fray on the project. Harvey 
and Nichols were completing their second winter of working 
together, and Nichols had lost all patience with the younger man. 
Harvey announced that excavation would be completed on 1 April, 
and Nichols believed that he had the responsibility to warn Brooks 
not to place any confidence in Harvey's statement. Referring to his 
own report, he called the 1 April date ridiculous. Nichols also 
warned Brooks that Harvey, acting as a "higher law," was directing 
the men to proceed rapidly while ignoring the canal's weak spots. 
There was at least one point that Harvey had pronounced finished 
that would never pass inspection, and Nichols feared that warm 
weather would reveal others. He also complained of Harvey's 
sarcastic criticism of his foremen and of the unfair demands he 
placed on everyone.24 
Brooks needed no reminder of Harvey's mistakes; the man's 
record was now a long one of overoptimistic reports and failed 
promises. It would never do to permit him to hide shoddy work in 
the hope that it would not be discovered later. Nevertheless, he 
would have to be handled with tact, at least until the navigation 
season opened. After all, Harvey was on the scene and Brooks was 
not, the same situation that existed between Brooks and Forbes 
regarding affairs of the Michigan Central. The result was a long and 
carefully worded letter of advice regarding the caisson gate and its 
sill. 
First Brooks told Harvey that he must not let the water into the 
canal until Clark had inspected the work. The order was quite 
reasonable, for Clark would want to inspect the lock floors and 
could not do so if they were underwater. Brooks realized that the 
timing would present a problem for Harvey, since the project could 
not be considered complete without the removal of the upper 
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cofferdam. The sequence meant that the caisson gate had to be in 
place and functioning on the day when Clark and the commissioners 
arrived to inspect. Clark had not been told of the problem with the 
caisson gate sill.25 
Brooks then offered Harvey three alternatives. If Harvey thought 
that the leakage problem would be minor, he could attempt a quick 
patchwork. If Harvey thought the problem more serious, he should 
leave the caisson gate in its place. Then, after removing all men and 
tools from the canal, he should test the caisson by lettering the water 
in through a special cut. The cofferdam must not be touched, and 
the cut must be such that it could quickly be filled again should the 
sill leak badly. In that case he should repair the leak and test again 
with the cut. If Harvey thought this solution hopeless because of the 
condition of the sill, Brooks offered a final plan. The most 
dangerous spot of all in the sill would be the area immediately in 
front of the transverse timber lying closest to Lake Superior. Brooks 
proposed that Harvey excavate a trench directly in front of this 
timber about two feet deep and three feet wide across the width of 
the canal. This trench would then be filled with six courses of brick 
mortared together in a terrace pattern with the widest terrace at the 
bottom to support the work. The entire terrace must then be covered 
with mortar to the level of the bottom of the canal.26 
There were several advantages to the last plan. Even if the 
covering mortar did not hold well, the bricks would prevent water 
from working under the timber and washing it out. As to the 
stability of the brick structure, Brooks had to rely on the principle 
that many alternating joints in the structure would provide 
sufficient elasticity in freeze and thaw. Brooks tried to encourage 
Harvey by telling him that this same plan had worked under the 
Charlestown drydock in Boston harbor. If Harvey had no bricks, 
Brooks would try to get him some in the spring, time permitting. 
Otherwise, Harvey could use medium-size stones, but these must be 
handset in mortar as close together as possible. Above all, Brooks 
warned, the caisson gate must be watertight. It would be the only 
way that the canal could be protected during repair in future years 
once the cofferdam was gone. Brooks also realized that Clark's 
orders would prevent the dredge from leaving Lake Superior. 
Harvey must not worry about that. Clark would permit dredging 
below the canal after the deadline, on the grounds that his order had 
made the dredging impossible before then.27 
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The letter, which included a rough sketch of the brick work, 
contained not the slightest note of criticism and offered several 
words of encouragement. Brooks had given Harvey three alter­
natives to meet all eventualities and had then permitted the young 
man to use his own judgment. He did take the precaution of sending 
a copy of his letter to Fairbanks, along with a copy of Nichols's 
angry letter of 4 March, and he advised Fairbanks that he had told 
Harvey to be careful.28 
It was all to no avail. Harvey snapped back that he could not carry 
out Brooks's instructions and that he had no time to give his reasons. 
To Fairbanks he wrote, "It is impossible for a man to sit in his office 
in Detroit and tell us explicitly how to carry on work here under all 
circumstances." He concluded, "If any adverse event should occur 
to frustrate our hopes I am inclined to believe that there would be a 
great 'shaking of skirts' & that the blame would all concentrate on 
my head right or wrong." The sail canvas would have to do, a 
decision that gave the directors something new to worry about. 
Harvey, with no engineering training, did not realize that the 
juncture between the caisson gate and its sill must be absolutely 
watertight. If water seeped under the gate, it would destroy the 
safety factor in Canfield's design by exerting a buoyant pressure on 
the gate equal to the weight of the water above it in the canal.29 
Harvey also reported to Fairbanks that he had personally 
wheeled the last barrow load out of the cut on 6 April; still, Brooks's 
anxiety reached a new height. He had no way of knowing that this 
time Harvey was telling the truth. He sent urgent messages to 
Fairbanks no fewer than five times between 18 April and 3 May, 
reminding the former governor of the importance of his presence in 
Michigan in May. Brooks wanted the directors to meet at the Sault 
in advance of the canal commission to form plans of action should 
Harvey contrive further misadventures. With a faith in the weather 
not shared by the western men, Corning and Pruyn issued a call for a 
directors meeting at Sault Ste. Marie on Friday, 11 May 1855, or as 
soon thereafter as a quorum should arrive. Fairbanks was as much 
on edge as Brooks, probably because of the urgency of Brooks's 
letters, and promised to be ready when the first boat left for the 
Sault. Then, to the consternation of all, he suddenly changed his 
mind and announced that he could not leave the East. His brother 
Joseph was dying, and he had to suggest that Corning and Seymour 
make the trip without him.30 
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There was nothing left to do but wait for the weather to clear the 
ice out of the St. Mary's River. Brooks had warned Fairbanks that 
there was more ice than usual in Lake Huron and that the opening of 
navigation would be late. He even contemplated going north in 
April but concluded that he could not run the risk of getting stuck in 
the ice. Harvey had estimated that the ice would break up between 1 
May and 5 May, and the first hopeful sign was observed on 2 May 
when a ship arrived in Detroit from Lake Michigan, indicating that 
the Straits of Mackinac were clear of ice. Finally, on 5 May, the 
impatient Brooks wired Corning that the steamers North Star and 
Illinois had come down from the Sault. The Illinois would return on 
8 May, and Brooks wanted the directors and, above all, Clark to be 
aboard. If the trip took the usual three days, Brooks would have 
eight days to correct any new Harvey blunders and to add what 
finishing touches were necessary.31 
Before leaving Albany, Corning learned that Clark, because of an 
injury during the previous fall, could not keep his promise to inspect 
the canal. The company was thus in the same position it had been in 
at the time of the death of Canfield. It was intolerable that Glenn 
should become chief engineer; Corning had to find a substitute for 
Clark. Fortunately one was available, the distinguished civil 
engineer William J. McAlpine, former state engineer and surveyor 
for the state of New York. Brooks had wanted McAlpine for the job 
in the first place, and McAlpine agreed to take Clark's place on the 
inspection trip.32 
When the Illinois arrived at the Sault on 11 May, the new owners 
of the Lake Superior Journal were on hand, one of them ready to 
assume the responsibility for the canal as soon as the state took over. 
They were friends of the Canal Company and found little to criticize 
and much to praise. They reported that Brooks had to attend to one 
small leak in the canal bank before the contract expired. They also 
reported general frustration when, on contract day, 19 May, only 
one canal commissioner had arrived. By 21 May all were finally 
present except for former governor John Barry. The visiting group 
also included Governor Bingham, Attorney General Howard, 
Secretary of State John McKinney, Auditor General Whitney 
Jones, former congressman David Stuart, and Zach Chandler. All 
carefully inspected the work; the commissioners would not 
comment to the editors of the Lake Superior Journal, but the latter 
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thought that the visitors looked satisfied. Their missions completed, 
the commissioners and canal officers then boarded the Illinois to 
return to Detroit. 
The editors were correct. Before the Illinois had steamed far down 
the St. Mary's River, the governor and commissioners handed 
Corning a document second in importance only to the land patents: 
We . .  . do hereby certify that a ship canal has been constructed 
around the Falls of St. Mary in the State of Michigan by the St. Mary's 
Falls Ship Canal Company. . . . That said canal has been constructed 
within two years within the making of the contract for the construction 
of said canal, to our satisfaction and acceptance. 
Kinsley S. Bingham 
Shubal Conant 
C. Joslin 
Henry Ledyard 
Alfred Williams 
The same Michigan officers also certified that the original 
contractors with the state of Michigan had assigned all rights, 
privileges, and remunerations to the New York-based Canal Com­
pany. This ended the responsibility of the canal commission, and 
tensions lessened aboard the Illinois. They did not entirely dis­
appear, however. Seymour foolishly interrupted McKinney on a 
matter of canal business while the latter was engrossed in the 
important business of a euchre game; the result was an exchange of 
harsh words between McKinney and Corning. This was unfor­
tunate, since one more important step remained to be taken: 
McKinney still had in his office in Lansing the seal of the state of 
Michigan needed to complete the transaction.33 
Fairbanks joined his fellow directors in Detroit when they 
returned from the successful Sault trip. His brother Joseph had died 
on 15 May, and the former governor could now carry his share in the 
effort to obtain the land. The directors agreed that speed was 
important. They did not want to fight a new series of injunctions 
from Brown or Sherman, nor did they want to initiate mandamus 
proceedings. Therefore they decided to launch a public appeal, 
should the state officers balk at transferring the land. Corning, 
meanwhile, prepared a lengthy letter addressed to Bingham, 
McKinney, and the commissioner of the State Land Office, S. B. 
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Treadwell, in which he reminded the officers that the canal had been 
satisfactorily completed and so certified by the governor, by the 
commissioners, and by McAlpine acting for Clark.34 
Corning first wrote that it was common knowledge that canal 
enemies had attempted to defeat the award of the land and to reverse 
the approval of the secretary of the interior in order to claim the 
lands for themselves. They had been turned back, however, after a 
full hearing in Washington. Corning then anticipated his opponents' 
next step by stating that they had attempted to obtain injunctions to 
prevent the conveyance of the land to the Canal Company. He made 
the further assumption that several state officers would question the 
regularity of the grant from the United States to Michigan and 
decline to issue the patents on that ground. Corning insisted that 
while the state of Michigan held the land in fee simple, it now did so 
as the trustee for the Canal Company. He would be willing for a 
third party mutually agreed upon to hold the land in escrow, but he 
wanted to avoid litigation that would prove vexatious to the state. 
Finally Corning made the official request for the lands and 
concluded, "We have no reason from our past experience to expect 
favor or friendship from the state, . . . and no doubt every just and 
fair minded man, will probably appreciate the motives as well as the 
wisdom of the policy which compels us to hold the canal."15 
It was a clever letter in several respects. When Corning announced 
the company's intention to hold the canal, he knew who held the 
whip handle. The navigation season had opened, yet the Canal 
Company had no authority to operate the canal for Great Lakes 
shipping. Corning could order the upper caisson gate closed and the 
canal drained—and then sit back to watch the fun. McKnight, 
Ward, and the rest of the shipping industry would join the numerous 
mining enterprises, the Detroit merchants, and the fishing industry 
in descending with rage upon the Michigan authorities. Democratic 
politicians ousted from office in 1854 by the upstart Republican 
party of Michigan would have a grand issue. Further, Corning 
cleverly referred to the canal enemies rather than to the enemies of 
the Canal Company. He was quite aware that no one of importance 
in Michigan was an enemy of the canal itself, and a slight twisting of 
words thus united his interests with the state's against a common 
foe. Finally, Corning signed the letter as president of the company, 
along with the two Michigan men who were his associates. The two 
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easterners, Fairbanks and Seymour, whose names had political 
associations, did not sign. 
Corning ordered that copies be made for general distribution if 
necessary, and the men dispersed for the next phase of the 
operation. Fairbanks and Seymour departed for Lansing at once, 
with Coming's letter and a somewhat subdued attorney general. 
Brooks hurried off to retrieve the land certificates that he had 
hidden in or near Detroit. He would follow his associates as soon as 
he could. Frost was already in Lansing talking to the state officials; 
and Corning, with his usual confidence in his directors, left for 
Albany.36 
In 1855 there was no railroad between Detroit and Lansing, and 
Fairbanks, Seymour, and Howard rode the entire eighty miles in a 
wagon over a rough log road, arriving in the capital at 3:00 A.M. on 
25 May. Perhaps Howard had been swayed by his visit to the canal, 
and perhaps he was impressed when Corning, in Detroit, confided 
to him that he must go to Lansing with the canal men to safeguard 
the interests of Michigan. It was also likely that the attorney general, 
an astute politician destined to reach the United States Senate, 
realized that a company about to take possession of 750,000 acres of 
Michigan land might be a power to reckon with in the future. 
Whatever the case, Seymour reported that Howard appeared to act 
in good faith and did not object to a word in any of the legal 
documents presented to him for approval.37 
When the day's work began that Friday in Lansing, Fairbanks 
turned his attention to the state officers, trying to win their support 
for what Seymour called a "Fairbanks Platform." He reminded 
Howard that in the eyes of the general public the attorney general 
exercised control over state secretary McKinney. The public 
therefore would hold Howard responsible for whatever decision was 
reached. Seymour, meanwhile, joined Frost and the state land office 
clerks in the tedious job of comparing the United States grants to 
Michigan with the copy of the Canal Company claims that Frost 
had brought to Lansing. Before the job was finished, Seymour felt 
that his tongue had been as completely quartered as a section of 640 
acres. He also managed, at least in part, to make up with McKinney 
for the angry exchange aboard the Illinois, although the secretary 
was by no means converted to the cause of the Canal Company.38 
Shortly after 4:00 P.M. Brooks arrived with the certificates, 
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having made record time from Detroit. Howard escorted McKinney 
to the secretary's office, where the two men began to sign and seal 
the certificates and patents, dealing first with the mineral lands, and 
then with the pinelands. By 7:30 P.M. they were done, and Mc-
Kinney delivered all 750,000 acres to Brooks and Seymour. With 
the lands safely in the possession of the Canal Company, Seymour 
handed the written transfer of the canal itself to McKinney. This 
paper was the last to change hands, and the job was done. 
Seymour reported that once the transaction was completed the 
Michigan officials suddenly became great friends with the canal 
men, behaving with as much cordial enthusiasm as if they had won 
the grant lands themselves. The next day they all rode together in the 
company's wagon to the Michigan Central lines at Jackson, where 
Brooks generously distributed passes on the road to the Michigan 
men. Brooks, Fairbanks, Seymour, and Frost then returned to 
Detroit to receive congratulations from all except Abner Sherman, 
who by this time probably wanted to separate the Upper Peninsula 
from the Union. A banquet followed in honor of the governor, the 
former governors, and the canal officers, and by 30 May the patents 
rested safely in the care of Pruyn in Albany. When Fairbanks 
delivered them, Seymour thought he heard Corning say, "All 
right."39 
1 A Counting the Cost and 
Operating the Canal 
Only a handful of Sault citizens, mostly bartenders mourning their 
lost clientele, and some passengers were on hand to witness one of 
the great events in industrial history. There was no DeWitt Clinton 
to pour a keg of Lake Superior water into the St. Mary's River, and 
the marquis de Lafayette, who had graced the opening of the Erie 
Canal, had been dead for twenty-one years. The canal builders, 
officers and laborers, had all departed. Gone too were the men, now 
redundant, of the freight forwarding business, when the first ship 
locked through to Lake Superior. It was the Illinois, returned from 
the lower Great Lakes on 18 June 1855 with cargo and passengers 
for the upper lake. What were the thoughts of the hardened miners 
as they crowded the bows to watch the locks operate? "A great 
moment in history"? No. More likely, "It's damn well about time." 
An event of even greater significance took place two months later in 
view of an even smaller audience. The brigantine Columbia, three 
days out of Marquette, locked through the canal with 132 tons of red 
iron ore mounded on her deck. Escorted by Lady Elgin, the canal 
mule and essential consort for sail vessels in the canal, the Columbia 
was destined for the Cuyahoga River and the Cleveland-Cliffs Iron 
Company. This was the first shipment in a trade that would reach an 
annual 100 million tons a century later.1 
Michigan now owned the canal and would own and operate it for 
the development of the Upper Peninsula and Minnesota until 9 June 
1881, when the United States took over. In return the United States 
and Michigan had released 750,000 acres, or slightly more than two 
percent of the total land surface of the state. In comparison 
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Michigan under the Morrill College Land Grant Act of 1862 
received 240,000 acres, all located within the state, for higher 
education. The Canal Company had made its selections a decade 
before and, as will be seen, had chosen wisely. Higher education in 
Michigan was the loser in these transactions, and it would be well to 
see what Michigan bought for so high a price. 
Strictly speaking, the canal was not built to specifications. The sill 
under the upper caisson gate was in questionable condition and 
remained a potential danger as long as the Michigan authorities 
relied upon the gate for protection. There was an obvious reason 
why McAlpine and the commission accepted the sill, sailcloth and 
all—they never saw it! Since Clark had insisted on inspecting the 
canal before the water was let in, the caisson gate completely 
covered the sill. It could not be moved after the breakup of the upper 
cofferdam without flooding the canal contrary to Clark's orders. 
When the canal was filled and the caisson gate towed to storage, the 
sill was out of sight under twelve feet of water. If Major Glenn had 
protested, it would have been his word against that of Brooks, 
Harvey, Nichols, Corning, and Seymour. Possessed of such a 
preponderance of dignity and authority (Harvey excepted), the 
Canal Company never had to argue at a disadvantage either at the 
Sault or in Lansing.2 
The work, although nearly finished, had not been completed by 
21 May. The Canal Company entered an agreement with the 
commissioners to complete the job after acceptance, and the total 
cost came to but $1,812.96. No steps were taken to remedy the 
weakness in the canal bank just west of the lock masonry, which 
would cause trouble in the future. However, the embankments had 
been built to specifications, and, contrary to Brown's dire 
predictions, the lock walls survived the winter of 1854-55 as well as 
subsequent winters.3 
No innovations were built into the Sault canal. The obvious 
reason was that Canfield, who had done most of the engineering 
work, had had no previous canal experience. When in doubt, he 
usually copied the methods used on the Erie Canal, although his 
plans for sandbar protection reflected knowledge gained in his own 
general line of work. Nichols, though familiar with canal 
engineering, did not tamper with Canfield's design because Brooks 
would not permit it. Thus several unsatisfactory features of the Erie 
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Canal were built into the Sault as well. For example, Canfield 
adopted the standard Erie method of filling and emptying the locks. 
A series of small sluice gates ran along the bottom of each lock gate. 
They were opened and closed by a butterfly valve system that could 
be operated by a gateman who turned a crank and rotated a 
horizontal shaft that ran the length of the gate. Through a simple 
gear arrangement, the shaft raised or lowered vertical shafts going 
down to each sluice gate. The raising operation brought a panel in 
the sluice gate parallel to the force of the water and opened the 
sluice. The lowering operation brought the panel parallel to the gate 
surface and closed the sluice. The system did not affect the physical 
strength of the gate itself, since the structural members were not 
involved. However, it did decrease the hydrostatic strength and 
permitted an annoying turbulence in the lock that had also plagued 
the Erie locks. Moreover, there was the inherent problem that if one 
of the sluice gates should be jammed in an open position, all gates 
would remain open, since they all operated off the same horizontal 
shaft.4 
John Burt, who inherited his father's inventiveness, solved these 
problems too late for the Sault canal. During his term as canal 
superintendent, he noted the objectionable turbulence that rocked 
the boats. He knew how solidly the lock bottoms had been built, and 
perhaps he wondered if such heavy construction had been necessary. 
In any case, he devised a system for filling and emptying the locks 
through a series of pipes running along the bottom. It worked like a 
modern buried lawn sprinkler system, except that the outlets were 
closer together and the water passed both ways.5 
Canfield solved the problem of the weight of his gates by 
supporting the far end of each from the bank with massive iron rods. 
Turnbuckles held the rods in constant tension and relieved the 
horizontal frame members of some of the sheer load. The 
arrangement was effective, but it could hardly be called a major 
innovation. The practice of mitering lock gates, or designing each 
lock gate with a variable thickness to accommodate stress with a 
minimum of gate weight, did not develop until after the Civil War.6 
The caisson gate was an innovation, perhaps, but it was also one 
of man's most cumbersome inventions. The enormous box had to fit 
snugly against the sides of the canal and rest firmly on the bottom. 
Anyone who has tried to fit a modern refrigerator into a niche in a 
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built-in kitchen will understand the problem. Not only must the 
dimensions be correct but the refrigerator must also be in a perfect 
upright position and absolutely level. The caisson gate presented 
even further complications. According to the principle of 
Archimedes, when water was pumped out of the gate preparatory to 
moving it to storage, the gate itself would slowly rise but the water 
within it would remain at a constant though slightly lower level than 
the water outside in the canal. Raise the gate high enough, and it 
would become a perfect sail, catching the slightest wind. One of the 
first warnings issued by Burt concerned the problem of protecting 
the canal should a violent storm come up at night. He could not set 
the caisson gate in place in the dark in a heavy wind. Burt's 
successor, Elisha Calkins, considered the caisson gate useless. By 
1857 it had been badly damaged, and Calkins asked that a regular 
set of gates be installed to protect the works.7 
None of these problems concerned the Canal Company 
stockholders, who at their annual meeting in 1855 reelected the same 
board of directors. It was discovered that James Joy had managed 
to sell all his stock before the acceptance of the canal, but Coming's 
partner Gilbert Davidson transferred five shares of stock to Joy so 
that the lawyer would be eligible to remain a director; Pruyn 
commented that Joy could resign if he did not like the idea. Joy's 
attitude was shared by several of the canal men. With only a dim 
idea of the value of the lands they now held, they wanted to sell as 
soon as possible and put their funds to work in other enterprises. 
Brooks and Harvey were still financially squeezed, and the latter 
gave Corning his power of attorney so that Corning could sell his 
stock to one of the Thayer brothers. Fairbanks had offered to help 
make a profit on the stock, but Harvey thought that he could "turn 
over money" better himself and was eager to sell at par. Brooks had 
a $10,000 note fall due at Fairbanks's St. Johnsbury bank in April. 
Forbes sent half the sum, and Brooks gave Fairbanks a four-month 
personal note for the rest. The annual meeting was also the time to 
reward faithful friends. Chapel already had a gold watch, and now 
Brooks gave Deodatus Whitwood ten paid-up shares of Canal 
Company stock, which by August of 1855 was selling for $107 a 
share.8 
The company's officers now faced the job of counting the final 
cost of the project. The largest work force employed at any time was 
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about 1,700 during the fall of 1854, when the call was for "men, 
men!" The company also used about one hundred horses and 
twenty-five head of cattle. The great shipping effort of 1854 required 
the use of twenty-five schooners, six barges, and four steam tugs. 
Nearly 150 tons of iron had gone into the canal, most of this coming 
from Coming's Albany Iron Works. Against the rock formation at 
the Sault, the Canal Company burned 3,157 kegs of blasting powder 
and required 4 1/2 tons of steel drills. Almost 200,000 cubic feet of 
heavy timber went into the foundation, gates, and piers, and 11/3 
million square feet of planks were used for a multitude of purposes.9 
Naturally, these materials cost far more than originally estimated, 
and it took several months before all the canal expenses could be 
totaled. The company officers attempted to separate canal costs 
from other items of expense incurred, although to do so was difficult 
with the figures from the Sault office. The expenses of excavation 
and building earth walls were the greatest items, amounting to 
almost double the cost of any other single operation. The total was 
finally set at above $403,000, almost exactly the amount that 
Nichols had estimated for the entire project and about four-fifths of 
Canfield's total estimate. The next most expensive item was the lock 
masonry, which cost almost $250,000. This included the cost of 
quarrying and freighting from Maiden, and neither Nichols nor 
Canfield had anticipated hauling face stone from such a distance. 
The piers cost almost $68,000, the only major item that Canfield 
overestimated.10 
Nichols received $7,739 for his arduous two years on the project. 
The Canal Company paid Michigan $19,982 for the services of state 
engineers. Assuming that Canfield received only his regular army 
pay, this was an exorbitant sum for Glenn's services and the brief 
episodes with Clark and McAlpine. The company also paid $33,522 
in salaries to Harvey, Chapel, Whitwood, and others; to Brooks for 
his summer's work; and to Seymour for finding labor.11 
The Canal Company was also forced to pay sums to landlookers 
to locate the best lands available for claim in both peninsulas in 
Michigan. Neither Canfield nor Nichols had taken this expense into 
account, and there was no reason why they should have done so; the 
item was not, strictly speaking, a canal building expense. The cost of 
locating land came to above $86,000, however, of which more than 
$77,000 was spent in the Lower Peninsula. If this item is set aside, 
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the cost of building the canal at Sault Ste. Marie was $913,492.15.12 
The Canal Company's expenses did not stop with the acceptance 
of the canal by Michigan. Although the lands granted were free from 
taxation for five years, the costs of surveying and maintenance 
began to mount immediately. In the first two years of ownership, the 
Detroit land office of the Canal Company paid more than $53,000, 
and the land agency at Marquette paid more than $29,000. During 
the same period the company sold only $37,300 worth of land. 
Company records also indicate that some of the stockholders failed 
to pay the full assessment on their shares; the account was short 
almost $78,000. Meanwhile, the company had succeeded in selling 
only $190,000 of the authorized $250,000 of its bonds. At the end of 
the two years, it had a cash balance of only $13,425. This sum was 
held in the Albany City Bank, of which Erastus Corning was 
president. The choice was not coincidental; although the bank was 
sound enough, Corning would certainly profit from the investment 
of the Canal Company cash.13 
Several factors accounted for the high cost of the canal, but one 
item can be dismissed at once. Harvey's dawdling in 1853 seriously 
jeopardized the organization as far as completion on time was 
concerned, but it did not add substantially to the cost of excavation. 
The project required 320,595 man-days, and it did not matter in 
which year the men worked. In 1854 there was no such thing as 
overtime pay, nor was the pittance paid to men like Knoblock for 
locating labor during that year's emergency significant in the total 
cost. Harvey's major contribution to the cost lay in permitting the 
quarrel with Brown to develop, thereby depriving the Canal 
Company of its source of prime limestone on Drummond's Island. 
The cost of frieghting from Maiden was never listed as a separate 
item in the company's published reports, but it must have 
represented a major portion of the cost of the lock masonry. It 
would have been better for the Canal Company if Harvey had 
admitted that he had been fooled by the clever editor and paid 
Brown's price. In addition, the quarrel stimulated Brown's paper 
war, which hurt the financing efforts of the men in the East. 
The isolated nature of the project as a cost factor worked both 
ways. It was costly to bring men, food, and tools to the Sault; but, 
once there, the men stayed for the season with no temptation to 
wander off in search of other jobs, relying on the Canal Company to 
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return them to Detroit in the late fall. The cholera epidemic added 
somewhat to the cost, as Seymour had to replace the dead and sick 
men, but the transportation expense involved was not a major item. 
In the long run neither mismanagement nor location accounted 
for the high cost of the canal. It was, rather, in the excavation cost 
that the company officers were misled. Canfield had all but used the 
word guess in his estimate, and Nichols had warned that the 
company could expect to find granite. In later years the company 
complained that it had been forced to excavate an additional foot 
beyond that required by the contract. The reason was not so much 
engineering error as general disagreement over the real surface level 
of Lake Superior—a matter of guesswork, inasmuch as the first 
geodetic survey of the western Great Lakes was not made until the 
early 1860s by an army captain named George Gordon Meade. Less 
than two months after Michigan took custody, the water level in the 
canal rose to a depth of fourteen feet, two inches.14 
In retrospect the project was threatened more by a lack of time 
than a shortage of funds, in spite of the squeeze on Brooks. Once 
Corning realized the seriousness of the situation in the fall of 1853, 
he took prompt steps to increase the rate of call on the stock; and 
through this practice and the sale of bonds, the Canal Company 
managed to raise over $1,123,000. 
Harvey was the individual most responsible for a situation that 
might have been disastrous, but others too were at fault. Nichols had 
estimated that the work season at the Sault was nine months per 
year, when seven would have been more accurate. Moreover, he 
assumed that each laborer would work 300 days per year and thus 
thought that the excavation could be completed by 325 men 
working eighteen months. It was to Nichols's credit that he was the 
first to realize the danger and issue a warning cry in late 1853. Had 
the company officers then listened to Harvey rather than to Nichols, 
the work would not have been completed on time. 
The principal directors were also to blame for their inattention in 
1853. Corning, Pruyn, Brooks, Joy, and Forbes were all preoc­
cupied with railroad affairs. Fairbanks was serving his year as 
governor of Vermont, and Seymour was attending to the family 
farms during his brother's term as governor of New York. 
Fairbanks's defeat for reelection was the company's greatest stroke 
of luck in two years of construction. If he had not been free to bring 
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order to the supervision of the project, a task that Corning was 
unwilling or unable to do, the work would not have been completed 
in contract time. Fairbanks was also in the best position to demote 
Harvey, since he was responsible for the young man in the first 
place. 
Since Harvey outlived all the Canal Company directors, he was 
able to claim credit that should have been given to others. It was true 
that Harvey was in complete charge of the project for seventeen of 
the twenty-four months of construction, but during the first twelve 
of these months he all but brought his company to ruin. However, he 
should receive credit for recognizing the potential of the canal 
project and bringing it to the attention of Fairbanks in 1852, 
although his major promotional goal was entirely selfish. 
Brooks too made his share of mistakes, and one of them was his 
failure to supervise Harvey closely at the upper cofferdam and the 
caisson gate. Nevertheless, the major credit for the fulfillment of the 
contract must go to Brooks. No other man in the service of the 
Canal Company could have driven the work so near to completion 
in 1854. Perhaps in recognition of this feat, Forbes finally made 
Brooks the president of the Michigan Central Railroad in 1855. 
Coming's major contribution to the project (except for his own 
funds) was made at the very beginning. He seemed to have an almost 
uncanny knack for selecting as directors men who would be in the 
right spot with the right talent when they were needed. As a former 
governor and the brother of another, Fairbanks and Seymour could 
speak on equal terms with the Michigan officials, and Joy could deal 
skillfully with the legislators. Forbes could "lend" Brooks to the 
project because of his own interest in it. He and the Thayers also had 
access to the White House, as did Corning himself, though less 
directly, through Secretary of State Marcy. Seymour knew how to 
find labor recruiters in New York, and Fairbanks could produce 
landlookers from Maine. If Brooks had a wild financing plan, Pruyn 
could block it. Westerners and easterners balanced each other, and 
in the end the project met its deadline and achieved its goal. 
From the moment the custody of the canal changed hands, the 
Canal Company had no further interest in it except for the minor 
finishing work to be completed under Harvey. The company's sole 
concern was for the lands granted. The canal itself would be placed 
in the charge of a succession of superintendents who were required 
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to make annual reports to Lansing; the first of these was John Burt. 
If Burt expected a rush of traffic following the opening of the 
canal, he was disappointed. Twenty-eight days passed after the 
opening before the Illinois reached the Sault again, this time with 
passengers and cargo for the Superior District. Next the steamer 
Baltimore ended its exile on Lake Superior. Business picked up but 
slowly during the rest of the year. As Greeley had written, the canal 
was essential, but the Upper Peninsula would need much more than 
that. There were piers to be erected, roads and rail roads to be built, 
and sandbars to be dredged. Above all, the area needed capital. At 
the close of the first navigation season, Burt reported that he had 
collected only $4,474.66 in tolls. Slightly over 109,000 tons had 
passed through the gates in the first year.15 
As long as traffic was light, Burt could report the quantity of each 
item passing through the locks, thus giving a rough idea of life on 
Lake Superior. During the first season 1,217 barrels and boxes of 
liquor, ale, and beer traveled to Upper Michigan. In 1856, 2,173 
barrels of liquor and 1,490 barrels of beer made the trip, along with 4 
tombstones, 2 billiard tables, and 1 melodeon. Other goods brought 
in during 1856 included 17,686 barrels of flour, 3,551 barrels of beef, 
4,316 barrels of pork, 4,296 boxes of candles, 3,968 tons of coal, and 
3,323 bales of hay. Passengers totaled 4,674.16 
There were many indications of progress in the mining industry of 
the Upper Peninsula. Eight steam engines, 12 steam boilers, and 26 
pumps went up in 1856 to keep mines dry. The new copper mills 
required 42 stamps, and the rail road between the Jackson mine and 
Marquette obtained 62 cars in 1855 and 65 in 1856. In the second 
year of canal operation, more than 82,000 tons of machinery of all 
types were shipped in, along with 55 dozen shovels and 39 wagons. 
In the same year the shipment of more than 2,000 items of furniture, 
158 individual doors, 76 bundles of doors, 220,000 shingles, 8 money 
safes, 36 dozen pails, more than 800 window sashes, and 886 boxes 
of glass gave evidence of increased permanent settlement. The Lake 
Superior district was not to be a farming area, however. Only 8 farm 
machines were brought up in the first two years of canal operation.17 
The real justification for the canal would lie in the bulk material 
brought down from the Upper Peninsula. Burt estimated that the 
value of the down cargo was in excess of $2,800,000 in the first two 
years. Shipments amounted to 3,196 tons of copper in 1855 and 
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5,726 tons in 1856. The tonnage of iron ore jumped from 1,447 to 
11,597 in one year. At the same time the tonnage of iron blooms 
(masses of wrought iron ready for further working) fell from 1,040 
to 781 as the presence of the canal gradually doomed the tiny iron 
smelting industry of the Upper Peninsula. Bulk shipments of copper 
and iron increased steadily every year in the decade of 1850-60. 
Copper shipments totaled 5,759 tons in 1857, with the copper 
recorded as coming down from twenty-five different mines. In 1858 
the total came to 6,944 tons, and in 1859 it was 7,245 tons. The figure 
jumped to above 9,000 tons in 1860, the pre-Civil War peak. (This 
was also the year canal superintendents abandoned the practice of 
itemizing individual items going west; superintendent Samuel Mead 
noted only that the people in the Upper Peninsula imported more 
than 9,000 barrels of beer in 1860.) In 1861 copper shipments fell to 
7,645 tons, and in 1862 to 6,881 tons. Meanwhile, iron ore shipments 
from the Upper Peninsula continued to rise unevenly as shown in 
Table 2.18 
TABLE 2 
IRON ORE SHIPMENTS FROM THE 
UPPER PENINSULA IN TONS, 1856-1862 
1856 11,597 
1857 26,184 
1858 31,035 
1859 65,769 
1860 120,000 
1861 44,836 
1862 113,014 
SOURCE: Reports of the canal superintendents for the years indicated. 
State revenue from canal tolls increased every year except 1861 as 
a result not only of the increased tonnage going through the canal 
but also of an increase in tolls. The Canal Board raised these to 6c 
per ton in 1859 in order to retire new canal bonds. By 1860 the 
revenue reached $25,582, and superintendent George W. Brown 
urged that the tolls be reduced to 4c per ton. The day was long past 
when a superintendent like Burt would report as a major budget 
item the spending of $31.32 to buy oats for Lady Elgin, the canal 
mule.19 
Each canal superintendent had to maintain the safety of the canal 
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by guarding against structural weaknesses, weather hazards, and 
careless ship captains. In the first winter Burt adopted safety 
precautions that were usually followed by his successors. He kept 
the ditch filled with water, the lock gates closed, and the locks 
partially filled. He did not permit ice to accumulate at the lock gates 
because he feared that expansion would damage the gates. 
Burt was troubled by the condition of the earth embankments at 
the cove just above the locks. In spite of precautions taken in the 
winter, he discovered that frost had penetrated to a depth of about 
six feet, and he feared that a sudden rise in the depth of Lake 
Superior during the spring thaw might cause a serious rupture 
between the frozen and unfrozen earth. Should a rise in the lake level 
occur at night, he would be helpless, for he could not work the 
caisson gate into place in the dark.20 
As a solution for this problem, Burt suggested that a stone wall be 
constructed outside the embankments joining the upper lock wall to 
the solid rock excavation. He estimated that this would cost 
$20,000; if that was more than Michigan could afford, he suggested 
sheetpiling on the whole embankment. Burt's successor, Elisha 
Calkins, also recognized the danger but suggested that a wall of 
stone be erected inside the embankment with timber fender work 
along the top. Calkins thought that such a wall could be constructed 
during the winter so that the construction would not interfere with 
navigation. Apparently Calkins did not appreciate winter problems 
at the Sault; Harvey could have told him what happens to mortar if 
it is applied during a sharp frost. Pending instructions from 
Lansing, Calkins put his men to work reinforcing the embankments 
with earth. By this time the upper caisson gate had been demoted 
from "troublesome" to "perfect nuisance."21 
Michigan authorities finally heeded the appeals of the canal 
superintendents and, in 1859, awarded a contract for the rebuilding 
of the earth walls to the firm of Holmes and Clark. Even this work 
did not prove adequate, and superintendent Samuel Mead added 
10,000 cubic feet of earth as reinforcement in the summer of 1860. In 
the summer of 1861, Brown added more earth and stone and began 
the general improvement of the landscaping by planting trees. By 
1862 the Holmes and Clark addition had begun to wash out, not 
from the water in the canal, but from the water in the river. The risk 
that Canfield had been forced to accept in 1852 when he made his 
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final decision on the course of the canal continued to haunt the 
Michigan authorities.22 
In 1862 Brown was also casting nervous glances across the river, 
fearing British intervention in the Civil War. He urged state officials 
to ask that Fort Brady be repaired, armed, and manned by the 
United States Army. Fortunately, the measures did not prove to be 
necessary, but any eastern manufacturer depending upon Superior 
District sources of raw material would have a great concern for 
Anglo-American diplomatic relations. There are few structures as 
vulnerable as a canal in a war.23 
Although Burt had to wait twenty-five days for the first ship to use 
the canal, the situation was soon reversed. Within four years an 
average of seven ships used the canal each day during July and 
August. Superintendent Mead reported new problems arising from 
the increased flow of traffic, problems that he correctly anticipated 
would grow in the future.24 
A major concern was that ships waiting their turn in the locks 
needed more room to lay by. Ebenezer Warner's old dock, located in 
the St. Mary's River just south of the canal mouth, would have to 
go. To avoid the dock, ships had to anchor so far out in the river that 
they came under the influence of the rapids, a situation resulting in 
delay, confusion, and collisions. Further, when a ship under sail 
arrived running before a strong east wind, it would round Warner's 
dock so rapidly that checking lines could not be used, and the ship's 
captain would have the choice of ramming the canal pier or 
dropping anchor in the channel. Since the channel was both shallow 
and narrow at this point, dropping anchor was a dangerous option. 
Warner's dock lay within the limits of the canal right-of-way granted 
to Michigan, and Mead instituted legal proceedings for its removal. 
Eventually Warner came to terms and agreed to destroy his dock if 
the state would enlarge the anchorage basin.25 
With the increased traffic, Canfield's design for the western end of 
the canal also came under criticism. To prevent the formation of a 
sandbar across the mouth of the canal, Canfield had ordered that 
the sand-catching pier be built in a curve. The underwater channel 
leading to the canal was therefore dredged in a curve to follow the 
pier line. Mead noted that there were several things wrong with this 
design. If the wind was unfavorable, a tug could tow only one 
schooner into the canal at a time (whereas if the channel had been 
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straight, the tug could have pulled several in tandem). Further, if, 
under more favorable wind conditions, a captain tried to sail into 
the canal, it took a high degree of skill to keep from running into the 
curved pier. Finally, the current at this point was rapid enough to 
swing the sterns of schooners under tow into the bridge pier to the 
north. Mead wanted the arrangement at each end of the canal 
improved for safety and efficiency.26 
There were other vexations of a minor nature. At intervals the 
sluice gates broke and allowed a strong current to enter the locks, 
making it necessary to apply extra force in opening the lock gates. 
CanfiekTs recommendation that a strong beacon be placed at the 
Lake Superior end had not been followed. At the urgent request of 
the ship captains, Mead furnished one in 1859. The sidewalls in the 
rock cutting had been cut at a slope of approximately thirty-two 
degrees for the purpose of maintaining strength in the banks, a 
feature steamboat captains found very annoying and at times 
dangerous. When steaming into the cut with a strong crosswind, 
they had difficulty staying clear of the downwind bank; and since the 
walls were jagged with many rock protrusions, there was a risk of 
underwater damage to the ships. The captains tried to avoid as much 
of the risk as possible by steaming rapidly through the cut to 
maintain headway. They therefore came into the area of the weak 
earth embankments at a speed higher than the legal limit, a practice 
that was hard on both the embankments and the superintendent's 
nerves. Mead asked that the sloping walls be replaced by 
perpendicular walls; he could then place wood fenders along the top 
of the canal to protect the ships.27 
The Michigan authorities responded to the complaints of their 
superintendents only to the extent of authorizing the strengthening 
of the earth banks. The legislature in 1859 approved an issue of 
$100,000 of canal bonds. The state would guarantee payment of the 
interest and principal, but the money was expected to come from 
future canal revenue. Tolls were raised to 6<p per ton, but what 
followed was something of a mystery. The bonds were sold, and 
presumably $ 100,000 passed into the hands of John McKinney, now 
the state treasurer. When it was discovered that half the sum was 
missing, McKinney was brought to trial. He was found guilty of 
embezzlement and spent most of the rest of his life in prison. He died 
without ever revealing the fate of the missing $50,000. The Canal 
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Board of Control used the rest of the fund to pay Holmes and Clark, 
but further improvements would have to wait. In the early 1860s 
Michigan and the United States had more important matters at 
hand.28 
Eventually the steamship captains and owners complained of the 
inequity of charging the same canal toll for sailing ships and 
steamships. So much of the enrolled tonnage of the steamships was 
taken up in coal and machinery that they could not carry the 
payload of a schooner of similar enrolled tonnage. Superintendent 
Brown stated the case for the steamship people, using the North Star 
as an example. This steamship was enrolled at 1,106 tons, and thus 
her captain paid $66.36 every time she went through the locks. 
Because of the weight of her machinery and coal, she never carried 
more than 500 tons of cargo. A schooner of the same enrollment 
could carry much more freight and pay the same toll. In 1862 Brown 
noted that 543 schooners paid $1,100 less in tolls while carrying 
45,000 tons more in freight than the steamers using the canal. He 
also noted that most of the steamships were owned by Michigan 
men, whereas most of the schooners were owned by out-of-state 
interests. Brown was obviously prejudiced in favor of the 
steamships. They were much easier to lock and could take care of 
themselves when the gates were opened. The sailing ships had to be 
manhandled through the locks, forcing Brown to bring his labor 
crew in from the embankment work. The argument between sail and 
steam continued until 1865, when the rate for steamers was lowered 
to 4!/2C per ton, and the sail rate remained at 6c per ton.29 
As a general rule, the ship captains took great care not to damage 
the locks. No injuries to the gates were reported through 1862. There 
were plenty of arguments as to which ship had precedence at the 
locks, especially when two arrived at the same time, one from each 
direction. The superintendents had the authority to settle such 
arguments on the spot. They also took considerable pride in their 
canal. They ordered the gates, snubbing posts, and houses painted 
every other year, and each made his contribution to the cleaning up, 
landscaping, and fencing of the area. Despite the problems 
encountered during its first years of operation, the canal was 
proving itself a sound investment.30 
11 The Canal Company Lands 
Several questions arise regarding the Canal Company's acquisition 
of its lands. Without exception the men who actually inspected the 
lands had no financial interest in the company. In light of the 
knowledge available in the early 1850s, did these agents of the Canal 
Company select land wisely? Did the company then attempt to gain 
additional knowledge of the land selected, and, if so, how? Having 
gained possession of the 750,000 acres, what did the company 
eventually find on or under the land? Finally did the Canal 
Company make the best of what it had? 
In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to consider the 
early history of mining activity in Michigan's Upper Peninsula. The 
white man had not waited for official settlement of the Indian title 
before entering the copper fields. In 1820 Lewis Cass referred to 
mining carried on by a few daring adventurers on the Eagle River 
near the Lake Superior coast. As miners and explorers pushed in­
land, they make a series of discoveries along the southwest branch 
of the Eagle River; and by 1848 the Boston and Pittsburgh Mining 
Company had opened two shafts of their Cliff Mine, discovered in 
1845 in Township 58N, Range 32W, Section 36. This mine was one 
of the most successful in the early stages of Upper Peninsula mining; 
in 1851 the Cleveland Daily Herald called it "the marvel of the 
world." One mile southeast along the same river bank, the North 
American Company had opened its shaft in 1848 in Township 57N, 
Range 32W, Section 36. Other mines clustered in the general area. 
From that point prospectors worked their way south to the area near 
Portage Lake and today's town of Hancock. Here the Quincy mine 
was opened in 1847 in Township 55N, Range 34W, Section 26. The 
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mineral wealth in the vicinity of Calumet, ten miles northeast of 
Hancock, was not discovered until 1864. Michigan geologist 
Douglass Houghton was quite aware of the copper deposits and had 
reported them to the legislature as early as 1841. He assumed that 
copper could be found in the greatest abundance along the plane of 
juncture of sedimentary rock and underlying trap rock; he also 
thought that it would take several years of hard work to prove out 
any mine. He was correct on both counts.1 
The possible presence of copper received ample publicity. 
Greeley, who owned several shares in the Pennsylvania Mining 
Company, visited the Eagle River site in the summers of 1847 and 
1848. He cited the Cliff Mine as being the most valuable, but he also 
warned of the risks involved in the copper fields, contending that the 
United States lease policy was a case of bad mismanagement of the 
mineral lands in the Upper Peninsula. Hunt's Merchants' Magazine 
added to Greeley's publicity. In April 1843 Freeman Hunt 
announced that Douglass Houghton had discovered a copper mass 
98 percent pure and weighing between three and four tons. In 1844 
Hunt recorded that a crew of twenty Cornish miners under the 
leadership of C. A. Gratiot was working at Eagle Harbor. By 1846 
Hunt chided Greeley for his exaggerations but claimed that the area 
was valuable nonetheless. He wrote that the United States annually 
imported about 1,480 tons of copper at a price of 16c per pound and 
claimed that British copper mine owners had made a profit of 
$105,000 each year. Hunt also listed the names of twelve companies 
that, in 1846, were actively mining in the Upper Peninsula, and gave 
the approximate location of each mine.2 
The publicity continued. In 1846 John R. St. John published his 
description of the Superior District, including the copper mining 
activity, but he also noted some of the same warnings that were to be 
advanced by Greeley- Days and weeks of labor must be spent 
without return. The men must be closely supervised by someone 
willing to go underground with them, and the business had its daily 
expenses regardless of the return or lack thereof. A year later 
Charles Lanman published his account of a canoe voyage he had 
made along the Lake Superior shore. He had no doubt about the 
value of the ore in the general area, but he wrote that an enormous 
amount of capital would be needed for successful operation, capital 
that most of the mine operators did not have. Lanman stated that he 
owned a few shares in a copper mining company, but he was 
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"exceedingly anxious to dispose of my interests, at the earliest 
possible moment, on the most reasonable terms." He noted that 
everyone on Lake Superior had suddenly become an amateur 
geologist and that a good number of speculators had appeared in the 
vicinity.3 
Yet even with all this publicity, it might have been difficult for a 
company about to claim a large quantity of land to obtain accurate 
information. To assure accurate and constant news from the mining 
area, John Ingersoll published his first edition of the Lake Superior 
News and Miners' Journal on 11 July 1846, at Copper Harbor. In 
1851 Hunt again publicized mining activity, noting an increased 
shipment in the past year. He estimated that 1,100 tons of copper or 
copper ore had passed through the Sault from eight different mines. 
All this copper in 1851 had to be unloaded at the Lake Superior side, 
hauled across the portage on McKnight's rail road, and reloaded on 
the St. Mary's River.4 
In addition to the obstacle at the Sault and the lack of capital, 
there were a number of reasons for the slow development of the 
copper fields. Copper was by no means in such demand as it would 
be after the inventions of Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham 
Bell in the 1870s and 1880s. Morse's telegraph, which had brought 
the news of Polk's nomination from Baltimore to Washington in 
1844, consumed oniy a minor part of the copper production. With 
its high heat conductivity, copper was also used for kitchenware. 
Other uses included candlesticks, ornaments in churches, and 
sheathing for wooden ship hulls. In the 1850s, however, iron was in 
much greater demand, as was indicated by the yearly increases in 
iron ore shipped through the Sault Canal. 
The government lease system also had done little to encourage 
exploitation, and Greeley's bitterness over the speculators' monop­
oly of the mineral lands was excessive. If the War Department 
figures were accurate, only 141 square miles of the Upper Peninsula 
were under government lease when the department suspended the 
leasing process, and more delays followed under the Treasury 
Department. It was this peculiar sequence of events, many months 
before the Canal Company was formed, that proved to be vital to 
the interests of the company. Only one further development was 
needed for the Canal Company to obtain valuable mineral land, and 
this took place at Sutter's Mill in 1848. 
The story of what happened after the announcement of the 
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discovery of gold is well known, but it is impossible to determine 
completely the discovery's effect in the Midwest. However, it must 
have been substantial. Cyrus Woodman noted the repercussions in 
western Wisconsin, where the lead mining industry suffered between 
the spring of 1848 and the fall of 1853, and communities like Mineral 
Point lost numbers of their most vigorous citizens, who headed west 
to the diggings. It is reasonable to assume that the same thing 
happened in the Superior District. It is also reasonable to assume 
that venturesome easterners would choose California over the 
Ontonagon. Why endure the hardships of the Upper Peninsula, 
when with a little more effort one could go to California and pick up 
gold from the riverbeds? It was even possible that some of the War 
Department leaseholders selected California over their option to 
purchase land in Michigan. Woodman noted that the influence of 
the gold rush lasted until the fall of 1853. By that time the Canal 
Company was well into the process of land selection. No other 
possible sequence of events and policies could have placed the 
company in so favorable a position to obtain the best lands.5 
To proceed successfully, however, the Canal Company needed 
specific and precise knowledge of the lands available. Rumor and 
gossip would not suffice in the copper area. For example, everyone 
knew that there was copper on the Keweenaw Peninsula, but there 
was no copper southwest of the Keweenaw fault plane. Knowledge 
of the precise location of the active mines was essential in order for 
the Canal Company to pick up all the adjacent unclaimed land, and 
on 10 April 1853 Harvey ordered Brown to obtain this information.6 
If anything, Brown had more infrrmation available than he 
needed, thanks to both the United States and Michigan 
governments. He was no stranger in the area, and he could talk to 
miners and mineowners as they passed through the Sault. He 
probably had a complete file of Upper Peninsula newspapers dating 
back to the year when Ingersoll tried to publish at Copper Harbor. 
In addition he had available various government publications, 
especially those of the Thirty-first Congress published in 1849 and 
1850. These congressional reports were especially valuable because 
they did much more than locate mines and mineral lands by some 
vague system of metes and bounds. References like Hunt's to "a 
copper mine on the Eagle River" were of little value, but the 
government surveyors and geologists located the mineral lands to 
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the quarter section and sometimes to the quarter-quarter section, 
and these reports were available to anyone interested. For example, 
Congress had ordered that 10,000 copies be made of the report of J. 
W. Foster and J. D. Whitney, which not only included the exact 
location of copper mines but also listed the number of shafts sunk 
and the number of men employed.7 
Brown also had access to the report of United States geologist 
Charles Jackson. The result of a survey made in 1847 and 1848, it 
included a geological map of the Upper Peninsula land between 
Portage Lake and the Montreal River as well as a four-page list of 
copper lands and detailed locations down to quarter sections. 
Jackson even indicated the sites, like Copper Harbor, where claims 
should not be made because mining activity had stopped. In 
addition there was another report by J. W. Foster and S. W. Hill 
that listed mine locations and stated the average monthly pay for 
mine workers.8 
Finally, Brown could consult a State of Michigan reference 
published in 1850, the report of Stephen V. R. Trowbridge, assistant 
agent of United States mineral lands. Besides including an excellent 
description of mining under primitive conditions, Trowbridge gave 
the location of mines in operation, listed the ones that had actually 
made shipments, and noted the one mining company (Pittsburgh 
and Boston Cliff) that had already paid a stock dividend. 
Trowbridge also reported that the Jackson Iron Company was in 
operation, having shipped fifty tons of blooms in 1849, and that the 
Marquette Iron Company was about to begin operations.9 
Precision was not as important in claiming iron ore locations as in 
claiming the copper sites farther west. If one section contained high-
grade iron ore, there was a good chance that the surrounding 
sections did so as well. Harvey could safely order Brown to claim 
everything available in a three-mile strip around the Jackson and 
Marquette sites, plus a block of about five thousand acres at the 
mouth of the Chocolay River, particularly since federal sources 
available included a map of the iron fields with fifty-two ore loca­
tions listed by the quarter-quarter section.10 
In spite of his own wide experience plus all the printed material 
available, Brown took one further step to assure that the Canal 
Company would get the best mineral land available. In the spring of 
1853, he hired J. D. Whitney as a mineral landlooker for the 
142 TO BUILD A CANAL 
summer. This was Brown's greatest service to the Canal Company, 
and of course it was provided several months before the outbreak of 
the dispute with Harvey. Since Whitney had already made a 
geological survey, he would need to do little more than review the 
results of his previous work in the light of any new discoveries made 
in the interval. Brown paid Whitney $500, a handsome sum for a few 
months' work, but the information gained was well worth the 
expense, since it resulted in Canal Company ownership, at least for a 
time, of potentially valuable mineral land.11 
The Canal Company's policy toward the acquisition of pineland 
was stated by Brooks in simple terms in 1854: "There is more pine in 
the state that we can take but we of course try to get that of such a 
grade that there may be little or none left as good as that we take." 
For a number of reasons, Brooks's goal was difficult to achieve. 
Governor Parsons had commissioned Harvey as a state agent to 
select land for the company in April 1853. He also commissioned 
George Frost on 10 June and Deodatus Whitwood on 8 July of the 
same year. These three men were too few for such a large 
undertaking, and two of them carried, or tried to carry, heavy 
responsibilities in connection with the actual building of the canal as 
well. The Canal Company could only be assured of obtaining high-
quality timberland by sending someone out to look at the land and 
make an expert judgment on the spot—and therein lay the problem. 
Landlookers hired by the company would have to be completely 
reliable, because none of the Canal Company officers would have 
the time to inspect their findings. It would be a simple matter for an 
unscrupulous or lazy landlooker to disappear behind the first hill 
with his supplies and a jug, merely to camp out, loaf, and fish for 
several weeks and then return to submit a fictitious report.12 
Another problem was the necessity to cover an enormous amount 
of land, either on foot or in a canoe. A canoeing landlooker could 
more easily inspect a broader area, but he would have to be careful 
in forming conclusions. He might see a magnificent stand of timber 
on both banks, but one hundred yards inland the timber might peter 
out into poor farmland. There would be vast acreages burned out, 
and these must be located and avoided. Today, one man with a 
camera and an airplane could do the job in a few days; in the 1850s it 
was not so simple. 
In the first year of exploration, with Harvey in charge, the 
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landlooking process fell as far behind schedule as progress on the 
canal itself. Once again, Harvey proved that he did not understand 
the magnitude of the task set before him. In the first place, he did not 
have two full years to conduct a land search. Little could be done in 
the winter months, when many parts of Michigan were inaccessible. 
Then, toward the end of the process, time must be reserved for 
handling all the paperwork and for winning approval in 
Washington. Brooks began to worry about the situation as early as 
June 1853, fearing that the Canal Company would lose the best of 
the mineral lands. As usual, Harvey was completely confident and 
wrote that he was quite satisfied with Brown's work. Nevertheless, 
by September 1853 the Canal Company had reserved only about 
277,000 acres, much less than half the total allocated. Harvey had 
reserved 27,000 acres in the Upper Peninsula, the bulk being 
described as mineral lands, and Frost had set aside about 250,000 
acres of pineland in the Lower Peninsula. The two men had only six 
search parties in the field, and Harvey wrote that he would reserve 
only a total of 77,000 acres in the Superior District.13 
Brooks redoubled the effort when he assumed full responsibility 
for land selection in 1854, but even when Fairbanks sent him 
lumbermen from Maine to help, he was not completely satisfied. He 
noted that the Maine men insisted on carrying more equipment into 
the field than western men usually took, a practice that delayed their 
progress. He was also forced to relocate some of the land reserved in 
the previous year when it turned out to be of little value. 
Nevertheless, by 27 March 1854 Brooks had eighteen search parties 
in the field and expected that Whitwood would send out still more 
from Detroit. The reliability problem was partially solved by 
sending men into the field in parties of three, and by the end of the 
summer there were seventy-five landlookers at work. Brooks even 
employed government surveyors as landlookers, but this practice 
proved to be an inconvenience when the surveyors were called back 
into government service in the late spring of 1854, and Brooks had to 
regroup his teams. Brooks also asked Fairbanks to return one of the 
most valuable Maine men for a second summer of work to "re-look" 
the lands. It was a wise decision. In later years the Canal Company 
would claim that the selections had been made as the result of 
investigations made by two separate parties. A negative report from 
either would be a cause for rejection. The company also claimed that 
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each forty- or eighty-acre lot had been individually inspected. 
Considering the enormous number of quarter-quarter sections 
selected, this claim was an exaggeration, but Brooks did make the 
effort to check the selections made in 1853.14 
When the looking task was over, Frost had the job of preparing to 
file the company's claims—an enormous problem in bookkeeping. 
In the Lower Peninsula the Canal Company claimed over 212,000 
acres in the Cheboygan Land District in the north, as well as almost 
227,000 acres in the eastern Genessee District. The balance of the 
Lower Peninsula land was claimed through the Detroit office. 
Finally, the company claimed almost 253,000 acres in the Upper 
Peninsula through the Superior District office at Sault Ste. Marie. It 
was important that Frost not claim land already owned by others, 
since costly litigation could result. With such a high total acreage 
claimed, however, it was almost inevitable that slips of this nature 
would occur. The complaints began to come in as early as May 
1855.15 
Frost had other pitfalls to avoid, such as the error of claiming the 
same piece of land twice. There was a danger that in one entry he 
might claim a quarter-quarter section, and many entries later he 
might inadvertently claim a half-quarter that would include the first 
forty acres. In all the 1,422 separate entries in the Upper Peninsula, 
Frost never made that error. His task was further complicated by the 
fact that he was not permitted to claim an entire section, "except for 
the northeast quarter of the northwest quarter." If the Canal 
Company wanted to claim an entire section except for a quarter-
quarter, as it sometimes did, Frost would have to prepare four 
separate entries for the one section. In the end Frost's accounting 
was almost impeccable, considering that he had to make allowances 
for deletions, additions, and surveying adjustments. He thought 
that he had claimed 252,966.27 acres in the Upper Peninsula, when 
actually he had claimed 252,958.10, an error of only about 8 acres.16 
The Canal Company eventually classified about half the total 
claim, or 373,000 acres, as good, accessible timberland. It anti­
cipated that 190,000 acres would prove to be mineral land, and it 
left the remaining 187,000 acres unclassified. It must be assumed 
that the latter consisted of farmlands or relatively inaccessible 
timberlands. As will be seen, the mineral total was too high, which 
meant that the Canal Company owned additional acres of timber in 
the Upper Peninsula.17 
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The largest single timber claim made by the company was in the 
area of the Saginaw River in the Lower Peninsula. Advertising the 
ease with which the timber could be extracted by water, the 
company claimed 100,000 acres along this route. It also claimed 
61,000 acres of timber along the Muskegon River, 56,000 acres 
along the Manistee, 42,000 acres along the Pere Marquette, and 
21,000 acres along the White River. Finally, the company claimed 
59,000 acres of timber at Thunder Bay.18 
On the Keweenaw Peninsula in Upper Michigan, where the Canal 
Company hoped to own copper land, Brown and his employee J. D. 
Whitney had varied luck. With several important exceptions they 
claimed land next to areas where copper had already been reported, 
and in many cases they were able to obtain the reported land. As a 
general rule, the line of claims followed along the approximate 
location of the Keweenaw fault plane. Any land claimed to the 
southeast of this plane would be of little value, since it would not 
contain copper; and its timber, if any, would be difficult to extract. 
The only major area so claimed was a solid block of over 8,000 acres 
lying between Portage Lake and the fault plane.19 
Either Brown or Whitney established the policy of claiming 
whatever land was available along the line of the fault plane even if 
no copper had been reported in that particular area. Under this 
policy the Canal Company claimed a great deal of worthless land, 
but it also claimed some of the best. For example, the government 
authorities had not reported copper along the fault plane between 
the site of the present towns of Winona on the southwest and 
Houghton on the northeast. For the southern two-thirds of the line, 
the authorities proved to be correct, and the Canal Company gained 
ownership of land of little value. Not only did it lack copper, but also 
any timber along this line would be most difficult to extract. 
However, in the northeast third of the line, below Houghton, the 
policy paid off. Although the government men had not reported 
copper in the area, the company gained possession of quite valuable 
land, including all the land that would eventually be worked by the 
Champion Mining Company (219,201 tons; $29,070,261), approxi­
mately two-thirds of the land of the future Baltic Mining Company 
(131,761 tons; $10,001,772), and about half the land from which the 
Atlantic Mining Company would extract copper (59,141 tons; 
$990,000).20 
In the same area below Houghton, the Canal Company narrowly 
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missed owning more valuable land. It completely surrounded a 
series of claims made by others, but to no avail. In between lay the 
lands that would eventually yield copper for the Isle Royale Mining 
Company (90,286 tons; $2,550,000). In several places the Canal 
Company claims ran to within a few hundred yards of Isle Royale 
property. The same situation existed immediately north of 
Hancock. Here the government had indicated the presence of 
copper, but it must be assumed that the best lands had been claimed 
before 1853. The Canal Company lands all but surrounded the land 
that would yield wealth for the Quincy Mining Company (363,011 
tons; $27,002,508).21 
Four and a half miles northeast of Hancock, the Canal Company 
ran into better luck. Once again claiming land that the government 
agents had neglected, the company gained all the acreage that would 
eventually produce copper for the Franklin Mining Company 
(77,158 tons; $1,240,000). The Canal Company did not do so well, 
however, with about 6,400 acres it took northwest of Torch Lake. 
Although government agents had proclaimed the presence of 
copper there, the land proved to be of little value. The best claims of 
all were made in Township 55N, Range 33W, just south of the 
present town of Calumet. The company claimed all but 120 acres of 
Section 23, and it was on this land that the first great Calumet lode 
was discovered and mined. The company also claimed 420 acres of 
Section 26 immediately to the south; the Hecla Mining Company 
would exploit this land. Finally, the company claimed land in three 
other sections in the township to the west, around the present town 
of Kearsarge, and this land formed the base when the two operations 
merged in 1871 to create the Calumet and Hecla Company 
(1,621,008 tons; $148,413,051). Their combined holdings included 
2,480 acres that once had belonged to the Canal Company. The 
government had indicated the presence of copper on only 220 acres 
of this land.22 
The Canal Company made only one other valuable mineral claim 
on the Keweenaw Peninsula. Following the fault plane further 
northeast, it gained possession of 120 acres that would become 
about one-third of the mineral land holdings of the Allouez Mining 
Company (54,604 tons; $2,850,000). Although the Canal Company 
claimed land beyond the Allouez location to within three and a half 
miles of the tip of the peninsula, it gained little of value there. In 
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claiming over 11,000 acres, it missed what would become Calumet 
and Hecla property by two miles. It claimed Mt. Horace Greeley 
and a solid block of land north of Lac la Belle to no avail. Through 
some perverse stroke of luck, the company found its best land when 
it ignored the reports of government surveyors and took claims on 
the northwest side of the fault plane.23 
The Canal Company also claimed over 27,000 acres of timberland 
on the Keweenaw Peninsula southeast of Ontonagon. Timber could 
be removed from the area on either the Ontonagon River on the west 
or the Flintsteel River on the east. This claim, together with the fault 
plane claims, encompassed a considerable area and all but cut the 
Keweenaw Peninsula in two. It would be possible for a man landing 
at Ontonagon from Lake Superior to reach Canal Company land by 
walking southeast for half a mile. Continuing in this direction 
thirteen miles, he would arrive at the area of the fault plane. A 
change in direction to the northeast would take him out on the 
Keweenaw Peninsula, and by walking a relatively straight line for 
fifty-five miles he would arrive back on Lake Superior in Allouez 
Township. During this entire trip of sixty-nine miles, he would have 
walked on Canal Company lands for all but six miles, and he would 
not have been off company lands for more than a mile at a time. 
Under the circumstances, the company's reputation for creating a 
land monopoly in the area was hardly surprising.24 
The experience of the Canal Company in the copper fields was 
reversed in the iron fields west of Marquette. In this area there were 
far fewer government reports to work with, but these turned out to 
be more accurate than the reports in the copper fields. When Brown 
and Whitney made their selections according to these reports, they 
picked up some highly valuable iron ore land. When they deviated, 
the land selected contained little of mineral value. From their ability 
to cluster their claims, it was obvious that competition had not 
arrived as it had in the copper fields. In fact, in 1853 there were only 
two iron ore mines in operation west of Marquette.25 
For some reason Brown and Whitney decided to ignore Harvey's 
instructions to claim 5,000 acres at the mouth of the Chocolay 
River. Apparently there was no valuable timber on the spot, and the 
location was over eight miles from the iron fields. They did claim 920 
acres, including the site for the future town of Harvey. From the 
Harvey location the Canal Company claimed land in a nearly 
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complete semicircle around Marquette. There were no minerals to 
be found in this claim of about 11,000 acres.26 
The principal location of the eastern part of the Marquette iron 
range lay in two townships, 47N, and Ranges 26W and 27W. Here 
the Canal Company made its best claims, taking more than one-
third of the available land, or almost 19,000 acres. The company did 
not, however, try to establish claims in the three minor ore enclaves 
to the west located near today's towns of Republic, Humboldt, and 
Michigamme, although iron had been reported there. It was difficult 
enough in 1853 to haul ore from the Jackson mine south of Teal 
Lake to Marquette. Humboldt, the nearest to Marquette of the 
three enclaves, was twice as far away. The opening of these areas 
would have to wait a few more years, and in any case the locations 
south of Nagaunee and Ishpeming would furnish more than an 
adequate supply of iron ore for the time being. By the end of 1862, 
435,625 tons had been extracted and hauled through the Sault 
locks.27 
The Canal Company claimed additional timberland in the Upper 
Peninsula. By exploring the river and lake network of eastern Delta 
County, it located over 17,000 acres of timber that could be brought 
to market via the tributaries of the Sturgeon and Fishdam Rivers, 
since both empty into Big Bay de Noc on Lake Michigan. The 
serrated edges of many of the claims indicate that the inspection was 
quite selective. The largest single block of land claimed in the district 
was only 2,240 acres.28 
The company landlookers also discovered 20,000 acres of timber 
in the eastern part of Alger County and the northern part of 
Schoolcraft County. These lands were located on or near the Sucker 
River, which empties into Lake Superior at Grand Marais, and on 
the branches of the Fox River, which empties via the Manistique 
River into Lake Michigan. Again the process was selective, since the 
largest single block claimed was only 3,200 acres along the east 
branch of the Fox River. Less wisely selected was a block of 5,100 
acres near Pull Up Lake in the western part of Mackinac County, 
from which it would be most difficult to extract timber because the 
center of the area was eight miles north of Lake Michigan, and there 
were no rivers available. Here land had been selected that would 
prove difficult to sell, a mistake that the company seldom made in 
the Upper Peninsula.29 
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The remainder of the Superior District timber claims were small 
and scattered. The Canal Company claimed nothing in Menominee, 
Dickinson, Gogebic, or Iron counties, not knowing of the existence 
of the Menominee iron range. It claimed only minor acreages in the 
Chippewa, Luce, and Baraga counties. 
In a few instances the Canal Company claimed areas, some quite 
small, because of immediate necessity or anticipated future growth. 
In the former case it claimed several lots on Hay Lake to assure 
access to Section 16, from which Harvey took timber for the canal. 
Examples of the latter situation are more numerous. The semicircle 
around Marquette represented a speculation upon the growth of the 
community, since anyone wanting to haul iron ore to the crude dock 
at Marquette would have to pass through Canal Company lands. 
The company claimed a similar semicircle around the little village of 
Baraga on Keweenaw Bay. It also selected lands at the mouth of the 
Portage River near the present location of a United States Coast 
Guard station, perhaps anticipating that the Portage River would 
some day be part of a canal cutting through the Keweenaw 
Peninsula.30 
Although Brown had predicted that Sault Ste. Marie would 
become another Detroit once the canal was completed, the Canal 
Company officers did not accept this prediction; and, with the 
exception of the strategically located lots on Hay Lake, the 
company did not claim an inch of land within fifty miles of the canal. 
This judgment proved sound, and the lands selected by the company 
were, by and large, wisely chosen. Thus the company officers and 
stockholders had been well compensated for the construction of the 
canal. It would now be up to them to make the best of their land. 
12 Land for Sale

In theory the officers of the Canal Company had two options. First, 
they could attempt to exploit their lands by forming the appro­
priate subsidiary companies for copper mining, iron mining, and 
lumbering. This option, which would have required afresh infusion 
of capital, was never seriously considered. When Harvey suggested 
that the company float a $50,000 bond issue, Pruyn rejected the idea 
out of hand. Many railroad men like Brooks and Joy were, for good 
reason, chronically overextended. As the railroad frontier moved 
westward, the owners of the eastern trunk lines believed that the 
taking of new risks was essential to survival. They had large fixed 
indebtedness, and, should the new western roads divert traffic to 
competing lines, the results might be unfortunate. Thus, in the years 
before 1875, Brooks and Joy attempted with considerable success to 
gain control over roads like the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy. 
The resulting overextension was at times professional and physical 
as well as financial, and it is not surprising that, with the exception 
of coal mining, the railroad men were not willing to launch mining 
ventures. In fact, it was just as well that they did not try: in the two 
decades after 1845, a total of ninety-four Superior District copper 
companies made capital calls on their stockholders of more than 
$13,100,000; during this same period the companies declared 
dividends of only $5,600,000.* 
The other option was to sell the lands at the best price possible, a 
choice that met with Brooks's enthusiastic approval. Brooks had 
once tried to interest Fairbanks in financing a railroad to the 
Mackinac Straits in order to increase the value of the company's 
timberlands. Now, in the summer of 1855, he wrote to Corning no 
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fewer than six times urging prompt disposal of the company's 
mineral lands. At first Brooks was under the impression that each 
stockholder of the Canal Company would receive a share of the 
lands for personal use. He and Joy believed that the mineral lands 
were worth well over $1,000,000, and Brooks offered to sell his share 
to either Corning or Fairbanks, whichever would pay the most. 
However, Corning and Fairbanks were in no hurry to sell the lands, 
although Corning considered the idea of sending Elon Farnsworth, 
a former state officer of Michigan who had already helped the Canal 
Company solve several minor problems, to London to try to find a 
market. Meanwhile, Brooks would have to be patient.2 
For the time being, the company directors decided to operate with 
two land offices for the management and sale of timberlands. 
George Frost supervised the undertaking from his office in Detroit, 
and Harvey opened a second office at Marquette. As to the mineral 
lands, Frost sent Corning a bundle of maps locating Canal 
Company lands for the use of Farnsworth. The officers still were not 
satisfied with the quality of information available regarding the 
mineral lands, and Fairbanks wanted a more complete exploration 
made; but Corning decided to attempt to sell the lands even without 
adequate knowledge of their wealth. In the fall of 1855, he went to 
Europe to look for a British market, and Brooks ordered Harvey to 
stop the sale of mineral lands pending the outcome of the trip. 
However, Corning was not able to find a buyer. With the Crimean 
War in progress, the British specie supply was tight, and London 
investors could get good rates in their own markets and in fact were 
getting ready to call in their own loans from the United States.3 
Meanwhile, conflicting news came down from the Superior 
District. Harvey sent Fairbanks a depressing report about the 
prospects in the copper fields, but on the very same day he gave a 
much more optimistic report to Seymour. In this he noted that a 
valuable copper discovery had been made near Portage Lake, and 
that the Canal Company owned the adjoining sections of land. He 
suggested that a considerable cash outlay would be justified to prove 
the presence of copper on the company land. Harvey was correct up 
to a point. The copper discovery in 1855 was indeed valuable and 
eventually became the property of the Quincy Mining Company 
(363,001 tons; $27,002,500). However, there was no copper on the 
adjacent lands of the Canal Company.4 
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Harvey did manage to sell some of the non-mineral lands that he 
described as being suitable for agriculture. He told Fairbanks that 
he had sold 680 acres in 1855 at prices that ranged from $5 to $ 12 per 
acre. However, he admitted that he had concluded a number of 
verbal deals, accepting down payments and notes, since he did not 
have proper facilities and forms. This was an excellent way of 
ensuring future trouble. As to the sale of mineral lands, Harvey did 
not expect that Corning would be successful in Europe. When 
released from his orders to sell mineral land, he announced that he 
was getting ready to hire printers and to advertise.5 
In fact, so slowly did the sale of land proceed that all the Canal 
Company officers had been dead for many years when the last of the 
Michigan holdings were disposed of, although men like Corning 
and Fairbanks lived long enough to reap a substantial, if not 
exorbitant, reward for the risks of 1853-55. In 1858 the company's 
officers adopted a plan devised by Harvey to separate the 
management and sale of the mineral lands from that of the pinelands 
in the Lower Peninsula; they formed the Saint Mary's Canal 
Mineral Land Company,6 with Erastus Fairbanks as president. No 
cash changed hands, but in return for 180,991.22 acres in the Upper 
Peninsula, the Canal Company received 15,000 shares of the stock 
of the Mineral Company. These 15,000 shares constituted only a 
quarter of the total stock issue, and the remaining shares were taken 
up by the officers of the Canal Company. In 1860 the same men 
traded 1,625 acres to the Albany and Boston Mining Company in 
return for 10,000 shares of the Albany and Boston stock. Each 
shareholder in the Mineral Company received one share of Albany 
and Boston stock for each four shares of Mineral Company stock 
held. The exchange turned out to be a dubious venture. The Albany 
and Boston Company operated for only ten years and never paid a 
dividend. Its maximum production, in 1865, amounted to only 159 
tons of copper. In the 1880s the property was sold to other interests.7 
Twenty-five years after the death of Corning, the Mineral 
Company still owned lands in the Upper Peninsula. In 1897 the 
Baltic Mining Company organized and purchased land in 
Houghton County from the Mineral Company. By 1925 the Baltic 
Company had paid over $10,000,000 in dividends. In 1899, in what 
was perhaps the most successful single transaction made by 
Coming's successors, the Mineral Company traded more of its land 
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to the Champion Mining Company in return for half of the 
Champion's stock. The Champion Company commenced 
operations in 1902 and was successful for the next twenty-two years. 
During the period it paid dividends of over $29,000,000, of which 
half went to the stockholders of the Mineral Company. In 1931 the 
Copper Range Consolidated Company absorbed both the Cham­
pion Mining Company and the Mineral Company.8 
Despite its success, the Mineral Company sold some of its land 
too soon. During the Civil War it sold to the Iron Cliffs Company 
about 38,000 of its 41,508 acres in Marquette County for a reported 
purchase price of $500,000, a fraction of the eventual value of the 
iron ore on the land. Again, in 1865, the Mineral Company sold 160 
acres to the Calumet Mining Company for $60,000. It was later 
estimated that the mine located on this quarter section was worth 
$13,000,000. It should be noted, however, that because of the crude 
state of mining technology it took the extraordinary efforts of 
Alexander Agassiz to put the Calumet and Hecla on a paying basis. 
The energetic son of Louis Agassiz traded his health for the copper 
wealth of Upper Michigan. In the winter of 1867, he wrote a letter 
that echoed the ones Brooks had written over a decade before: "It is 
fortunate that I am tough, for if I were not I should have broken 
down; but I begin to feel the effect of this infernal work and drive; I 
get fearfully tired." Perhaps Brooks could have managed the same 
feat to the great enrichment of the Mineral Company, but he was too 
busy with railroad affairs to consider it.9 
The original owners of the Mineral Company were unfortunate in 
that they obtained their copper lands at the wrong moment in the 
history of American technology. Alexander Agassiz faced a 
declining market and increased foreign competition even as he 
toiled in the Upper Peninsula. Iron ships did not require copper 
sheathing as did wooden ships, and the decision of the government 
to begin a steel war fleet in the administration of Chester Arthur was 
of no help to the copper industry. Nor were Thomas Edison and 
Alexander Graham Bell, who were barely out of their teens and still 
years away from creating a world demand for copper.10 
The pineland holdings of the Canal Company were also difficult 
to sell or manage. In 1857 Frost published a catalogue of the 
holdings, with lumber statistics and maps. The company offered 
timberland at prices that ranged from $5 to $ 15 per acre, depending 
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upon the quality and quantity of the timber. One-fifth of the 
payment was required at the time of purchase, with the balance due 
in four yearly installments at an interest rate of 6 percent per year. 
Other land located on rivers (probably farmland) was available at 
between $5 and $8 per acre. The following year the company pub­
lished a directors report that included most of the information of­
fered in the catalogue the year before. The trouble was that 1857 and 
1858 were not good years in which to sell land. A combination of fac­
tors, including the withdrawal of British investments in the United 
States and excessive speculation in land and railroads, brought 
about panic and depression—and then came the Civil War.11 
A company stockholder, questioning Forbes about the prospect 
of the sale of land, concluded, "As for the Sault Ste. Marie the pine 
lands must wait for the prairie farmers to build again." However, the 
directors could not wait for the end of the war. In May 1860 the tax-
exempt status of the land expired, and the state of Michigan began 
to tax at once. Two years later the cost of administration and taxes 
for the Canal Company's lands was estimated at $50,000 a year. 
Therefore, in the spring of 1862, the company launched a major 
effort to sell the 100,000-acre tract along the Saginaw River. To 
handle the sale, twelve agencies were established in Detroit, Boston, 
Chicago, Springfield, Albany, Buffalo, New York, and other places, 
including St. Johnsbury, where Fairbanks would try to sell land.12 
Prominent among the new agents was Cyrus Woodman, whose 
reputation as a western land agent was well established by 1862. In 
1847 he had been selected as the Wisconsin Territory's represen­
tative on the River and Harbor executive committee, and before 
that he had served as the western land agent for the Boston and 
Western Land Company, a difficult and exasperating job that did 
little to enhance his local popularity. He was, in the first place, 
responsible for the holdings of absentee landowners. He had to see 
that the lands were protected from trespassers and timber poachers. 
Taxes must be paid promptly. He had to make the best possible 
bargain when selling land because his sole income came from 
commissions. If a sale had been made on a credit basis, he was 
responsible for the collection of the balance plus the interest, a 
difficult duty to perform in a depression. When Woodman accepted 
the agent's position for the Canal Company, he moved to Detroit, 
where he lived for the next two years.13 
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The directors set the minimum price on the Saginaw River land at 
$3 per acre. The terms were one-quarter cash, with the balance due 
in three yearly payments at 7 percent interest per year. In spite of the 
efforts of Woodman and his associates, the sale was a failure. Buyers 
took only 10,000 acres, and of this land less than 40 percent was paid 
for. The problem was twofold. First, in the same months that the 
company advertised its great sale, the Homestead Act went into 
effect with Lincoln's signature, and Michigan was not in the best 
geographical position to furnish lumber where it was now most 
needed, in the trans-Mississippi west; it cost enough to ship lumber 
west from Wisconsin and Minnesota. Second, there was little 
demand for Michigan farmlands. With the rural lads flocking to the 
Army of the Tennessee, the remaining farmers were hard pressed to 
handle the land already under cultivation.14 
The failure of the sale brought about the first major disagreement 
among the directors of the Canal Company. Corning and Fairbanks 
wanted to divide the pine holdings among the stockholders, so that 
each could assume responsibility for the management and sale of his 
own plots. The Boston-based directors and chief stockholders, on 
the other hand, were reluctant to accept a division and personal 
responsibility. This group included Forbes, Nathaniel Thayer, J. N. 
Denison, J. N. A. Griswold, and Brooks, who by 1862 was 
established in Boston as president of the Michigan Central 
Railroad. In the end each side had its way. The Boston men agreed 
to a division if an equitable formula could be found but planned to 
form their own association after the division had been ac­
complished.15 
Fortunately for all concerned, Woodman was available to carry 
out the task. He had performed exactly the same service for the 
Boston and Western Land Company in 1840 to the satisfaction of 
the owners. Now, in 1863, he proceeded to divide the pine holdings 
of the Canal Company into 747 parcels of varying size and value. He 
then published a catalogue in which he described the land parcels, 
estimated the value of each, and announced the terms of sale. At the 
auction stockholders of the Canal Company would be permitted to 
pay for up to 90 percent of their land with company stock. The 
balance was to be paid in cash or Canal Company bonds. The gen­
eral public could purchase on terms of 50 percent down, with the 
balance due in one year at 7 percent interest. Payments by the public 
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were to be in cash or Canal Company bonds. Woodman scheduled 
the auction for 2 September 1863 in Detroit.16 
The event was a success. According to Woodman's calculations, 
land valued at $900,000 was sold, with the majority going to the 
stockholders of the Canal Company. The average price paid was 
$2.20 per acre, and through the auction the company disposed of 
over 400,000 acres. Since the Canal Company had already sold or 
traded over 182,000 acres to the Mineral Company and had made 
other minor sales, its land assets were reduced to less than 150,000 
acres. It is probable that Corning converted all his stock into land, 
since Fairbanks became the new president of the Canal Company 
after the auction. Woodman agreed to continue serving as land 
agent for many of the individual owners.17 
Two months after the Detroit auction, the Boston men formed 
their own organization, the Michigan Pine Land Association. All 
the members still held some stock in the Canal Company, although 
in the articles of association they stated that they had used "a large 
portion" of this stock to purchase land at the Detroit auction. Each 
of the twenty-eight members of the association listed the number of 
Canal Company shares he owned or held in trust for others. Forbes 
still owned 626 shares outright and held 239 in trust. Thayer held 445 
shares, Dennison 300, and Griswold 180. Brooks held 524 shares, an 
indication that he did not exercise his option to purchase more land. 
Altogether, the Boston group owned or controlled after the Detroit 
auction 3,720 shares of the 10,000 shares originally issued. If this 
constituted a "remaining . . . small amount" of stock after the 
auction, as the association members said, the canal at Sault Ste. 
Marie was largely built with Boston capital.18 
The purpose of the association was quite simple. The members 
assigned the management and control of all their Michigan pineland 
to three trustees, Forbes, Brooks, and R. S. Watson. These were 
empowered to develop the land, build sawmills, sell the land, and 
even buy more land. The trustees were also given control of all the 
remaining Canal Company stock held by the members of the 
association in return for a scrip issue. The trustees thereby gained an 
important degree of control over the lands still held by the Canal 
Company; their control increased when, within a few years, 
Woodman became president of the company, succeeding Fair­
banks.19 
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All these transactions meant more work for Woodman. He served 
as the western land agent for the association, for the Canal 
Company, and for many of the individual purchasers at Detroit, 
including Fairbanks. The arrangement must have been complicated 
for Woodman in an era of slow land sales, but it was very convenient 
for eastern owners. For example, in 1864 Woodman had the 
opportunity to dispose of all the pineland holdings along the Pere 
Marquette River. The Canal Company had sold this land at the 
auction for over $111,000, with Corning and the Fairbanks brothers 
each buying about 40 percent and the association buying the rest. By 
selling the entire tract for $200,000, Woodman made a good profit 
for the eastern men and a commission for himself. The purchaser of 
the land was that old friend of the Canal Company, Eber Ward of 
Detroit. Such windfalls were rare, however. In 1865 Woodman sold 
only 9,000 acres for the association for $53,772; in the following year 
he sold 3,000 acres for $26,800. The profits were good, but the 
process was slow.20 
Woodman's management problems were considerable, for he 
represented three classes of absentee owners. Whereas Harvey had 
once stolen timber from public land with relative impunity, now the 
problem was reversed. Michigan Canal Superintendent Elisha 
Calkins reported considerable local hostility as early as 1857, and by 
the 1860s it was found necessary to keep the pinelands under almost 
constant supervision to prevent illegal lumbering and theft. 
Absentee owners were in a vulnerable position. The thieves were 
more popular than the owners, and Woodman found it difficult to 
conduct legal prosecutions, since grand juries were reluctant to 
indict even in the face of conclusive evidence. Woodman also had to 
worry about vengeful poachers setting forest fires on canal lands in 
reprisal for lawsuits.21 
The sale of the pinelands picked up after the Civil War, and in 
1874 the Michigan Pine Land Association closed its books. Be­
cause the transactions took place over so many years and were so 
varied in nature, it is impossible to state in full the profits that 
accrued to the builders of the Sault Canal. Corning still owned 
western land at the time of his death in 1872, when his fortune was 
estimated at $8,000,000. The fortunes of Fairbanks and Forbes were 
involved in too many enterprises to isolate the canal factor of profit, 
although it is certain that Fairbanks did not suffer through his canal 
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activity. He returned to the governor's chair of Vermont to pledge 
his fortune to buy uniforms and equipment for the Vermont 
regiments in the Civil War.22 
Some of the Mineral Company's ventures were failures, as was the 
case with the Albany and Boston Mining Company. Other mineral 
ventures were spectacularly successful. When the Mineral Company 
traded a mere 480 acres in Houghton County for half the Champion 
Mining Company stock, the reward in dividends amounted to over 
10 times the cost of the canal. It was a reward, however, that went to 
a new generation and to men who were clever enough to hold on to 
the Mineral Company stock. It would be a fair, if conservative, 
estimate to state that the men of Coming's generation probably 
received $1.50 in return for every $1.00 paid in response to Pruyn's 
stock calls. As usual, the great fortunes were made by the corporate 
developers who followed the pioneers, the Calumet and Hecla being 
the chief example. At least the Canal Company stockholders did not 
lose their money, although they came dangerously close to it in 1854. 
In contrast, of the 110 companies organized and mining copper in 
Michigan before 1925, only 6 paid dividends between 1845 and 
1865, these totaling $4,658,000. Almost half this sum was paid by 
one company, the Pittsburgh and Boston. Fifty-three companies 
that had launched mining activity before 1865 never paid a single 
dividend. Finally, of course, the Canal Company added to the value 
of its own land in the Upper Peninsula through the building of the 
canal itself.23 
Epilogue

Erastus Corning and his associates saw their venture at the Sault 
primarily as a land speculation. When the canal was completed, they 
had no further interest in it as long as it was not shut down. 
However, if they believed that the canal itself would bring about an 
immediate and substantial increase in the value of their land in the 
Upper Peninsula, they were sorely disappointed. Horace Greeley 
was correct—more than a canal was needed; but he did not go far 
enough, and perhaps Corning in the 1850s did not understand the 
limitations of Greeley's analysis. Indeed, as Greeley wrote, the 
Upper Peninsula needed not only a canal but human resources and 
what those resources could provide: capital, labor, roads, docks, 
harbors. What Greeley failed to understand was that a much-
improved technology was required both east and west of the canal 
before the riches could be grasped. 
West of the canal human resources were obviously at work before 
1855; and the effort continued unabated after that year, but progress 
was hampered by poor technology. For example, the "cars" 
recorded by the canal superintendents as passing westward through 
the canal destined for the iron fields were little more than large carts 
to be pulled by mules over one of the crudest rail roads ever 
constructed. The first steam locomotive did not arrive until 1857, 
and the need for improved mining technology continued long after 
that. A decade after the completion of the canal, Alexander Agassiz 
toiled in the most primitive conditions to bring in the Calumet 
and Hecla. Since history does not usually record the pathetic fail­
ures of small men, there is little knowledge of others who sacri­
ficed as much as Agassiz and lost everything. When Edison and Bell 
created new markets for copper, modern mining technology finally 
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became available—to the enrichment of the Saint Mary's Canal 
Mineral Land Company. Corning, however, was dead, and the 
valuable iron fields had been sold early by the Mineral Company, 
which had failed to understand that iron ore varies in quality 
and composition and must therefore be classified. Men in the iron 
fields in the 1850s who did not grasp this principle or could not 
apply it risked heavy financial loss. 
East of the canal—east to England in fact—the conversion of iron 
to steel also required a technology not yet developed in 1855. The 
principle was already understood by a few, including at least one 
American, William Kelly of Kentucky. Blowing cold air through 
molten iron to oxidize the unwanted carbon would produce steel. In 
the early 1850s Kelly tried the process—and produced malleable 
iron. He could not control the oxidation, and in England Henry 
Bessemer faced the same problem. Over a decade passed before 
Americans found the key, some years after Bessemer discovered it. 
It was no coincidence that after the advance in steel technology 
the original canal became obsolete in about a decade. Improved 
technology both east and west of the canal produced an increasing 
flow of iron ore, which required larger carriers; these in turn 
demanded a canal of new proportions. The Army Corps of 
Engineers took over in 1881 and over the years built four parallel 
one-lock canals that were much faster and permitted the passage of 
larger ships. The "Harvey locks" were removed. 
Although by World War II the Sault canal system was the most 
heavily protected installation in the forty-eight states, the canal was 
an insignificant factor in the Civil War. The war that had begun just 
six years after the completion of Brooks's work was still a war of 
men and horses. Again it was the lack of technology rather than iron 
ore that delayed the exploitation of the mineral wealth of Upper 
Michigan. When the Union lost the United States armory at 
Harpers Ferry in 1861, only one government armory remained, in 
Springfield, Massachusetts. It could turn out only 1,200 rifles per 
month in the critical manufacturing months of 1861 -62. In the same 
period private concerns in the United States produced fewer than 
15,000. The answer was foreign purchase—expensive, often 
corrupt, but necessary. Meanwhile, changing economic conditions 
caused a fluctuation in iron ore shipments through the canal (table 
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2); ore shipments in 1862, the first full year of the Civil War, were 
less than they had been in I860.1 
The economic impact of the canal, though long delayed, was 
ultimately as significant as its builders could have wished. Its social 
impact was also significant—and not entirely favorable. Some 
social loss occurred, and by a stroke of irony the loser was Michigan. 
In 1862 President Lincoln signed the bill once vetoed by James 
Buchanan, the Morrill College Land Grant Act. Michigan 
educators had been among the leaders in demanding the law, which 
granted large areas of the public domain to support agricultural and 
mechanical education in each state. According to the census of 1860, 
Michigan's population entitled the state to six members in the 
House, and thus it was now entitled to 240,000 acres of land. The 
land would be used for the benefit of the institution then known as 
"The Agricultural College of the State of Michigan," now Michigan 
State University. The problem was that the land must be selected 
from the public domain in Michigan, where 750,000 acres had 
already been preempted to build the canal ten years earlier. 
Lumbering interests had purchased Michigan land in the interim, 
and the best farmlands in the Lower Peninsula had been sold by the 
early 1860s. Brooks had once boasted that though the Canal 
Company could not claim all the excellent timberland available, 
nothing left over would be better than the company land. His claim 
was well founded. The Michigan commission under the Morrill Act 
selected almost all its land in the northern third of the Lower 
Peninsula, where the Canal Company had already taken 212,000 
acres, and the quality of the Morrill land was disappointing. 
Approximately one-fifth of it was later described as having "no 
water, no soil, no timber, no grass, no value." Most of the 
undesirable land was returned to the United States in 1927, but 
excellent management of the rest of the grant maximized the 
benefits for Michigan education. Nevertheless, the canal land grant 
represented a definite social loss.2 
Overriding the social loss was the major social gain produced by 
the original canal and its successors, a saving in the cost of steel. 
Bulk commodities, including iron ore, travel more cheaply by water 
than by any other means. If, for example, great iron ranges had been 
found in Nebraska instead of Michigan and Minnesota, American 
EPILOGUE 171 
industry would have exploited them just as rapidly; but it would 
have been more expensive. Cheap, high-quality steel was indispen­
sable to American economic development, and the St. Mary's Falls 
Canal played a vital role to that end. 

Appendix 
The Crow of Victory 
Utica June 1. 1855 
Hon Erastus Corning 
Dear Sir 
After bidding you good bye at the Detroit Depot thursday afternoon 
Governor Fairbanks Attorney General Howard and myself went safely to 
Lansing arriving there at three o'clock in the morning after a ride over logs 
that turned our pantaloons into corduroys by the "Stamp Act" 
At Lansing we found all the State Officers.— Frost informed us that 
Mr McKinney was particularly short and crusty— Mr Frost and the 
State Clerks compared papers in the morning, I joined in this exercise and 
repeated over "half "quarter" . . . "North West" and "South East" until 
my tongue was cut up into quarter sections at all points of the compass. 
The governor went to work in his quiet but effective way to adjust the 
State Scales which at that time acted very much as if they would kick the 
beam against us. By night the Governor had every State Officer on "Fair­
banks Platform" What he said and did I can not tell but I will give you a 
sample. 
After dinner he said to Mr Howard about thus— "Now Sir we have 
been here all the morning and it is time that we should be informed what to 
expect from Mr McKinney" Mr Howard replied "I can not control 
him" to this the Governor answered— "That may be so but the opinion 
is rife that you can, and the public will hold you responsible" 
Remembering our pleasant interview with Mr McKinney on board the 
Illinois, I kept away from him until I suppose he began to imagine I 
intended to avoid him. I met him accidentally about 4 o clock in the 
afternoon and hesitated about shaking hands with him, but he advanced 
towards me and shook my hand with a decided squeeze, this was such a 
good symptom that I followed it up by telling him, and Howard, and Jones 
that we had been unfortunate with Mr McKinney. That while on the boat 
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you thought it best to consult with him as to what might properly be done 
to expedite our business, and for that purpose I looked him up and found 
him playing eucre— that I knew it was bad policy to take a man away 
from a pleasant game to attend to business, but we were obliged to do it.— 
that the first word he said to you was offensive to you— and that the 
first word you spoke to him he drew himself up as straight as a friend ot 
mine who some times stood so straight that he fell over backwards— 
When I said this he laughed and exclaimed "I won't fall over back­
wards" 
In the midst of this conversation, in came Brooks like a fresh 
locomotive— the certificates were all on hand. Howard hurried Mr 
McKinney off to his room, and in half an hour he began to sign and seal the 
patents, the mineral first then the pine lands. I drew up a written transfer 
of the Canal which Mr Howard preferred to the one which he drew. Mr 
Brooks and I signed and kept it until half past seven when Mr McKinney 
handed me forty patents and then I delivered to him the transfer of the 
Canal the canal was the last thing that was given up— 
Then you never saw happier faces, and you have no idea how friendly 
all of the State Officers were— they were our warm friends— they had 
always been.— did not they show us that they would do their duty.— 
The next morning they drove to Jackson with us in our wagons— 
took passes on the railroad from Mr Brooks— and they fussed with us 
in all things, in short, they were the Canal Company and had just got their 
lands. 
Mr McKinney requested me to tell you that you did not understand 
him on the boat, that he was not so bad a man after all— in fact he was 
"all right."— It is due to Mr Howard to say that from the moment you 
announced to him— "that it was quite as important for the State, that he 
should go to Lansing as it was for us"— he appeared to act in perfect 
good faith— indeed I did not present to Mr Howard any paper that he 
did not agree to without changing a word.— 
Mr Brooks made the quickest time to Lansing on record.— When 
we reached Detroit we found rejoicing and congratulations from all sides 
except from Sherman, and he swore enough to make every body satisfied 
that he deserved his defeat— Saturday night and Sunday I was complete­
ly prostrated— Monday Mr Ledyard gave the 4 governors and us a 
handsome dinner— Tuesday Governor Fairbanks Mr Frost and I re­
turned via the Batavia land office— on Wednesday Governor Fairbanks 
delivered to Mr Corning 40 patents for 750,000 acres of land and when he 
did it I thought I could hear some one say — "All right" 
Very Truly Yours 
John F. Seymour 
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made the first passage through the locks to 
open the canal to commerce with little of the 
fanfare and a good deal more disillusionment 
than had accompanied the opening of the Erie 
Canal a quarter of a century earlier. 
In many ways, the canal that was so sorely 
needed and so long awaited proved a dismal 
disappointment during the early years of its 
operation. Speculators who believed that it 
would bring about an immediate and dramatic 
rise in land values saw their hopes dashed; and 
the expected growth and rapid expansion in 
the demand for iron was similarly to prove 
unfounded. Horace Greeley had been right, it 
seemed, when, a number of years earlier, he 
had said that more than a canal was needed to 
realize the potential of the area, and had called 
for larger investments and an augmentation of 
the labor force in order to construct new 
roads, docks, and harbors. What Greeley had 
failed to foresee, however, and what turned 
out to be the crucial ingredient in the ultimate 
success of the venture was the technology by 
which iron was converted to steel. When that 
became a reality, the canal's promise was ful­
filled; and the nation that was only a congeries 
of small business enterprises in 1860 embarked 
upon an industrial development undreamed of 
before the Civil War, to become the industrial 
giant of the modern world. 
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